



CARANA Country Study Scenario-Based Exercise

Light Version Package

for United Nations Staff Officers Specialised Training
Materials

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* Please refer to the CARANA Country Study complete Package for this Item.

Disclaimer:

The CARANA Country Study has been developed as a fictitious scenario for learning and peacekeeping training purposes. Reference to any country, group or organization does not reflect the position of the UN or the foreign policy stance of such country, group or organization.



General Instructions

1. General

The purpose of the "CARANA Light Version Package" is to provide you with the essential information available about the hypothetical CARANA country and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), which may be necessary for the Learning Activities (LA) of Lesson 3.5 – United Nations Military Decision-Making Process (UN MDMP) and Scenario-Based Exercise (SBE) of the United Nations Staff Officers (UNSO) course.

The information in this package is important for you to effectively participate in the LA of Lesson 3.5 and the SBE, so that you are more confident and well-equipped to tackle day-to-day situations in Force and Sector HQs, and able to support the operational and tactical decision-making process using the UN MDMP once deployed in a UNPKO.

Therefore, it will be extremely important that you carefully read the content of this package to perform the activities well in the UNSO course.

2. Method

Self-paced (reading)

3. Duration

3 (three) working days (approximately 2 hours per day). It is suggested that participants read this package during their free time in the first 3 days of the UNSO course.

4. Content

CARANA country study and the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

5. Aim

The overall aim of the "CARANA Light Version Package" is to equip participants with the information needed for the Learning Activities and Scenario-Based Exercise of the United Nations Staff Officers course.

CARANA – COUNTRY STUDY

The Country Study provides a short overview of the essential aspects of the country and the conflict.

The information reflected in the Country study has been collected through:

- Public sources (internet, publications)
- Information provided by International Organizations represented in Carana
- Information provided by UN Member States




Figure 1 – 8th Continent

1. Carana Country fact sheet

| Republic of Carana | |
|---------------------------|---|
| Country name: | Republic of Carana (conventional long form); Carana (short form) |
| Government type: | Republic |
| Capital: | Galasi (1.28 million legal inhabitants) |
| Districts / Provinces: | Fellari, Guthar, Leppko, Barin, Hanno, Mahbek, Tereni, Koloni |
| Independence: | 22 October 1986 |
| Executive branch: | Chief of state: President Jackson Ogavo, |
| Head of government: | Prime Minister William Degusa |
| Legal system: | Based on the national constitution and a legal code from 2013. Customary law is also observed based on unwritten traditional practices for the indigenous sector. |
| Political parties: | Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC) |
| Flag description: | Green, blue and white. An armillary sphere in the middle represents the Portuguese heritage (found on their flag as well). The writing in the Wheel Says: Notre (French = our), Patria (Italian = Country), Carana, as well as the Year of Self-Governance (not independence). Within the wheel are three diamonds, which not only symbolize one of the country's natural resources, but which also represent each ethnic group. The cross is also indicative of Carana's colonial history and Christian roots. |
| Population | |
| Population: | 17,024,561 (last census conducted 2015) |
| Population growth: | 3.6 % (annual growth rate) |
| Age Distribution | <p style="text-align: right;"><15 : 44 % 15 to 18 : 13 % 18 to 60 : 39 % >60 : 4 %</p> |
| Fertility Rate | 5.1 children per woman |
| Sex Ratio | 1.06 females/male |
| Infant Mortality | 9.1 deaths per 100 live births |
| Life Expectancy | Total population: 45.3 years Male: 42.1 years Female: 47.9 years |
| Disability | An estimated 14% of the population have physical and mental disabilities, including due to conflict- and mine/UXO-related injuries. |
| Languages: | In Carana there are more than 20 original languages or tribal dialects spoken. The official and administrative language is French. |
| Ethnic groups: | Falin 60 %, Kori 20 %, Tatsi 15 %. |
| Religions: | Roman Catholic (40%), Protestant Lutherans or Baptists (35%), Muslims (20%), all with mixed in indigenous beliefs (45%) |
| Literacy: | 40% of adult population can read and write (77.5% males, 62% females); 20% of youth can read and write (under 18) |

| Economy | As of 2015 |
|---------------------------------|--|
| GDP: | 14,05 billion |
| GDP per Capita: | \$ 825 US dollars |
| GDP composition by sector | Agriculture: 27% Manufacturing: 16% Mining: 32% Services: 25% |
| GDP growth | 1919 to 2000: average 3% per year 2015: -4% 2016: -2.5% 2017: -2.8% 2018: -2.9% |
| Labour force: | 10.2 million |
| Labour force by occupation: | Agriculture: 50% Industries: 10% Mining: 10% Services: 30% |
| Country Comparison to the World | 174 rd |
| Inflation rate | 12,35% |
| Unemployment rate: | Total: N/A. In urban areas more than 29% |
| Population below poverty line: | 45% |
| Agriculture products: | fruits, vegetables, grains, fish |
| Export commodities: | fruits, vegetables, textiles, mineral goods, frozen fish |
| Export partners: | US, France, Italy, Germany, Portugal, China, Sumora, Rimoso |
| Imports: | machinery equipment, transportation equipment, communication and electronics equipment, manufactured goods, foodstuffs |
| Import partners: | France, Italy, Portugal, China |
| Currency code: | Carana Franc (CF) 100 CF = 1.5 \$ US |
| Infrastructure | |
| Communication: | Supported by telegraphy, telephone and weak (unreliable) radio connections. |
| Railways: | Two railway tracks operated by Carana Rail (CR), from Galasi to Akkabar and the other from Maldosa to Mia. There are also 'land-trains' hauled by enormous tractors. |
| Highways: | A number of paved roads and highways remain intact, though there are a number of unpaved roads and tracks that are fairly robust. Car and coach are the most predominant forms of transportation. |
| Airports: | International airports (Galasi, Corma), 4 local (Alur, Folsa, Amsan, Mia). Additionally there are basic 25 airfields around the country. None of these airfields has paved runways. The length and quality of facilities at each airfield varies considerably. |
| Ports and Harbours: | 3 (Galasi, Cereni, Maldosa) |

2. Introduction

In November 2020, negotiations for a ceasefire and peace agreement, the Kalari Peace Treaty, give hope to end almost 10 years of civil war and a legacy of ethnic discrimination and conflict. Negotiations facilitated by the Fasia Union, the ceasefire agreement foresees that a United Nations mandated mission would take over from the Fasia Union Advisory Mission in Carana (FUAMC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire as well as in the stabilisation of the country.

Despite the cessation of violence, Carana remains a politically unstable country and a transitional government under the leadership of President Ogavo has had limited success in re-establishing order and the rule of law in the country. Small uprisings and violent clashes still occur in the rebel-controlled regions of West and South Carana.

The United Nations Security Council recently considers the creation of a UN Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to assist the parties in implementing the Peace Agreement, to support in the country's transition into a secure and peaceful democracy and to make recommendations for the establishment of a UNAC. UNHQ is planning the mission to date using its internal capacities.

The document and its annexes are provided as pre-reading to allow course participants to become familiar with the scenario that will be used throughout the complete course. They reflect the first information/material based on which UNHQ prepares strategical and technical assessments. At later stages, they may also serve as an introduction to the new Mission Leadership Team (MLT) by UNHQ.

3. Geography of Carana

Location

Carana is located on the East coast of the Fasia continent. The total area of Carana is 119,480 km² with 300 km coastline. Carana has land boundaries of 1500 km with its neighbouring countries, Rimosa (southern border), Katasi (western border) and Sumora (northern border).

Hydrography

The three main rivers in Carana, the Kalesi, Mogave and Torongo, flow from the western highlands in an easterly direction and discharge in the ocean. The huge Kalesi River is very salty, like the Dead Sea, and almost divides the country into equal halves. It discharges in a large delta with surrounding swamplands. Though all major rivers are in principle navigable, only the Torongo mouth is the site of a major port (Maldosa) and thus the only waterway used for larger cargo transportation. Two dams along the Kalesi and Mogave are used to produce electricity. Carana has no large natural lakes.

Vegetation

Carana was originally completely covered by jungle and dense bush land. Over the last century, the central and eastern areas have been cleared and cultivated, being used for agricultural purposes. Even though the soil in Carana is fertile, the intensive use of the land as pasture has left large areas barren and useless for agricultural purposes.

Approximately 20 % of the total area is currently in use for growing grain, millet, vegetables and fruit. The West and South of the country is still covered by jungle and dense bush land. Small areas in the jungle are used for agricultural purposes.

Topography

Carana is topographically divided into two major areas: the plains in the eastern and central parts of the country and the highlands in the West and Southwest areas. The terrain in Carana generally increases in elevation from East to West from sea level to a height of 1200 m.

The composition of the ground is mostly flat and sandy with insignificant areas of rocky, steep terrain. The terrain along the coastline is flat with no cliffs or rocks. The water is calm but with only a few areas suitable for deep-water ships.




Figure 2 – Carana Topographic Map

Climate and Weather

The west of Carana experiences heavy rainfalls (monsoons) from August to October with an average precipitation rate of 250 mm a month and mild temperatures throughout the year. During winter season, especially at higher elevations, temperatures might fall towards the freezing point. In summertime, one sees colourful vegetation and karst mountains.

The north of Carana has a milder climate. There are pine forests and many trees, though it is also possible to find rough deserts and mountains. The northern coast of central Carana has a lot of inlets especially around the Kalesi River Delta. Most time of the year the weather is mild, expect for the mountain areas in the North-West of Carana.

In the East and South of Carana the weather is mainly hot and dry with an average daily temperature during the dry season is 36°C. Palm trees and desert plants are the typical vegetation in the southern part of Carana. However, there are also very green highlands and the presence of the Torongo River enriches the region with minerals like diamond and copper.

Natural Resources

Carana is rich in natural resources, which are not equally dispersed throughout the country. In the jungle-covered mountains of the West, rare wood and timber are the main natural resources. Diamonds are found along the Kalesi River in the provinces of Mahbek and Barin. Copper is mined in the highlands West of Mia. Coal is mined in the province of Hanno. Further alkali metals (lithium, sodium, potassium, etc.) are found in Central Carana as well as oil off the southern coastline of Carana.

The soil in Carana is naturally fertile. The rivers and coastal waters are rich in fish.

4. People and Culture

Human Geography

Human development in Carana has been shaped by differences in climate zones, creating a divided society featuring disparate social structures organized around different modes of subsistence. The most salient cleavage is between the semi-nomadic pastoralists inhabiting the pasturelands in the southwest, and the largely sedentary farmers and miners in the east.

Population

Major cities: Galasi, Maroni, Amsan, Cereni, Turen, Maldosa, Corma, Folsa, Sureen, Alur, Faron (100,000 to 1 million).

Ethnic Distribution

The population of Carana consists of more than 15 ethnic groups. Most of these groups are small in number and socially and politically marginalised. The three major ethnic groups, the Falin, Kori and Tatsi represent 95% of the population. The Kori (20%) live in the West and are the dominant ethnic group in the provinces of Tereni and Koloni. The Falin (60%) are the ethnic majority in the country and mainly live in the East and centre of Carana. The Tatsi (15%) live in the South and are the majority in Leppko Province.

The national boundaries result from the colonial time and do not represent the ethnic distribution of the region. The Falin make up 54% of the population of neighbouring Sumora, the Kori make up 65% of the population of Katasi and the Tatsi make 95% of the population of Rimosa.

Religion

According to the last census conducted in 2015 about 75% of the population of Carana are Christian. About 35% of the population are Protestant Lutherans and Baptists, while 40% are Roman Catholic. Islam is practised by over 20% of the population, mainly in the South/West. The vast majority of Muslims are Sunni, who overwhelmingly live in the West of Carana. However, there are small but active Shia communities in the South of Carana and along the coastal plains. Several Sunni groups are extremist in nature and have instituted Sharia Law in the southwestern areas of Leppko. On the other hand, syncretism and indigenous beliefs form a vital part of many Caranians' religious experience.

In terms of ethnic distribution, the majority of the Falin are predominantly Christians, while most of the Kori and Tatsi are Sunni Muslim. Indigenous beliefs, which have been embedded in the main religious, are practised by parts of the population.

The 2013 Constitution (suspended) provides for freedom of religion while prohibiting certain forms of religious fundamentalism. Christian holidays are celebrated as national holidays. Missionary groups within Carana are tolerated and include Lutherans, Baptist, Grace Brethren and Jehovah's witnesses. They tend to operate only in the West and South. The Catholic Church is influential in Falin occupied territories.

5. History

Carana historically formed a vital part of the ancient and early modern trading hub Fasia, as described in Briefing 01–Fasia.

Colonial Period

The invading powers faced significant resistance by local kingdoms, the most bloody of which the kingdom of Galasi upheld. The Italian army finally conquered the kingdom in 1898 and established formal colonial rule. After the Italian defeat in World War I, the French government took over the territory as French protectorate and developed the country according to their policy of “assimilation” with Galasi to remain the capital city. Since the French administration focused on the exploitation of the natural resources and accepted the tribal structure in the country, as well as the role of local authority, the period between 1919 and 1979 was relatively calm and peaceful.

The following period was characterised by rapidly evolving civil unrest based on the increasingly popular movement for national liberation. From 1979 unrest and riots were frequent and developed into more organised actions and violence against the colonial power. In the beginning of 1982, the French lost control of most of the country outside the capital and the main coastal cities. To retain a minimum level of control, the French were forced to agree to certain forms of cooperation and to an autonomous State of Carana. In 1984 the legal status of Carana changed from a French protectorate to a Republic of the French Community. Carana was finally granted full independence from France on 22 October 1986.

Because of a long period of colonial rule, a strong influence on nearly all-cultural, social and economic aspects of the country is still visible, and in some areas still dominates. Important parts of the infrastructure, particularly the railway and road systems were built during the colonial period and have not been improved until now. The architecture of the political/administrative system in Carana also reflects the strong French influence imposed over recent decades.

Post-Colonial Period

After gaining independence, and although being faced with multiple challenges, Carana experienced about 10 years of decent development and stability, first under a communist/socialist system lead by Falin-backed President Joseph Uroma, then after a military coup in 1991 by the former Chief of the Falin dominated Army Christian Hakutu, who re-established links with France and other Western countries. The successor regime under the Falin General Tarakoni, in power until 2003, facilitated humanitarian, human rights and economic crises as well as strong civil political opposition. The death of General Tarakoni in February 2003, however, created an opening for the country's first democratic elections in many years, where Jackson Ogavo, a Falin, from the Parti Democratique de Carana (PDC) was elected President in April 2003.

During the early years, some economic and social reforms were realised but over time, Ogavo's focus changed, and he became preoccupied with suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Since 2008 he expanded the influence of the central government

on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. Ogavo was re-elected for four consecutive terms (2003, 2008, 2013, 2018), though opposition to his regime began to grow early 2010 due to a lack of economic growth and increasing discrimination against Kori and Tatsi members by the ruling – and predominantly Falin – party. All opposition to the government was met with either the threat or use of armed force, and eventually escalated into civil conflict in January 2014.

Current developments

Starting in 2014 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better-organised rebel groups known as Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in some local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the West. In February 2016 the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program and failed to capitalise on their success. Their only clearly stated aim was to remove Ogavo from power. Early 2018 the MPC gained control of the three provinces in the West (Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek).

Low level but frequent MPC operations in the West increasingly tied down the FDC, leaving it with weak capability in the south of the country in Leppko province, and creating an opportunity for elements of the predominantly Muslim Tatsi minority to attack government institutions. Initially this amounted to little more than a few localised incidents, but it quickly escalated into more radicalised activities including particularly brutal reprisals against ethnic Falin civilians. Realising that the government could do little against them, a number of these small rebel groups united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC). Both the MPC and the CISC took as their initial aim the removal of President Ogavo from power, though cooperation between the two groups has been minimal.

All parties have suffered numerous defeats, though the civilian population of Carana has been particularly targeted by all parties, leading to an estimated 150,000 killed from violence, famine or disease. The CISC's exploitation of resources in the south has helped fuel their efforts, while the MPC has exploited diamonds and has been receiving external support from the neighbouring country of Katasi. A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of both the MPC and CISC, as well as President Ogavo, to start negotiating a cease-fire and peace treaty in November 2020. The "Kalari Peace Treaty" will most likely mandate all parties to disarm and establish a power-sharing arrangement in a new transitional government, including integration in a new Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC) and take over from the Fasia Union Advisory Mission in Carana (FUAMC) to assist in overseeing and verifying the ceasefire.

6. International relations

Neighbouring Countries

Sumora is the main trading partner of Carana in the region. The relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally good, with ethnic Falin making up approx. 54 % of the population. In the recent past, the government of Sumora has tended to support the position of President Ogavo.

The relations between Carana and **Katasi** are strained. Carana repeatedly accused Katasi of supporting the MPC rebels with money, weapons and fighters; these allegations were not without foundation and have been corroborated by reports from a number of international organisations, although the scale of support remains unclear. The government of Carana does therefore lay the blame for its inability to deal with the MPC at Katasi's door. By supporting the MPC, Katasi hoped the fall of the Ogavo regime would lead to better trade relations with Carana. These hopes have been stalled, both by the continued regime and the El Hasar insurgency further straining the relationship. Following a request by the Government of Katasi, French Forces are conducting Counter Insurgency Operations (COIN) operations against El Hasar. El Hasar fighters have now been evading into West Carana, causing instability and insecurity as they conduct attacks against the local population to obtain logistics supplies.

The relations between Carana and **Rimosa** are also tense. Rimosa has been in the grips of a civil war between two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi, who hold nearly all positions of power in the Rimosan government, and the Muslim minority of the Ellassi, pastoralists who claim that they suffer ethnic discrimination and persecution. Most of the interethnic fighting in Rimosa has taken place in northern Rimosa, near the border of Carana. The rebel group Ellassi Liberation Front (ELF) has waged a guerrilla-style campaign against government forces and pro-government Tatsi militias and has established links to the CISC for financial and logistics support. All aforementioned groups at times cross the border into Carana and conduct raids for obtaining food and supplies, posing a threat to the local population.

In addition, there is a political dispute between Rimosa and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well as over related fishing rights in the respective national territory. Oil was also discovered in the Labta Sea in the southeast of Carana, offshore of Maldosa. However, due to the ongoing border dispute and the high start-up-costs required for the exploiting of the oil resources, no company or consortium is currently willing to invest.

Caranese refugees (particularly the Falin) in Sumora and Rimosa have been consistently discriminated and are often under attack by local police and armed forces. Rimosan (Tatsi) refugees in Carana and Katasi face similar treatment, as do Katasi refugees to a lesser extent.

Membership in International Organisations

Carana is a member of the Fasia Union (FU). Its main goal is to have a common political and diplomatic representation / voice for the six Fasia member states as well as to improve the

continent's economic development. Carana has also been a member of the United Nations since 09 October 1987 and Member of the Fasia Union since 23 October 2005.

On occasion, however, the FU has brought political and diplomatic pressure to bear when tensions arise between some of the Member States of the Union. Since Mid-2013 the FU has attempted to mediate between the warring factions in Carana. In February of that year, it did succeed in bringing the main groups to the negotiating table, only to see the opportunity for peace slip away when a member of the Sumoran government, who held the FU presidency, was accused of arranging arms shipments to President Ogavo. The allegations were subsequently proven unfounded but too late to save the talks.

The state of Mosana assumes the rotating FU presidency at the end of 2019. Being more distant from Carana, Mosana has the advantage of not being seen to have any stake in the Carana conflict and has pledged to renew the FU efforts to resume negotiations.

International Trade

45 foreign companies (from Anglo and Western Europe and more recently from Asia) rival the quest for mineral and other natural resources of Carana. France is one of the main trading partners in military goods with Rimosa, which is providing support to the CISC in Carana. In general, Carana's trade balance reflects its colonial legacy: with industry capacities limited to the food sector, exports comprise mainly raw goods (timber, diamonds, copper, cotton and to a lesser extent fish, fruit and woodcrafts) and processed food to other emerging markets. In contrast, manufactured goods (industrial products, vehicles, food, and petroleum products), services, official development assistance (7.3% of GNI) and remittances (3.6% of GNI) comprise the spectrum of imported goods and capital, mainly from France, the US and other Western nations.

7. Economic System

The economy in Carana is based on a free market system with free enterprise but with strong government participation and influence. The government controls the mining sector and all foreign trade activity; however, rebels groups control some major diamond mining areas.

Mining

The mining of coal, diamonds and copper is an important contributor to the GDP. Hanno district has several coal mines in Akkabar and Maroni; Kika produces diamonds from the Gachal and Herla swamps. Copper is also mined in Lora and being exported via Maldosa. Due to the conflict and weak infrastructure, exports, however, are only at about 15% of possible capacity.

Before 1997, the mining industry was controlled by private enterprises but since then the government has progressively taken control of the industry. Illegal exploitation of natural resources and exportation by private businesses to neighbouring countries is rife and armed groups and rogue security force elements are heavily involved.

Along with rare wood, timber and cotton, diamonds and copper are the main export of Carana. Coal is mostly used in the country for production of electricity.

Oil Exploration

Oil is also found in the Labta Sea in the southeast of Carana, offshore of Maldosa. Initial exploration and export have commenced, however, due to the unresolved border conflict and ownership of the oil resources between Carana and Rimoso, international investors / corporations are reluctant to invest. Neither Carana nor Rimoso have the financial capacity to further develop infrastructure for exploration or refining the oil resources.

Manufacturing

The main activities in this sector are the food and fish industries, production of goods for local markets, and the processing of timber and textiles. The manufacturing sector suffers from a lack of infrastructure, skilled workers, an inefficient administration and widespread corruption. Manufacturing contributes 16% to the GDP.

- Metallurgic industry (creating useful objects from metals): both heavy and light (e.g. machine building, shipyards)
- Textile industry - All major cities have a clothing factory.
- Food industry - Food-preparing factories are built across the country to bottle and can many things. Food storage facilities (silos) are mostly located in the northwest region of Carana.

Agriculture

Providing 27% of the GDP and roughly 50% of the labour force employed, agriculture is a relatively large sector in the economy of Carana. The Northeast and Central Region of Carana produce large quantities of agricultural produce that not only feed the people of Carana but are also used

for export. The soil is fertilized by using the "slash-and-burn" technique on a large scale. Products are fruits, corn, grain sesame seed, cocoa, coffee, ginger, groundnut, coconut, rice and maize.

Most of the agricultural land exists as small farm lots owned by the local population. Cotton is the only commodity produced on large farms using employed labour.

Approximately 31% of the total land area of Carana is used for agricultural purposes.

8. Political System

Government

Carana is a Presidential Republic in line with the first Carana constitution adopted by a referendum in 1987. The President is serving as head of state, elected for a five-year term. The head of the government is the Prime Minister, who is appointed by the President. The Prime Minister appoints the ministers and heads of the government departments.

A Parliament with 256 elected members has broad authority and was intended to be representative of the ethnic balance of the country. Under the Ogavo regime, the oversight functions of the parliament as foreseen in the Constitution were merely ornamental and there was no actual institutional counterweight to the personal rule of Ogavo. The Commission on Defence and Security of the Parliament is weak and has limited power in the effective democratic control of the security sector.

Although the constitution supports a democratic political system, President Ogavo has gradually suppressed any effective opposition and since 2013 Carana has effectively been a one-party state. Today the only legal political party is the Falin-dominated PDC (Parti Démocratique de Carana). All members of parliament are members of the PDC or have close ties to the PDC.

Administration

The state of Carana is divided, following the French model, into eight provinces (Tereni, Koloni, Mahbek, Hanno, Barin, Fellari, Guthar, and Leppko) and a special capital zone of Galasi. The President appoints the governors who are the administrative heads of the provinces, and report directly to the President. The administrative system of Carana is a centre-orientated administration. The central government controls most governmental issues.

The central government has intervened particularly in Hanno, Barin, and Leppko provinces to assure the selection of local District Heads predominantly from among the Falin group, who are often outsiders. Appointments to Head arrondissements in Galasi have been at the demand of the President, and usually awarded to cronies (close associates and friends of the government).

9. Judicial System and Police

Legal System

In theory, the Constitution and judicial (legal) system in Carana is based on modern democratic principles comprising three levels of courts: Supreme Court, provincial and district courts.

De facto, the judiciary sector has lacked institutional capacity and resources for years and has suffered from limited territorial coverage, with no actual presence in some districts, and endemic corruption. Basic administrative tools are missing, and, as a result, the case management flow does not work properly and response times for cases are extremely long. This has also exacerbated the overcrowding of prisons, from which convicts regularly manage to escape. Salaries of judicial staff often are unpaid for months, leading to absenteeism and corruption. Meanwhile, legislation remains outdated and often discriminatory against women, ethnic minorities and other vulnerable groups. In some regions, local traditional authorities hold considerable influence over the district courts or act as de facto legal authorities in parallel to or in the absence of the state system.

Under the State of Emergency imposed in March 2018 a system of mixed civilian/military courts with very limited rights of appeal has been put in place to try all treason, terrorist and other similar cases. Carana courts regularly impose the death penalty for serious crimes.

In 2017, the Interior Ministry also ran 10 jails, with room for 20,000 inmates, though among these, only three are still in operation with a nominal capacity of some 2,000 inmates.

Police and Civil Security

Prior to the conflict, the Carana police was organized under the Ministry of Interior, based on Western principles. In general, especially in the urban areas the police were sufficiently trained and equipped and functioned according to those principles. Due to the conflict and the domination of the military confrontation, all parties to the conflict neglected the police force in Carana.

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. CNP are located in population centres and are controlled by the Ministry of Interior via the provincial administration. The Gendarmerie is part of the Ministry of Defence and maintains the police presence in rural areas and is responsible for border security. However, in recent years the Gendarmerie has been used more often to suppress opposition political groups than for rural security or border control. In addition, FDC army units often undertake policing tasks in the internal security role, often on an ad hoc basis.

In recent years, CNP and Gendarmerie have suffered a critical shortage of qualified personnel, aging staff, low morale because of unpaid salaries, lack of logistical and financial resources, and training. Police corruption is a severe problem in most government-controlled areas. Police stations have little or no equipment, while the police-training centre is basically a building shell. Within government-controlled areas, a national police presence is visible but not able to deal efficiently with the high level of crime. Police detention facilities are overcrowded and in a dilapidated state. In addition, they have been plagued by heavy politicisation, corruption and mismanagement.

Police presence in Carana is very low. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers' amounts to 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,700 citizens. Out of this number, only 5 % are female officers and they are in largely administrative roles. The majority of police are ethnic Falin, including in areas populated mainly by minorities.

In the rebel-controlled areas, there is no governmental police presence. In the West, the MPC took over basic police functions to maintain civil order, while in the CISC area there is no policing at all.

Land and marine border policing, immigration, customs, port authority and other related sectors of internal security have ceased to function. In recent months, evidence of organised criminal activities, especially drug and human trafficking as well as diamond smuggling have come to light, in some cases involving collusion or active participation by law enforcement officials.

Crime rates particularly in population centres are high and there are numerous reports of human rights abuses and looting perpetrated by the law enforcement agencies. A small group of officers has been involved in reported human rights abuses. This inefficiency and erosion of professional standards has led to a widespread loss of their credibility and trust within the population.

10. Public Services

Carana School System

In comparison to other countries within the region, Carana originally had a well-developed educational system, which includes first, second and third level education. Prior to the outbreak of war, Carana had one of the best-developed educational systems in the region.

The formal school system in Carana follows a 7-3-2-2 pattern. This pattern represents primary, lower secondary, upper secondary and pre-tertiary levels respectively. The Université de Carana, Institut de Technologie Carana (the Carana Institute of Technology), provides education and training at the post-secondary level, in both academic and professional fields. The Carana Nursing College and various technical and vocational education institutions and training centres provide further opportunities.

Carana Medical System

The Carana Medical system before the conflict was sufficiently developed and structured. Hospitals were available in the major cities (Galasi, Maroni, Sureen, Alur, Faron, Folsa, Cereni, Corma, Turen and Maldosa) and mid-level cities had decent health facilities (clinics and/ or health stations). Because of the civil war and economic policy abortive developments, the medical situation of the population has deteriorated dramatically. Even in the regions that are not affected by the civil war, the range and quality of medical services deteriorated, and medical support / supply are insufficient. In addition, the supply with drinkable or potable water represents a problem in some regions.

Postal Services

The Carana Post Office provides postal and money-transfer services, as well as postal savings accounts. Its 1,580 post offices and other facilities handled more than 7 million items each workday in 2000, delivering mail to some 5 million addresses. In its first year in power, the PDC opened at least 70 new post offices and upgraded many others in previously ill served areas. It also installed an estimated 700,000 new mailboxes at private addresses and in post-office box locations. Carana was admitted to the Universal Postal Union in 1992, enabling it to participate in international technical assistance programs and accounting facilities within the Union.

Telecommunications

The landline telephone system covers less than 20% of the country and is unreliable. Cellular telephone coverage is expanding and generally covers the main towns and routes throughout the country. Some of the more remote border areas can access nodes in neighbouring countries. Governmental institutions and major companies also use satellite communications, particularly in the more remote areas.

Media

There are approximately 20 daily newspapers, two radio stations and two television channels in the country. The radio stations are operated by state cooperatives while most newspapers are

privately owned. The two largest newspapers are government owned and the Catholic Church publishes another. Additionally, there are some low power, community radio stations and locally printed media with local and very limited distribution. A few months ago, MPC started producing a regional newspaper and operating one radio station. International newspapers are only available in Galasi. National newspapers are available in the provincial capitals and in some other towns.

In principle, the Ministry of Information controls all media. The censorship is very limited in the case of the small, local media but nearly absolute in the case of the official radio stations and main newspapers. A significant part of the population is very active on social media, which they can access through mobile phones. Social media is used as a tool for awareness raising and democratic mobilisation, but also to spread hate speech and incite to ethnic violence.

11. Infrastructure

Roads

Carana has a system of capable paved roads, which connect most parts of the country and key urban centres. In the West and the North, these roads also ensure cross border travel with neighbouring countries. Most paved roads can withstand the effects of the monsoon season.

Carana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks. Unpaved roads and tracks are mostly very vulnerable against significant rains and floods and deteriorate quickly if not maintained. The years of civil war, harsh weather, minimal investment and maintenance have degraded it significantly with the result that the road network is often impassable in the rainy season.

Bridges along the paved roads are normally steel and concrete constructions, which can carry trucks and heavy vehicles. Bridges along the unpaved roads are normally of wooden construction and must be assessed individually.

Railways

The two railway tracks running with a total length of 280 km between Galasi - Akkabar and Maldosa - Mia are both operational but not dependable. The entire track system and loading facilities were built during the colonial period. Even though the track from Maroni to Akkabar is operational, the northern line ends in Maroni because the railway bridge west of Maroni was damaged by flooding in March 2020. The stations in Galasi, Maroni, Akkabar and Maldosa are sufficiently equipped for loading and unloading of containers, vehicles and all types of goods. The station in Mia is specialized for the transport of copper and has no container facilities. A lack of maintenance has resulted in the rail system being in bad shape.

Airports

The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft and used by international airlines. However, their cargo handling capacity is currently limited.

The airports in Alur and Folsa are suitable for medium transport aircraft, but they do not have equipment to handle heavy air cargo. All other airfields, without additional construction work are only suitable for light fixed wing aircraft. They can be used for communication and small size personnel transport. Consistent fuel supplies are only available in Galasi and Corma.

Harbours

In Carana there are three harbours for deep-water ships and some smaller harbours for fishing boats. The smaller harbours have no capacity to support the loading and unloading of ships, but they are suitable for coastal vessels. The main harbour in Galasi is well equipped with sufficient capacity for large ships and with Roll on/Roll off (RoRo) capability.

The harbour in Cereni has no RoRo capability but does have capable cranes and sufficient transport equipment to handle heavy loads and containers. The harbour in Maldosa, which has

railroad access, is mostly specialized for the transport of copper but it is also capable to handle regular transport ships. The fact that just two wharves are equipped with cranes for vehicles and containers can cause limitations for deployment and support. The location of the harbour in the town results in a lack of free space to store containers or to assemble vehicles. There is plenty of space for this purpose available outside the city.

Electricity

Carana could be relatively self-sufficient in the production of electricity; this is generated by three power plants (the Kilu Dam, the Salobo Dam and the coal power plant in Galasi) and two hydro-electric power stations. In previous years, the country was a net exporter of electricity during and after the rainy season.

During the conflict, most of the power supply equipment around the Salobo Dam was destroyed or damaged. This, together with a weak distribution network, leads to a consistent power supply only to Galasi, the provincial capitals, and some other cities. The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply. Some small local waterpower plants and generators provide electrical power for small numbers of the rural population.

Water and sanitation

Only the capital and some larger cities have a water supply system for the central area of the city. All other towns and villages rely on wells and water trading. Potable water is available in most parts of the country, but the quality of water varies. In dry areas southwest of Maldosa and west of Galasi drinking water during the dry season is mostly taken from small ponds and slow flowing brooks.

The quality of this water is low and causes several diseases. The wells in this region are not deep enough to reach clean water. The quality of water provided by the few supply systems does not meet international hygiene standards but causes no direct health threats for the population. The water quality in the rural areas is mostly satisfactory. Even the water quality of the crowded Galasi suburbs and the IDP camps is problematic.

There is no system of sanitation and garbage removal in Carana, leading to permanent disease and health problems, particularly in the heavily populated areas.

12. Security and Defence Sector

Security Overview

There have been several disputes with neighbouring countries in the past few decades; however, there were no external military threats to Carana. The main internal security problems continue to be the high level of crime in urban areas (resulting from the poor economic situation), the activities of uncontrolled armed groups and the conflicts between government forces and rebels.

An estimated 12,000 people have been killed in recent months and anything up to 700,000 were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the North and the South. The large numbers of combat-related IDPs further affects the security situation.

With the formation of the El Hasar Terrorist Group in Katasi, new external threats evolved, as well as with the fundamentalist groups in Rimoso that challenge the progress and stability of the ongoing peace process within Carana. While relations with Katasi and Rimoso remain tense, currently the likelihood of intra-state conflict is considered low. This might however change if the situation further escalates and the territorial integrity of Carana is being challenged through these groups.

Security in Carana is negatively impacted / may be impacted:

- If the ongoing peace process based on the Kalari Peace Agreement is delayed in time and conducted without full participation of all parties to the conflict, especially the impact of the CISC splinter groups on the implementation.
- If spoilers to the peace process (CISC splinter groups) pose a threat to the local population of Carana
- through increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining in the North and West, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora.
- If the El Hasar terrorist group infiltrate the West of Carana to avoid the French COIN operations in Katasi and exploit local communities for logistics and supply.
- If the militia groups (warlords) conducting illegal exploitation and trade of diamonds in central Leppko pose threats to the local population and impede the peace process.

The poor economic situation has resulted in increased and more radicalised level of criminal activity, some of it organized in urban areas. In the North and West there is increasing evidence of criminal usurpation of the diamond mining, probably with government connivance and controlled by cartels based in Sumora. Rimoso and Carana still dispute the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well related fishing rights in the respective national territory. Armed groups abducted many civilians, mainly by extremist rebel and militia elements. There are, however, also reports of violations conducted by the parties to the PA.

Presidential Guard

The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions and it is not part of the regular defence force. The commanders and most officers are from the tribe of President Ogavo.

Members of the Presidential Guard received intensive training and are entitled to several privileges. This unit is a loyal elite force with the task to protect the President. It is also used for special purpose tasks. In the recent past, the Presidential Guard was used several times, together with Gendarmerie units, to fight against rebel groups, and has a reputation for being particularly brutal.

Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) or Carana Defence Force (CDF)

The FDC/CDF has a total strength of approximately 20,000 men (17,500 Army, 1,600 Air Force, 900 Navy). The chiefs of the services report direct to the president. With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats the Navy plays a specialised but insignificant role in the Defence Force.

The Air Force is equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers, which have a limited strike capacity. Although a limited capacity, it allows the government to project its' power over the entire country. However, this limited capacity is not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups.

The main service in the FDC/CDF is the Army, primarily but not solely recruited from the Falin people. Its senior leadership is almost wholly Falin. Structured in four area commands it represents the power of the central government all over the country. The areas of responsibility of these commands do not necessarily match the administrative and provincial boundaries. Instead, they reflect the location of the headquarters and troops rather than the real responsibility for a certain precise, defined area. Troops, especially those employed in rural areas, face recurrent problems of non-payment of wages. A number of units are composed of integrated armed group members, lack operational capacity and commitment to human rights, conduct, and discipline standards.

Women's participation in the armed forces is low, with female soldiers and higher-ranking officers making up some 6% of the FDC/CDF in total. During the Uroma regime and on Uroma's specific request, women were recruited and received substantial training abroad, which eventually led to positions as senior officers. A small but steady recruitment of female soldiers continued over the following decades, although their status has been continuously deteriorating due to lack of political support for women's participation.

The French and Russian Governments provided most of the existing military equipment during the 1980s and early 1990s. Since this time, equipment maintenance has often suffered from a lack of spare parts and well-trained mechanics. The level of equipment availability is estimated as low.

All Services have the same set of SALW, about 3,000 modern assault rifles (M-16), all in good quality and about 15,000 older types, nonetheless functional (a mix of Belgian and British made FN FAL and some German G3).

Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC)

The MPC is an avowed secular organization with broad appeal that has a total strength of 10,000 fighters and 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. The level of public support is high in the West and cuts across the different religions. The MPC is structured into groups of 700 men. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure, but a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good.

The official HQ of MPC is in Alur but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. Because of the broad public support for the rebels, and the dissatisfaction with the government, the new role of the MPC is well accepted by the largely Kori population in the West.

No detailed information on the equipment and training standards of the MPC is currently available.

Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC)

The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are Tatsi deserters from the FDC, while others have fled the civil war in Rimoso and joined CISC for lack of alternatives. The total strength is estimated to be around 3,000 to 5,000 fighters. They are organised in company-strength formations (nominal battalion formations), many of which are under-strength. The public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province because of many acts of FDC violence against the population.

The movement has been successful in recruiting young men to its cause through a combination of government anti-Muslim excesses, religious zeal and the poor economic situation, as well as due to recent rebel successes. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training, although lately there is increasing evidence of the presence of experienced foreign extremists who have upped the tempo and quality of CISC operations.

No detailed information on the equipment and training standards of the CISC is currently available.

Militias, gangs and warlords

During the years of fighting, several smaller armed groups have formed in Leppko. Some of these groups are fragmentations of the CISC or deserters from the government forces. Other groups have arisen from local vigilant groups built to protect their villages from attacks from soldiers and rebels.

These groups operate mainly in the northern Leppko province, chiefly for economic reasons (theft, illegal exploitation of resources, ransom) and are perceived as loyal to their leaders (warlords). Initial information indicates that these groups consist of 300 up to 1,000 fighters with light weapons.

The aims and loyalties of these groups are very uncertain and the boundary from local militias to armed bandits is affluent. None of these groups is part of the ongoing peace process.

13. Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces

El Hasar Group

The El Hasar group was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Katasi and turned into a “terror organisation” requesting their own state and engaging in guerrilla type terror operations against the Katasi government. Recently, following anti-terror operations conducted by the Government of Katasi supported by the French Forces, El Hasar fighters/elements crossed the border into Carana in the western parts of the Koloni and Tereni Region. Local communities report armed attacks and raids on villages by these elements, the latter stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties.

Unconfirmed reports claim the fundamentalist elements from both the Tatsi and Kori communities are supporting / sympathising with the El Hasar fighters/elements.

The FDC and MPC do not have the capability to engage the El Hasar elements. Both, however, agreed to allow the French Forces to pursue the fighters into the territory of Carana.

Elassi Liberation Front (ELF)

The ELF was formed in 2018 in the neighbouring country of Rimosa and is conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosa government. They mainly operate south of the Carana border in Rimosa, but have begun to challenge CISC in southern Carana and collaborate with some CISC splinter groups. Recruitment for ELF has surged both in Carana and Rimosa during the past year. Carana communities along the border report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements. ELF plans the establishment of an independent State in Rimosa, possibly to be extended to Carana, as non-negotiable and is not part of the peace negotiations.

Carana communities along the border report armed attacks and raids on villages by ELF elements, who are held to be stealing money, food, supply items like spare parts, gas and ammunition. Reports also indicate violence against civilians like rape, torture and other casualties.

Banditry / Piracy

With the discovery of oil and its initial exploration offshore of the southern coast of Carana, and the shipping of copper ore from Maldosa, incidents of piracy and hijacking of transport vessels are growing more frequent. The bandits/pirates operate mainly by using the island as base/cover and attacking the vessel to demand ransom for further passage.

There is little information about these pirates, who seem to have the support of the local population, based on economic gains and local investment from these illegal operations. Due to the ongoing border dispute between Carana and Rimosa, both Naval Forces are preoccupied and are not engaging the emerging threat of piracy.

14. Humanitarian Situation

As result of the fighting, many people in Carana fled their homelands, but most remained in the country. An estimated 100,000 have taken refuge in the neighbouring countries of Sumora (about 40,000 refugees), Katasi (appr. 40,000 refugees) and Rimoso (appr. 20,000 refugees). Another 700,000 settled in IDP camps around the harbour cities where they are now clustered in makeshift camps and shantytowns in or near urban areas. The largest part of these IDPs currently live in the camps around Galasi, the majority arrived within the last 12 months.

News of the possible arrival of a UN mission has buoyed the hopes of the nearly 900,000 refugees and IDPs to return home. UNHCR, however, has expressed concerns about whether the environment is sufficiently safe and secure for their return. All parties to the conflict are reported to have used mines. In many areas from which people are displaced there is little prospect of employment or other livelihoods.

Finally, the country of Rimoso, sharing a border of approximately 200 km with Carana, has suffered from civil conflict between the two rival ethnic groups, the majority Tatsi and the minority Elasi. As a result, approximately 30,000 Elasi have taken refuge in southern Carana. Most of these Elasi refugees are sheltered in Camp Lora near the village of Lora, approximately 50 km from the Rimosan border, and are a source of potential instability within the Tatsi dominated Leppko Province. UNHCR and two NGO implementing partners, Refugees International and Care for the Children, maintain Camp Lora.

Conditions of health, sanitation and hygiene in these areas are dangerously inadequate and increasingly provide a breeding ground for extremist discontent. The situation in the IDP camps is poor and has significantly deteriorated during the last months.

Nutrition

Although all basic food is available at the market, large numbers of the population cannot afford the necessary food for sufficient nutrition. In rural areas most people can compensate for inflation and unemployment through self-sufficient agriculture. However, severe nutritional problems exist in the urban areas and the IDP camps. The child mortality rate has dramatically increased during the last several years. The most affected areas of malnutrition are the Barin Region, the area between Faron and Folsa and the coastal area south of Cereni. These areas are already experiencing humanitarian emergencies.

A humanitarian emergency is forecasted to affect approximately 2 million people next year. Projects recently started by the UN World Food Programme (WFP) and other NGOs are not sufficiently funded and cannot to prevent a widespread humanitarian crisis.

Health

Almost no medical infrastructure exists in the rural areas. The rudimentary health system that exists in the cities is unable to provide basic medical support. One of the main humanitarian concerns in Carana is the acute lack of functioning medical facilities in the rebel held South and West. Here

there is a critical lack of emergency supplies required for displaced and vulnerable populations, particularly in the IDP camps.

If the situation in the large cities continues to worsen, the threat of epidemics will increase. The WHO (World Health Organisation) has already reported 70 cases of cholera in Carana to date.

15. Explosives

During the conflict, landmines were used extensively by both sides. Similar to other cases, mine warfare was not conducted with documented mine obstacles. Landmines were used by all sides as a means of terror and deterrent and to prevent access to certain areas. As a result, the precise location of mines and explosive devices is not documented and mostly unknown. Further analysis is necessary to identify high mine threat areas.

Carana first pledged its support for a ban on antipersonnel mines in November 2009 and it was a supporter of the Ottawa process that led to the signing of the Mine Ban Treaty on 02 December 2011. Carana was one of the signatories of the treaty, never ratified the treaty, however, due to the outbreak of civil war. Carana also did not attend any Treaty-related meetings and abstained from voting in favour of every pro-ban United Nations General Assembly resolution since 2011.

Carana is not an identified producer or exporter of antipersonnel mines. At the same time, Carana has not enacted any internal measures to prohibit its production or export of antipersonnel mines. The size and origin of Carana's mine stockpile is not known. Antipersonnel mines have been used extensively in the recent civil war by all sides to the conflict. The PA prohibits further use, however, uncorroborated reports of continuing mine use appear.

16. Civil society organizations

Civil society in Carana is weak and there are no groups with substantial influence outside of the PDC party structure. The PDC did have an affiliated social movement organising activities in sports and culture, but the organisation is elitist (oriented exclusively towards ethnic Falin party cadres) and not viable without party support. Non-affiliated organisations have been harassed and persecuted under the Ogavo regime. Remaining elements of former parties have lost their internal structure and are represented by a few motivated individuals only. Some smaller political movements were nevertheless identified, including small communist groups in the capital of Galasi and in Maldosa, as well as ethnically motivated minority groups of Kori along the coastline. These groups are not very well organized and suffer from a lack of followers.

The well-established civil society organizations pre-dating Ogavo's crackdown on opposition outside of parliament, the National Bar Association and the Carana Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, are staffed by known members of the opposition as well as by close allies of the PDC. Their internal struggles have rendered them de facto unimportant in the process. Some members of the NBA have acted as advisers to the Peace Process; however, their agenda is unclear.

The coal and copper miner's trade unions have limited political influence, but are active only as single-interest organisations that have not challenged the political leadership. The teachers' union may currently also be considered a single-interest organisation, demanding their salaries be paid, and face violent backlash.

Women's organisations are starting to form at grassroots level but so far are poorly organised. Some local human rights organisations are becoming more active. Currently, social activity and organisation connected to the religious institutions is increasing. Traditional structures in the form of chiefdoms with some de facto authority exist, particularly in the rural areas.

Annexes:

- A - Carana thematic maps
- B - Carana Security and Defence Forces
- C - Carana Law Enforcement
- D - International Organisations in Carana
- E - United Nations and related agencies

Annex A: Carana thematic maps




Figure 1 - Carana Natural Recourses




Figure 2 - Carana Vegetation




Figure 3 – Ethnic distribution in Carana




Figure 4 – Ethnic percentage distribution in Carana




Figure 5 - Rebel-controlled areas in Carana




Figure 6 - Disputed borders and resources




Figure 7 - Carana Administrative boundaries




Figure 8 - Humanitarian Overview in Carana

Annex B: Carana Security and Defence Forces

Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) or Carana Defence Force (CDF)

The military expenditures currently are estimated at 2.7% of the Carana GDP.

It is further estimated that the potential personnel pool for a military mobilisation is about 5,250,000 (males age 18-49). Family members accompany many of the personnel. Numbers have not yet been determined.

According to the Draft Law, 18 years is the minimum age for conscription and voluntary service, but in spite of this, it is estimated that 15-20 % of the CDF soldiers are younger than 18 years old. Age composition of FDC:

- 18-29 yrs: 63%
- 30-39 yrs: 27%
- 40-49 yrs: 10%
- Officially 5% female soldiers (above 18)

There is evidence that in the last phases of war, there has been increasing recruitment of under 16, so the estimated number of under 18-year-olds is 10% (boys only).

Command Structure

| Area Command | Location | Assigned Troops |
|--------------|----------|---|
| North | Maroni | 2 Inf Bn, 1 Airborne Bn, 1 Arty Bn, 1 Engr Bn, 1 AAA Btry, MP, Mil Band |
| West | Alur | 2 Inf Bn, 1 Arty Btry |
| Central | Folsa | 1 Inf Bn, 1 Engr Coy, 1 Recce Coy |
| South | Corma | 2 Inf Bn, 1 Recce Coy |

Major Equipment

Army

| Type | Quantity | Role |
|-----------------|----------|----------------------------------|
| AMX 13 | 12 | Light Tank |
| Mamba | 17 | Reconnaissance Vehicle |
| AML 60/90 | 11 | Reconnaissance Vehicle |
| M 3 | 21 | APC |
| M 2 | 11 | 105 mm Artillery Gun |
| 120 mm Brandt | 14 | Mortar |
| 81 mm Brandt | 27 | Mortar |
| RCL M 40 | 8 | 106 mm Recoilless Launcher |
| Panhard M 3 VDA | 9 | Self-propelled Anti-Aircraft Gun |
| L 60 | 17 | 20 mm Anti-Aircraft Gun |

Air Force

| Type | Quantity | Role |
|------------------------------|----------|-----------------------|
| Alpha Jet C | 6 | Ground Attack |
| Fokker 100 | 3 | Communication |
| Cessna 421 | 2 | Communication |
| F 33 C Bonanza | 4 | Training |
| Aérospatiale SA 330 H Puma | 6 | Utility |
| Aérospatiale SA 316 Alouette | 5 | Utility/Communication |

Navy

| Type | Quantity | Role |
|----------|----------|-------------------|
| Suscal A | 3 | Coastguard Boat |
| LC-84 | 2 | River Patrol Boat |

Carana Presidential Guard

The Carana Presidential Guard has a strength of almost 1500 personnel. The guard mainly consists of two infantry battalions, but also features additional units (see organisational chart).

The presidential guard was created to carry out representative tasks. It is also responsible for the close protection details for the president and close relatives, support of military and of public order operations as well as special assignments from the president.

It is not part of the regular defence force. The presidential guard reports directly to the president of Carana. The guard possesses ties to the gendarmerie of Carana which were created through the frequent joint deployment in operations.




Figure 9 – Structure of Carana Presidential Guard

Annex C: Carana Law Enforcement

The Carana law enforcement agencies are divided into the Carana National Police (CNP) and the Gendarmerie. The estimated number for CNP and Gendarmerie officers' amounts to 10,000 officers.

Carana National Police

The Carana National Police (CNP) has an estimated strength of approximately 7,100 police officers. Precise numbers cannot be aggregated due to the high fluctuation in the regional personnel bodies.

The CNP operates mainly in densely populated areas. The CNP's first operational pillar concerns public order and safety. In fulfilling this task, the CNP is also tasked with traffic safety. Its second main objective is the investigation of criminal acts. In doing so, the CNP is expected to conduct major investigations outside its area of responsibility, i.e. in rural areas.

The CNP find itself within the command structure of the Carana Ministry of the Interior. However, the Ministry of Justice carries out oversight relating to operational matters of criminal investigation cases.

The CNP has a history of being underfinanced, understaffed and being insufficiently organized. Therefore, the organization lacks basic administrative mechanisms and routines. One example is the lack of a functioning education and training pillar. The CNP does currently not command a centralised educational facility such as an academy.




Figure 10 – Structure of Carana National Police

Carana Gendarmerie

The Gendarmerie of Carana has a strength of close to 2,900 officers. It is tasked with upholding public order in rural areas. The gendarmerie is further authorized to conduct military police duties.

The Gendarmerie is under the control of the Ministry of Defence. Operational control of units, which engage in public order operations, is transferred to the Ministry of the Interior. However, this mechanism has been widely disregarded, as the Gendarmerie was utilized as a governmental strong-arm.

Traditionally the gendarmerie is closely connected to the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC). Its organisational structure, the operational approach and its self-understanding are strongly influenced by the FDC's customs and culture. The Gendarmerie has benefitted from its strong ties to the FDC and to the presidential guard. Consequently, it is better funded and staffed than its civilian counterpart, the CNP.




Figure 11 – Structure of Carana Gendarmerie

Annex D: International Organisations in Carana

German Red Cross

International Headquarters: Berlin, Germany

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Corma, Folsa, and Faron.

Local presence: since 2012

The German Red Cross is a leading member of the largest independent humanitarian organization in the world – the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement. The German Red Cross responds immediately to conflicts and disasters around the world, providing essentials such as food, clean water, shelter and medicines.

In Carana the German Red Cross is distributing food in cooperation with the WFP to the most vulnerable groups. An Emergency Response Unit (ERU), which recently arrived at the hunger-stricken country, has been working around the clock to set up the essential infrastructure to ensure the food is distributed safely and to those most in need. About 25 per cent of the population are short of food. The German Red Cross is also closely monitoring the prevalence of HIV/AIDs in the country, as well as other conflict-related diseases to assist in the design of prevention programmes.

Save the Children

Headquarters: London, United Kingdom

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Cereni

Local presence: since October 2013

Save the Children (SC) advocates for the rights of children around the world who suffer from poverty, disease, injustice and violence. In particular, SC fights to protect children from becoming not only a victim of war, but also a perpetrator of violence. Around 300,000 youth – both boys and girls – are currently fighting wars around the world. SC's core mandate is to ensure that all children around the world have a right to a childhood.

In Carana, SC is working closely with UNICEF to provide programming for youth education and recreation to create an alternative to fighting in the war. Following the signing of the Kalasi Treaty, SC is also concerned with the reintegration of child soldiers who have either escaped, or voluntarily left armed groups, particularly those who have experienced physical and/or psychological trauma. SC is committed to helping the children of Carana learn new skills and regain their lost childhood, all the while preventing their recruitment or return to battle.

CARE International

Headquarters: London, United Kingdom

Local Headquarters: Galasi

Local presence: since June 2014

CARE International works with communities in need to improve living conditions once the immediate crisis or conflict is over. In specific, CARE INT works with communities to re-establish stability, order and create the means for sustainable development to take root.

In Carana, CARE is working with women to promote their safety, security and status in the aftermath of conflict. This project involves working with a wide group of women affected by the conflict – from widows, former female combatants, HIV/AIDS patients, to the disabled and landmine victims – in order to promote reconciliation, rehabilitation and reintegration into the local community. CARE works closely with the ICRC in providing both health and sanitation needs, as well as Save the Children in dealing with female youth affected by conflict.

Doctors without Limits

International Headquarters: Amsterdam, Netherlands

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Maldosa, Faron, and Corma

Local presence: on and off since 2012

Doctors without Limits are an international humanitarian aid organization that provides emergency medical assistance to populations in danger. In Carana, Doctors without Limits works in rehabilitation of hospitals and dispensaries, vaccination programs and water and sanitation projects. They further work in remote health care centres, slum areas and provide training of local personnel with the objective of rebuilding health structures to acceptable levels.

While carrying out humanitarian assistance, Doctors without Limits seeks also to raise awareness of crises; it acts as a witness and will speak out, either in private or in public about the plight of populations in danger for whom the organization works. In doing so, Doctors without Limits sets out to alleviate human suffering, to protect life and health and to restore and ensure respect for the human beings and their fundamental human rights.

Further organisations

| Acronym | Organisation |
|----------------|--|
| AECID | Spanish Agency for International Development Cooperation |
| AFD Int. | Alliance for Freedom and Dignity |
| AGICO | Agrico cooperative |
| Amnesty Int. | Amnesty International |
| CARE CA | CARE, Canada |
| CGSC | Center for Global Communication Studies |
| DFID | Department for International Development, UK |
| GIZ | Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit |
| HRW | Human Rights Watch |
| IFAD | International Fund for Agricultural Development |
| JICA | Japan International Cooperation Agency |
| MOFCOM | Ministry of Commerce, People's Republic of China |
| NORAD | Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation |
| NRC | Norwegian refugee council |
| Open AID | Open government data of Swedish Aid |
| OXFAM Int. | OXFAM International |
| SDA | Seventh-day Adventist Church |
| USAID | United States Agency for International Development |
| WB | World Bank |
| WRC | World Refugee Council |

Annex E: United Nations and related agencies

United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Folsa, Corma, Alur

Local presence: since 2009

UN OCHA's mission in Carana is to represent the role of the Emergency Relief Coordinator (ERC) and coordinating and facilitating humanitarian assistance responding to the needs of affected people in Carana.

United Nations International Children's Emergency Fund (UNICEF)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Headquarters: Galasi, Folsa, Corma

Local presence: since 2008

UNICEF's mission in Carana is to provide care and special protection to the most vulnerable groups and victims of war, namely women and children. UNICEF is also providing safe access to vulnerable populations, and provides them with health care, basic education and protection from harm.

World Food Programme (WFP)

International Headquarters: Rome, Italy

Local Offices: Galasi, Amsan, Corma, Folsa, Alur

Local presence: since 2009

The UN World Food Programme has been providing food assistance in Carana through a regional operation since 2000 to respond to the food aid needs of vulnerable populations and more than 700,000 IDPs. Programme activities have included therapeutic feeding programmes, supplementary feeding, food for agriculture, food for training, and emergency school feeding.

UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi, Alur, Lora

Local presence: since 2011

World Health Organization

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2003

UN Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2010

Joint United Nations Program on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS)

International Headquarters: Geneva, Switzerland

Local Offices: Galasi, Corma

Local presence: since 2003

United Nations Development Program (UNDP)

International Headquarters: UN HQ New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2010

United Nations Population Fund (UNFPA)

International Headquarters: New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2015

United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC)

International Headquarters: Vienna, Austria

Local Offices: Galasi, Faron

Local presence: since 2010

United Nations Mine Action Service (UNMAS)

International Headquarters: UN HQ New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi, Alur, Maroni

Local presence: since 2009

United Nations Entity for Gender Equality and the Empowerment of Women (UN Women)

International headquarters: New York, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 2013

World Bank

International headquarters: Washington DC, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 1980

International Monetary Fund

International headquarters: Washington DC, USA

Local Offices: Galasi

Local presence: since 1980




Figure 12: UN Country Team locations in Carana

Peace Process in Carana

Summary



New York

25 September 2021

THE PEACE PROCESS IN CARANA

After a longstanding civil war demanding thousands of victims and causing more than 700,000 Caranese citizens to become internally displaced, the warring factions in the Carana Civil War, the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique de Carana MPC, and the Combatants Independants de Carana CISC, have finally agreed to engage in peace negotiations in Kalari, Namuna. As negotiations take off under UN mediation, the UNSC has therefore decided to weigh its options of assisting a transition to peace.

At the 5342nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 11 December 2020, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The situation in Carana", the President of the Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

"The Security Council commends the Fasia Union (FU) for its role in mediating between the parties and urges it to use its influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

"The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 2013 Constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.

"The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the Fasia Continent that are affected by the Carana crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations."

"The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict."

"The Security Council affirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with the Fasia Union, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict. The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens

assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity.”

“The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains seized of the matter.”

Thus, the Integrated Task Force (ITF) was set up and tasked to develop a strategic assessment and options for the UN in Carana aiming to implement the following political/strategic end state.

“A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic wellbeing so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.”

The ITF tasked by the UN SG and based on the compiled Carana Country Study conducted a strategic assessment with the following recommendation:

- Root causes of the Caranese civil war are to be found in a history of the colonial and post-colonial centralized governments neglecting rural and provincial areas, in the destruction of livelihoods both man-made and through climate change, in violently exploited ethnic tensions, as well as in political authority challenged through corruption and favouritism and a popular demand for the non-existent rule of law and civic participation. International involvement is deeply entangled with the current conflict dynamics.
- In September 2019, the leaders of the three major factions, President Ogavo (FDC), Cdr. Sefu Akinyi (MPC) and Cdr. Abdirahim Muhamed (CISC) agreed to peace negotiations. First, these took place in Kuku, Mosana, under FU brokerage. After their failure due to perceived mediator partiality, the UN assumed renewed negotiations in Kalari, Namuna in 14 November 2020.
- The Peace Agreement (PA) will supposedly get signed by the parties to the conflict within the next 6 months. The parties will invite the UN to support in the implementation of the PA.
- Expected challenges to the implementation process:
 1. In the northern Leppko region in central Carana, several unmonitored armed groups have formed around locally powerful and well-connected warlords. These groups operate mainly according to economic goals (theft, illegal exploitation of diamond, copper and wood, ransom) and are thought to be connected to the organized crime network in northern Carana. The warlords are not part of the peace agreement.
 2. The Elassi Liberation Front (ELF) is collaborating with CISC splinter groups, plans to establish an Independent State in Rimoso, frequently raids villages in the border area to Rimoso and is not part of the PA.
 3. CISC hardliner splinter groups refute the ongoing peace process and gather increasing support from CISC armed forces.

4. The overall humanitarian and development situation is expected to worsen further.
 5. The political dispute between Rimoso and Carana regarding their overlapping maritime territory, contested because of unexplored oilfields and because of fishing rights, has recently intensified.
- The El Hasar insurgency in neighbouring Katasi will have an effect on the development of the peace process. The government of Carana and MPC have agreed to coordinate its actions against El Hasar with Operation Aigle (FRAFOR) and the situation is deemed stable. In the medium-term, this joint effort may create an obstacle to the DDR of MPC fighters. Government institutions and FDC troops are currently not present on the ground there.
 - The UN will be prepared to deploy a multidimensional Peacekeeping Mission under Chapter VII of the UN Charter to monitor and observe the compliance of the PA and to address spoilers to the PA in order to support the establishment of a unified and peaceful Carana. Thus, the UN will also support in establishing a safe and secure environment, in preparing and conducting democratic elections, to offer good offices in resolving the disputes with Rimoso and in assisting the coordination with the Government of Katasi and FRAFOR efforts to neutralize El Hasar.

With the UN SG Report of 01 April 2021, the UN SC was informed about the recommended option to assist Carana upon an signed Peace Agreement. In order to support the strategic planning efforts, the UN SC mandated a military-civilian Technical Assessment Mission to conduct a two-week field survey to verify the conditions in Carana as assumed in the Strategic Assessment.

The report the Technical Assessment Mission then provides to UNHQ can be summarized as follows:

- Even after the beginning of the negotiations for the Ceasefire- and Peace Agreement, Carana can be described as politically unstable. The government holds limited power over the Northeast and no control over the West and the South of the country. An increasing level of public resistance can barely be handled by the security forces. The administration displays a dramatic lack of efficiency. Official administration in the rebel-controlled areas is non-existent. Institutional political mechanisms, such as parties or formal civil society gatherings, are currently non-existent.
- The armed conflict in Carana has also resulted in serious violations and abuses of human rights and humanitarian law. All sides have been responsible for violations and abuses. Torture has been widely used by all parties to the conflict.
- The estimated number of CNP and local police officer's amount to about 10,000 officers, or one officer for every 1,700 citizens. There is no clarity about the exact figure of national police, or even if those in police uniforms are certified police officers. The relationship between civil society and the police force is fraught with crises of credibility and impunity. In MPC-controlled areas, currently about 50 formally trained police officers and up to 300 personnel appointed from the ranks of the MPC are active. No regular police force services the South anymore. The CISC has taken over all police functions.

- In terms of military strength, the FDC currently commands 20,000 personnel (all three services), mainly in three brigades. The Presidential Guard has a strength equivalent to two infantry battalions and it is not part of the regular defence force. The MPC has an assessed strength of 10,000 fighters. CISC structures are loose and their strength is estimated at about 3,000- 5,000 fighters. In contrast to the MPC, CISC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force.
- During the years of fighting, several smaller armed groups have formed in Leppko. Some of these groups are fragmentations of the CISC or deserters from the government forces. Other groups have arisen from local vigilant groups built to protect their villages from attacks from soldiers and rebels. Two external militias are important to the Caranese context, The El Hasar group requesting their own state in Katasi and the ELF conducting insurgency operations against the Rimosan government. Both frequently penetrate into Caranese territory. The MPC engagement in the deterrence of El Hasar fighters along the Carana-Katasi border is expected to provide an obstacle to the DDR process otherwise embraced by all relevant actors. In the meantime, ELF has begun to challenge CISC in southern Carana, actively to recruit soldiers in Carana, and to collaborate with some CISC splinter groups.
- The majority of the country is currently without regular power supply and is relying on generators. Water is available in most parts of the country, but the quality of water varies. Carana has a network of capable paved roads, mostly unaffected by meteorological effects especially the rainy season. Carana also has a dense network of partially robust unpaved roads and tracks, the availability of which is highly uncertain during and after the rainy season. The two railway tracks running between Galasi and Akkabar, and between Maldosa and Mia are both mostly in bad shape but operational. Carana has three harbours for deep-water ships and some smaller harbours for fishing boats. The international airports in Galasi and Corma are both operational and meet international standards for air traffic. Both airports are suitable for heavy and extremely heavy transport aircraft. A strong mission support capability needs to be established to allow the operation of a PKM as limited capabilities are only available in Carana.
- During the conflict between FDC and rebels, both sides used landmines as a means of terror and deterrent as well as to prevent access to certain areas, and mine obstacles were not documented. Because of this conduct of mine warfare, as well as through flooding and landslides displacing minefields, the precise location of mines and explosive devices is not documented and mostly unknown. As a result, the explosive picture is chaotic and there are no reliable data or estimates of the amounts of explosives available. Anti-personnel mines, 120mm mortar shells and 122mm howitzer shells are confirmed to have been in use.
- Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance. The overarching immediate humanitarian issues that need to be tackled in a comprehensive and coordinated fashion include food insecurity and livelihoods, protection from exposure to conflict and human trafficking, health and education. Communities most at risk are IDP camp populations, returning IDPs, refugee

communities, those hosting IDPs and refugees, children and adolescents, as well as women-headed households and survivors of sexual and gender-based violence (SGBV). In terms of development, protection of people and livelihoods, infrastructure, access to credit and markets are key concerns.

- During the past 10 years of civil war, approx. 700,000 Caranese people have become internally displaced (IDPs) and settled in IDP camps around the harbour cities, most in the Galasi area. Approx. 40,000 fled to Sumora and 20,000 to Rimosa and periodically attempt to return to their lands for the farming season. With the peace process in reach, this year a substantial number of IDPs has begun to leave Galasi to return to their lands in Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek. Carana itself hosts refugee populations from Katasi (approx. 30,000 mainly in Tereni and western Koloni) and Rimosa (approx. 20,000 mainly in southern Leppko).
- Humanitarian access has overall proven difficult in the MPC- and CISC-controlled areas and in flooded areas during the rainy season. Government participation in assessment missions is a common demand throughout the entire country. Other obstacles include the road conditions during the raining season, fuel shortages, the frequent interruptions of mobile phone coverage and access to cash, because of both the thin banking infrastructure and the high and fast-evolving inflation. Capacities for air transport are low. An initial assessment conducted showed that the medical facilities in the major cities might be sufficient for minor treatment of UN personnel.

The Kalari Peace Agreement has been signed on 1 August 2021 by the parties to the conflict. The Treaty is structured in five sections, an overview, the Ceasefire Agreement and DDR process, a section on governance and the re-building of state functionality, wealth sharing and development measures and finally humanitarian aspects and issues of transitional justice.

The ceasefire agreement includes the complete cessation of armed hostilities, distribution of weaponry, land mining, propaganda and violence against civilians, release of all civilian abductees and demobilization of under-age combatants. It invites the UN Peacekeeping mission, calls for the establishment of a Joint Ceasefire Commission to observe the transitional process and a National Commission for Demobilization, Disarmament and Reintegration, to have completed its actions after 240 days regarding the signatory factions and after 360 days regarding other armed groups.

A new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), shall be created of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants. A new police force shall be created of not more than 12,500 officers with up to 3,000 are being drawn from former MPC combatants and up to 1,250 being drawn from former CISC combatants. Prisoner-of-war issues are to be discussed further.

The governance section describes the formation of the NTGC in three branches, the National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA), the executive; and the judiciary, all of which are to be staffed according to principles of power-sharing. It determines the establishment of a constitutional board, a presidency and two vice-presidents, and calls for elections six months after the adoption

of the new constitution. Furthermore, the treaty describes wealth-sharing measures, administered by a Reconstruction and Development Fund, as well as a Multi-Donor Trust Fund. Last part lays the foundations for future humanitarian engagement and sketches out mechanisms of transitional justice.

Given the host nation consent for a UN peacekeeping mission on Carana territory, the detailed plan of how to engage in peaceful transition, and the consent of the parties to the conflict to lay aside their arms, the UN SC passed Security Council Resolution 1544 (2021) and authorized an UNPKM.

The UN SC resolution decided to establish the Multidimensional United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) for an initial period of 12 months, requested the SG to appoint an SRSG to oversee mission planning and coordination between the UN country team, UNAC, the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and the French Forces Operation Aigle in Katasi. The mandate set UNAC troop strength at up to 13,315 UN military unit personnel, 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 staff officers, and up to 1,885 civilian police officers including formed units. The resolution asked TCC to contribute personnel and adequate equipment and to declare caveats and asked for Caranese compliance. It called upon neighbouring states to ensure unhindered movement to and from Carana of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods. Finally, it emphasized the need for coordination between the implementation of the Peace Agreement in Carana and the French-led operation in Katasi.




Figure 13: Deployment of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Carana (UNAC) - Overview

Statement by the President of SC



United Nations

S/PRST/2020/24



Security Council

Distr.: General
14 December 2020
Original: English

Statement by the President of the UN Security Council

At the 5342nd meeting of the Security Council, held on 11 December 2020, in connection with the Council's consideration of the item entitled "The question concerning Carana", the President of the Security Council made the following statement on behalf of the Council:

"The Security Council expresses its grave concern to the ongoing deterioration of the political, security and humanitarian environment in Carana, and the serious consequences for the population of this country and the region. It deplores the loss of life that has already occurred, and fears that the failure, thus far, to reach a political settlement may result in further bloodshed, and calls for an immediate end to hostilities.

"The Security Council commends the Fasia Union (FU) for its role in mediating between the parties and urges it to use its influence to promote a peaceful solution, stressing that the crisis in Carana can be resolved only through a negotiated political solution in which all parties, both those involved in the conflict and within the region, work actively to achieve such a solution.

"The Security Council firmly condemns the continued use force to influence the political situation in Carana and calls for a return to the principles of the 2013 Constitution, and urges all parties to agree terms for a lasting peace agreement that addresses the underlying causes of the conflict and reestablishes confidence among the parties.

"The Security Council also expresses its concern at the humanitarian consequences of the crisis in Carana. It calls upon the international community to provide urgent humanitarian assistance to those in need in all the countries of the Fasia Continent that are affected by the Carana crisis. It also calls on all parties to provide unhindered access to the affected populations."

"The Security Council condemns the deaths of innocent civilians and human rights abuses in Carana and calls for such incidents to be fully investigated. The Council calls upon the Government and all other parties to respect human rights and take immediate steps, with support from the

international community, to reverse the climate of impunity, particularly in the context of the use of children in armed conflict.

"The Security Council affirms its readiness to consider the active involvement of the United Nations, in coordination with the Fasia Union, including through concrete sustainable and effective measures, to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and in an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict. The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity."

"The Security Council will continue to monitor closely the situation in Carana and remains seized of the matter."

Strategic Assessment Report

Development of the Peace Process in Carana

Proposed further engagement of the United Nations



New York
22 February 2021

(Omitted - refer to the CARANA complete package)

SG's Planning Directive



Secretary-General's Planning Directive Planning for a United Nations Peacekeeping Operation in Carana

1. The United Nations Security Council, in its Presidential Statement S/PRST/2020/24 of 14 December 2020 stated its preparedness to consider measures to assist in the implementation of an effective ceasefire agreement and an agreed process for political settlement of the conflict in Carana.
2. In light of the ongoing violence and consistent violation of human rights in Carana, the displacement of more than 700,000 people, and the implications of the conflict for the region more generally, the objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity; and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk. This should be achieved through a multidimensional presence, including political, military, police, humanitarian and human rights elements.
3. The deployment of a United Nations operation in Carana assumes that the Kalari process will have produced effective ceasefire arrangements and a comprehensive peace agreement, and that the United Nations should be prepared to supervise and directly support the implementation of such an agreement. The success of a United Nations operation in Carana will require the provision to the United Nations, by Member States, of military and police personnel to deploy into Carana; as well as critical intelligence and logistical capabilities, and sustained political and humanitarian support.
4. In consideration of the of the above, the Under Secretary General for peacekeeping operations will identify a course of action for the United Nations system which will produce options for a multi-dimensional United Nations Mission in Carana. These options should be prepared by 23 July 2021 for my review and subsequent presentation to the United Nations Security Council. These options should reflect an integrated mission that should include political, military, police, human rights, public information and support elements; they should reflect a close linkage to the existing humanitarian operation and should be based on the findings of a thorough technical assessment carried out in Carana, and should factor in the physical and logistical challenges presented by the general degradation of Carana infrastructure. These options should clearly define the obligations of all major stakeholders and should be developed with the full participation of United Nations agencies, funds and programmes, which have an operational presence in

Carana, and in close consultation with Carana, the Fasia Union (FU), the Peace Building Commission, key partners, and members of the Security Council.

5. All identified options should allow the United Nations to achieve its objective as described above.

23rd May 2021

USG DPO's Planning Directive



Under Secretary-General's Planning Directive Planning for a United Nations Operation in Carana

SITUATION

The conflict in Carana has reached a stalemate in which the government can no longer control significant portions of the country and other elements have stepped in to fill the vacuum. In the east and south, an alternative structure is evolving in areas controlled by the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC). No single entity is capable of achieving a successful military outcome to the conflict, resources are tight, and ethnic tensions have been increasingly evident with atrocities being committed in a number of areas. The worst-case scenario would see the stalemate that exists now sliding into a state of general anarchy, or see a de facto break-up of the country under individual factions. The ongoing peace process offers the only real option for sustainable peace, and is an essential precursor to any long-term ability to address the root causes of the conflict.

The International Community, led by the Fasia Union (FU) has played a significant role in moving the peace process forward and is increasingly optimistic that an agreement will be reached in the near future, key aspects of are likely to include:

- Mechanisms for disengagement, implementation and monitoring of a ceasefire;
- Confidence building measures, including the release of prisoners;
- Respect for human rights;
- Establishment of a National Transitional Government of Carana (NTGC);
- Commitment to the longer term establishment of a democratically elected government;
- Disarmament of armed groups;
- Restructured military and police capacities.

United Nations Security Council S/PRST/2020/24 confirmed the Council's readiness to consider active UN involvement and with a letter from President of the Security Council, dated 13 May 2021, tasked the Secretariat to initiate planning a multidimensional UN Mission to support the implementation of a ceasefire and a long-term political settlement.

Based on the SG Planning Directive of 17th December 2020 an Integrated Task Force (ITF) has been formed conducting a Strategic Assessment and Department of Peace Operations (DPO) has assumed lead responsibility to conclude the operational planning and prepare the deployment of a UN multi-dimensional Mission to Carana.

The operational imperative is to ensure that the UN system is prepared to act quickly and deploy an integrated mission as soon as the terms of a peace -/ceasefire agreement are confirmed. The conditions for such a deployment are generally good but any delay will create an opportunity for disaffected groups to undermine the process, and result in a renewed cycle of violence with consequences for both the long-term political situation and the immediate humanitarian problem.

The plan produced under DPO's directive must synchronise the immediate stabilisation objectives within the overall framework of recovery, reconstruction and development, which is essential for long-term stability in Carana.

STRATEGIC DIRECTION

Strategic direction was given by Security Council S/PRST/2020/24 which stated that: *"The objective of the United Nations should be to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity, and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk."*

Within the International Community and the parties to the conflict it was agreed that the role of the UN in Carana, will be to assist the parties in all aspects of the implementation of the peace agreement, in the establishment of the rule of law, in the revitalization of the economy, in the restoration of trust between all war factions and in the relief of humanitarian emergencies. National ownership of the process will be key to success.

A potential multi-dimensional UN Mission in Carana will consist of:

- A civilian component to advise and assist the transitional government and to support the parties in their peace process; particularly in the field of:
 - re-establishment of acceptable standards of human rights
 - protecting civilian, particularly the most vulnerable groups
 - rebuilding the necessary governmental institutions
 - re-establishment of the rule of law,
 - strengthening the structures and institutions of the civil society,
 - building a Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC),
 - incorporate and reintegrate armed groups into Carana's security institutions, the civil service and societal institutions
 - establishing and restructuring the national police force in Carana,
 - preparing for elections on whatever timescale is established by the peace agreement,
 - addressing the economic needs of Carana, as a basis for sustainable peace,
 - rebuilding the education and public health system shattered by the conflict

- coordination of humanitarian and development activities in Carana, in accordance with the mandate of a potential Mission in Carana
- providing Good Offices in addressing and resolving the disputes between Carana and its neighbouring countries.
- A military component with the task to:
 - observe and monitor the ceasefire, report violations and contribute to the rebuilding of trust between the parties,
 - provide protection to UN personnel and facilities, as well as protection of civilians
 - prevent spoilers from disrupting the implementation of the Peace Agreement and protect civilians within capabilities in imminent threat, within the vicinity, without prejudice to the responsibility of the Government of Carana,
 - provide assistance in support of programmes to disarm armed groups, demobilize and assist in the reintegration of former combatants,
 - provide assistance in demining and security sector reform (SSR),
 - provide support to humanitarian assistance; this is defined as providing physical protection when necessary and requested.
- A police component with the task to:
 - advice Carana national authorities on all police issues,
 - support the establishment and restructuring of an efficient nationwide Carana police service which acts in accordance with the law and international standards of human rights,
 - support Carana, national authorities to create an efficient vetting system for the recruitment of police officers,
 - support Carana national authorities to establish an efficient police education and training system.
 - provide protection for IDP – camps in close coordination with the local police authorities,
 - fight organized crime in support of local authorities,
 - support and train the police service in crowd and riot control activities.
- A Mission Support Component with the task to:
 - plan, coordinate, set-up, and maintain the administration and logistics structures to deploy, operate and sustain the UN PKM in Carana,

- be able to support other UN entities in the field if required and within capabilities,
- plan, coordinate and manage the Mission Budget.

STAKEHOLDERS

Achieving the objective will require a concerted effort by all stakeholders. The full involvement of the United Nation Country Team (UNCT) in the work of the Integrated Task Force (ITF) is essential from the outset.

In addition to those represented in the ITF, it is essential to ensure that:

- The Government of Carana, is included, and that its responsibilities are clearly understood by all parties,
- Individual Member States, International Organisations and donors who are prepared to support the reconstruction effort are encouraged to do so, and engaged at an early stage.

AREA OF OPERATIONS

The Area of Operation is strictly defined as the territory of Carana.

INITIAL OPERATIONAL CAPABILITY

To use the momentum and to meet the pace of the peace agreement, the mission shall reach an initial operational capability no later than M + 120.

ASSUMPTIONS

The finally signed Ceasefire and Peace Agreement between the FDC, MPC and CISC will not differ in its essential parts from the current discussed and negotiated documents.

The parties will continue to cooperate with the UN and a potential UN Peacekeeping Mission.

If an agreement is signed, the parties will comply with the Peace Agreement.

2nd June 2021

Report of the UN Technical Survey Team for Carana



June 2021

(Omitted - refer to the CARANA complete package)



Kalari Peace Treaty

Kalari Peace Treaty

11 August 2021

PREAMBLE:

WHEREAS the Government of Carana (GOC), Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC), (the Parties) having met under the auspices of the United Nations (UN) in Kalari, in respect of the issues related to an Inclusive Peace Agreement and its implementation;

REAFFIRMING their determination to build a State of democratic law and prosperity, guaranteeing the rights of citizens and harmonious and sustainable development in Carana;

REAFFIRMING their commitment to the Constitution of the Republic of Carana of 15 April 2013;

RECOGNIZING that a viable ceasefire and peace process can meaningfully be realized through adherence and commitment to the Kalari Peace Treaty;

AWARE of the overwhelming support shown by the people of Carana to the irreversible peace process and the will in resolving the outstanding issues of conflict in Carana, the peace process and the need for an expeditious conclusion of the peace agreement;

REITERATING their commitment to the final, just and comprehensive peace settlement, the security, welfare and stability of the people of Carana within the framework of a true and sincere national reconciliation;

CONSCIOUS of the need to promote true national reconciliation as the basis of sustainable peace in Carana;

DEEPLY ATTACHED to the values of democracy, good governance, justice and the protection and promotion of human rights in accordance with the relevant international instruments;

AWARE of the fact that Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) of ex-combatants are crucial components for a secure and peaceful Carana and commit themselves to credible, transparent and effective DDR processes which will support the ex-combatants' transition to a productive civilian life;

THE PARTIES HEREBY AGREE AS FOLLOWS:

for: The Government of Carana

for: The Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC)

for: The Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC)

for: The United Nations

PART ONE

General and Fundamental Provisions

ARTICLE I

1. A Peace Agreement (PA) is hereby established throughout the territory of CARANA, between the belligerents as defined. The PA shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be put into effect as soon as possible.
2. The **Ceasefire Agreement** (as part of the agreement) is the first stage of the peace process, which shall serve as a stable platform for further negotiations with the aim to re-establish complete peace and security in CARANA.
3. The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within seventy-two hours after the signing of the ceasefire agreement.

ARTICLE II

4. The Parties agree to a permanent ceasefire among all their forces with their broader objective of sustaining the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, promoting peace culture, reconciliation and confidence building;
5. The ceasefire shall uphold the following principles: Permanent cessation of hostilities between CDF, MPC and ICSC within 72 hours after the signature of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement.
6. The permanent cessation of hostilities shall include the following activities:
 - a) The suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry.
 - b) Banning the distribution of lethal logistical supplies to or from any of the forces.
 - c) Upon signing of the Peace Agreement, the parties will discuss the issue of prisoner of war, political prisoners, and camps for displaced persons. The parties agree to release all civilian abductees and to demobilize combatants who are less than eighteen years.
 - d) A complete ban on any mine-laying operations and the hindering of operations to remove mines.
 - e) Cessation of all domestic and external propaganda between the parties and incitation of ethnic hatred.
 - f) Cessation of all acts of violence against the civilian population; acts of revenge; summary executions; torture; harassment; detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnic origin, religious beliefs, or political affiliation; arming of civilians; use of child soldiers; sexual violence; sponsoring or promotion of terrorists or genocidal ideologies.
 - g) Cessation of all attacks by air, land and sea, as well as all acts of sabotage.

h) Cessation of any actions likely to impede the normal implementation of the process.

ARTICLE III

7. The Parties agree to request the United Nations to constitute an effective, sustainable and affordable UN Peace Support Mission to monitor and verify this agreement and to support the implementation of the Peace Agreement.
8. The size of the UN Peace Support Mission shall be determined by the UN in consolidation with the parties.
9. For the purpose of monitoring activities related to the cease fire, the international monitors shall have unrestricted access in accordance with a Status of Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Status of Forces Agreement (SOFA).
10. The Parties request the UN to provide cultural orientation to all its members to create conducive atmosphere for respect and better understanding of social values and cultures to ensure effective implementation of this agreement.

ARTICLE IV

11. The Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will be composed of one senior representative from each party and one legal adviser of each party signatory of the agreement and the United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General or his/her deputy.
12. It shall be established no later than 30 days (D¹+30) upon signing the Peace Agreement.
13. The Commission, which is the decision-making organ for the ceasefire shall be based in Galasi and shall be headed by the UN. The tasks include:
 - a. after signature of the present Agreement, developing the ceasefire measures to be taken, including in particular the security measures, the cantonment and disarmament of armed groups in Carana as well as the active redeployment of defence and security forces in Carana,
 - b. monitoring the security arrangements.
14. The Commission will discuss and decide on all disputes about allegations regarding the agreed Cease Fire reported by the Regional Joint Teams (RJTs).

¹ D = Day of signature of the peace agreement

ARTICLE V

15. The Regional Joint Teams will be composed of representatives of all signatories, and the United Nations. The RJTs shall be led by officers of the UN. The RJTs will be responsible to the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC).
16. The RJTs shall have a Secretariat made up of senior United Nations officers. It shall be based at Galasi. It may meet anywhere as convened by the JCC or upon request of the RJT leaders.
17. The RJT will share information and facilitate communication between parties in order to reduce the likelihood of violations of the Ceasefire Agreement and to clarify alleged violations of the agreement. They will thereby assist in building confidence amongst signatories and help create trust in the peace process.
18. The duties and tasks of the Regional Joint Teams will be established by an internal rule of order that will define the attributes, way of functioning, rights and general duties of this structure.
19. RJTs shall be established no later than 60 days (D+60) of signing the Peace Agreement in all provincial capitals of Carana.

ARTICLE VI

20. The signatories of the present agreement accept the following principles whose modalities of implementation specified in the Kalari Peace Treaty:
 - a. Re-establishment of the rule of law based on national unity, democracy, pluralism in all its forms and respect for human rights.
 - b. Formation and composition of the new CARANA National Defence and Security Forces shall consist of Government forces and combatants of the Armed Political Parties and Movements.
 - c. Establishment of power sharing within the framework of a broad-based inclusive Transitional Government.

ARTICLE VII

21. The government of CARANA will undertake any effort to conduct Presidential and National elections within six months of the adoption of a new constitution for Carana.

PART TWO

Ceasefire Agreements

1. A ceasefire is hereby established throughout the territory of Carana between the signatories of the Peace Agreement. The ceasefire shall enter into force upon signature and the implementation will be put into effect as soon as possible.
2. The final cessation of hostilities shall enter into force within 72 hours after the signing of the Ceasefire Agreement.
3. The Ceasefire Agreement is the first stage of the peace process and shall serve as a stable platform for further negotiations with the aim to re-establish complete peace and security in Carana.
4. The permanent cessation of hostilities shall include final termination of the following activities:
 - a. Military activities including movement, reconnaissance, reinforcement, recruitment, drafting and military exercises other than those permitted by the JCC.
 - b. Land, air and river operations;
 - c. Laying of mines and other subversive activities;
 - d. Use of force against and abuse of civilians;
 - e. Replenishment of ammunition, weapons and other lethal or military equipment;
 - f. Hostile propaganda from inside or outside the country;
 - g. Occupation of new locations; The cessation of all acts of violence against the civilian population, including acts of revenge, summary executions, torture, harassment, detention and persecution of civilians on the basis of ethnicity, religious beliefs or political affiliation. Parties also agree to cease the use of child soldiers, sexual violence, or the sponsorship and/or promotion of terrorists or genocide ideologies.
 - h. The cessation of all domestic and external propaganda between the parties and the incitation of ethnic hatred.
 - i. The cessation of any actions likely to impede the normal implementation of the Kalari Treaty and the peace process.
 - j. Any other actions that may impede the normal progress of the peace process.

Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR)

5. To establish a National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR) based in Galasi that shall be chaired by a representative of the transitional Government of Carana and consist of twelve members: three each from the FDC, MPC, CISC and the UN. The Commission shall be responsible for all elements of the DDR programme.

- a. The commission shall have a military sub-commission chaired by the United Nations Head of Military Component with four members: one each from the FDC, MPC, CISC, and the UN.
 - b. The commission shall also have a reintegration sub-commission chaired by the transitional Government of Carana with representatives of the four organizations.
 - c. The commission shall also have a small arms and light weapons sub-commission chaired by the transitional Government of Carana with representative of the four organizations.
 - d. The commission may establish other sub-commissions as required.
 - e. The NCDDR should have been constituted by D+30 and have its first meeting on D+60. The sub-commissions shall be established NLT D+90.
 - f. It reports regularly to the National Transitional Government and informs the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire. The Sub-commissions report to the NCDDR at regular intervals to be determined by the NCDDR.
6. To voluntarily commit all MPC and CISC forces to the DDR process. All FDC, MPC and CISC soldiers shall be registered.
 7. A complete ban on any mine-laying operations and the hindering of operations to remove mines. All parties further agree to declare all force structures, weapons, minefields and locations to the National Commission by D+45, and further agree to remain at their reported locations.
 8. The immediate suspension of supplies of ammunition and weaponry and a ban on the distribution of lethal logistical supplies to and from any of the parties to this agreement.
 9. To discuss, upon signing of the Kalari Treaty, the issue of prisoners of war, political prisoners, and camps for displaced persons. The parties also undertake to release all civilian abductees and to demobilize combatants who are less than 18 years of age.

National Army

10. A new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), shall be created of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants. The FDSC shall operate under the authority of the new transitional Government of Carana, based on the establishment of a power-sharing arrangement outlined in the Kalari Treaty.
11. All belligerents will exchange detailed documents about the strength, capabilities and locations of their forces. The information is to be shared with the NCDDR and the JCC NLT D+45.
12. All forces of the FDC, MPC and CISC will withdraw from their field locations to respective Battalion HQ locations, by D+150.
13. All belligerents will decide on cantonment sites/locations for disarmament and demobilisation by D+180.

14. MPC and CISC will disarm and demobilise as soon the security situation allows, but NLT D+210.
15. To ensure that all weapons (including ammunition and mines) are surrendered to international authorities for storage or destruction no later than D+240.
16. 4,000 MPC and 1,500 CISC members will be integrated in the new FDSC NLT D+360.
17. All military personnel beyond 22,000 will need to be disarmed, demobilized and integrated into other government sectors or private sectors.

The Ceasefire Zone

18. The scope of the ceasefire shall be the whole territory of Carana.

Violations

19. The following acts shall be constituting violations of this agreement:
 - a. Any acts that may contravene this agreement;
 - b. Unauthorized movements of troops;
 - c. Unauthorized recruitment, draft and/or mobilization drive;
 - d. Unauthorized replenishment of military equipment and supplies;
 - e. Hostile acts;
 - f. Violation of human rights, humanitarian law and obstruction of freedom of movement;
 - g. Hostile propaganda and media warfare;
 - h. Espionage, sabotage and acts of subversion to undermine either party and/or agreement;
 - i. Recruitment of child soldiers.

Other Armed Groups

20. The Parties agree to expedite the process of incorporation and reintegration of armed groups allied to either Party, into their armed forces, other organized forces, the civil service and societal institutions.
21. The Parties agree to guarantee all armed groups the freedom of choice, which forces or other institution they are joining.
22. By D + 360 all fighters of other armed groups shall be reintegrated or disarmed.

Verification, Monitoring, Complaints and Obligations

23. The structure and levels of verification and decision on disputes of the implementation of the Agreement shall be as follows:
 - a. Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC);
 - b. Regional Joint Teams (RJTs).
24. The structure and levels for the implementation and verification of the Disarmament Process shall be as follows:
 - a. National Transitional Government (until new government is being elected);
 - b. National Commission for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (NCDDR);
 - c. NCDDR sub-commissions.

National Police Force

25. A new national police service shall be created of not more than 12,500 officers with up to 3,000 are being drawn from former MPC combatants and up to 1,250 being drawn from former CISC combatants.
26. The United Nations will support the establishment and restructuring of the police service through the provision of training and monitoring.

PART THREE

GOVERNANCE

ARTICLE I

ARCHITECTURE

1. The Parties shall put in place an institutional architecture enabling the populations of the Carana to manage their own affairs in a spirit of participative citizenship, based on the principle of free administration and enabling wider representation of these populations within national institutions. To this end, the following provisions shall be made:
 - a. the representation of the population shall be enhanced by increasing the number of electoral constituencies and/or other appropriate measures; in particular of representatives of the traditional elites, and of women and young people;
 - b. there shall be better representation of the population of Carana in the institutions and main public services, bodies and administrations of the Republic of Carana; governance and wealth sharing agreements are to be developed.
2. The Parties acknowledge the need to share remit and responsibilities between the State and territorial collectively, to ensure that the latter are effective and able to meet the needs and demands of local communities and citizens.

ARTICLE II

ESTABLISHMENT OF A TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT

1. An all-inclusive Transitional Government to be called the National Transitional Government of Carana, (NTGC), is hereby established to replace the present Government of Carana.
2. The NTGC shall consist of three branches, namely:
 - a. The National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA);
 - b. The Executive; and
 - c. The Judiciary.
3. The Executive Branch of the NTGC shall be inaugurated and fully commence operations by D + 30. The National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) and the Judiciary shall be inaugurated and fully commence operations by D + 90. Their mandate shall expire when the next elected Government of Carana shall be inaugurated.
4. Upon inauguration of the NTGC in Carana, all cabinet Ministers, Deputy and Assistant Ministers, heads of autonomous agencies, commissions, and heads of public corporations and State-owned enterprises of the current GOC shall be deemed to have resigned. This does not preclude re-appointment according to the appropriate provisions of this Agreement.

5. The authority of the NTGC shall be established and recognised throughout the territory of Carana, immediately upon its installation in Galasi. The NTGC shall have control over the entire territory of Carana.
6. There shall be no restriction on members of the parties to the conflict to engage in national politics through the formation of political parties or otherwise, save and except those restrictions imposed on all parties and associations by the relevant laws of Carana.

ARTICLE III

MANDATE OF THE NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT OF CARANA

1. The primary responsibility of the NTGC shall be to ensure the scrupulous implementation of this Peace Agreement.
2. In addition to normal State functions, its mandate shall include the following:
 - a. Implementation of the provisions of the Peace Agreement;
 - b. Overseeing and coordinating implementation of the political and rehabilitation programs enunciated in this Peace Agreement;
 - c. Promotion of reconciliation to ensure the restoration of peace and stability to the country and its people;
 - d. Contribution to the preparation and conduct of internationally supervised elections, for the inauguration of an elected Government of Carana.

ARTICLE IV

THE NATIONAL TRANSITIONAL LEGISLATIVE ASSEMBLY (NTLA)

1. There is hereby established a National Transitional Legislative Assembly (NTLA) in Carana which shall reflect a broad spectrum of the Carana society.
2. The NTLA shall be unicameral in nature and shall replace, within the transitional period, the entire Legislature of the Republic of Carana.
3. The NTLA shall have a maximum of seventy-six (76) members who shall come from the following entities:
 - a. Each of the eight (8) Provinces;
 - b. The present Government of Carana, the MPC, the CISC, the political parties, civil society and interest groups including the National Bar Association, the Carana Chamber of Commerce, Industry and Agriculture, women's organizations, trade unions, the Teachers' Union, internally displaced persons (IDPs), and the youth;

- c. The formula for the composition of the NTLA shall be as follows: GOC -15 seats, MPC -15 seats, CISC -15 seats, Political Parties -15 seats, Civil Society and Special Interest Groups - 8 seats, Provinces -8 seats.
4. The NTLA shall elect a Speaker to head the Assembly as well as a Deputy Speaker. The Speaker and Deputy Speaker within the NTGC shall not contest for any elective office during the coming elections.
5. The NTLA shall have responsibility for the following:
 - a. Assuming responsibility for the country's legislative functions;
 - b. Encouraging and supporting the emergence of a new democratic space, particularly in the areas of human rights and freedom of expression.
6. Two-thirds (2/3) of members of the NTLA shall form the quorum for meetings of the Assembly.

ARTICLE V

CONSTITUTION AND ELECTIONS

1. Under the auspices of the Speaker and the Deputy Speaker, a constitutional board shall be established. The composition of this board shall be as follows:
 - a. Three (3) of the GoC, three (3) of the MPC, three (3) of the CISC, two (2) of the political parties, two (2) of the civil society and two (2) representatives of the International Community;
 - b. The board shall be established not later than three months after signing of the Peace agreement and shall complete the draft of a new constitution of Carana within one year;
 - c. The constitution shall be adopted by 2/3 (two thirds) of the NTLA;
 - d. Immediately after the new constitution is adopted elections shall be prepared and conducted within 6 months of the adoption.

ARTICLE VI

INSTITUTION OF THE PRESIDENCY

1. There shall be established the Institution of the Presidency consisting of the President and two Vice-Presidents.
2. The functions of the two Vice-Presidents shall be clearly defined by the parties to this Agreement.
3. Until such time as elections are held, the current incumbent President (or his successor) shall be President and the Commander-in Chief of the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC). The current Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) Chairman (or his successor) shall

be the First Vice President and at the same time holds the post of Commander-in Chief of the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC). The current Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC) Chairman (or his successor) shall be the Second Vice President and at the same time holds the post of Commander-in Chief of the Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC).

4. In respect to the following matters, the President shall take decisions with the consent of both Vice-Presidents:
 - a. Declarations and termination of the state of emergency;
 - b. Declaration of war;
 - c. Appointments that the President is required to make according to the Peace Agreement, (to be specified), and
 - d. Summoning, adjourning and promulgating the National Legislature.
5. The President shall be elected in national elections, the timing shall be subject to the agreement, preferably together with the national election following the adoption of the new constitution. The President shall also appoint two Vice Presidents, ensuring representation of all three major ethnics groups in the Presidency.
6. Should the post of President fall vacant prior to the election, the functions of the President shall be assumed by a President Council comprising the Chairman of the National Transitional Assembly, the First Vice President and the Vice President.
7. Should the post of President fall vacant after the election, the post shall be filled through presidential elections which shall be held within sixty (60) days.

PART FOUR

WEALTH SHARING AND DEVELOPMENT

PRINCIPLES FOR WEALTH SHARING

1. The Parties agree that the guiding principles and provisions below shall be the basis for the comprehensive text on Wealth Sharing.
2. The wealth of Carana shall be shared equitably so as to enable each level of government to discharge its legal and constitutional responsibilities and duties.
3. The sharing and allocation of wealth emanating from the resources of Carana shall ensure that the quality of life, dignity and living conditions of all the citizens are promoted without discrimination on grounds of gender, race, religion, political affiliation, ethnicity, language, or region. The sharing and allocation of this wealth shall be based on the premise that all parts of Carana are entitled to development.
4. The Parties agree that those areas in need of construction/reconstruction shall be brought up to the same average level of socio-economic and public services throughout Carana. To achieve these objectives will take time and effort to build up local institutional, human, and economic capacity. For this purpose, two special funds shall be established as provided herein.
5. That revenue sharing should reflect a commitment to devolution of power and decentralisation of decision-making concerning development, service delivery and governance.
6. The development of infrastructure, human resources, sustainable economic development and the capacity to meet human needs shall be conducted within a framework of transparent and accountable government.
7. This Agreement sets out the respective types of income, revenue, taxes and other sources of wealth to which the various levels of government are entitled.
8. The Parties recognize that the National Transitional Government of Carana (NTGC), during the Interim Period, will need to mobilize additional national resources.
9. There is a limit on how many additional national resources can be mobilized and part of the national needs in a post-conflict Carana will have to be met by external assistance.
10. In agreeing to these wealth-sharing arrangements, the Parties signal to the international community that it will have to play a strong and constructive role in providing post-conflict construction/reconstruction assistance to Carana, especially to East and South Carana and other war-affected and least developed areas.

Reconstruction and Development Funds

Carana Reconstruction and Development Fund (CRDF)

1. By D+90 there shall be established a Carana Reconstruction and Development Fund (CRDF) to solicit, raise and collect funds from domestic and international donors and disburse such funds for the reconstruction and rehabilitation of the infrastructure, for the resettlement and reintegration of internally and externally displaced persons, and to address past imbalances in regional development and infrastructure.
2. A monitoring and evaluation system shall be established to ensure accountability, transparency, efficiency, equity and fairness in the utilization of resources.
3. The Government / NTGC shall be responsible for expenditure from the fund and shall be entitled to raise additional funds by way of donation from foreign States, multilateral organizations, or other bodies for the purposes of the reconstruction and development of the states/regions.
4. The Fund shall be transparently administered and professionally managed subject to an oversight committee appointed by the Government /NTGC. It should include a representative of the National Ministry of Finance and of the National Audit Chamber.

Multi-Donor Trust Funds

1. The Parties recognize the need to establish a Multi-Donor Trust Funds (MDTF) to support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components. The Trust Funds shall be operational for the Interim Period and shall thereafter be transformed into the Carana Reconstruction and Development Fund.
2. The MDTF shall commence immediately to support, among other things, priority areas of capacity building and institutional strengthening and quick start/impact programs identified by the Parties.
3. The MDTF shall support urgent recurrent and investment budget costs under clearly stated criteria of eligible financing components, and shall have the right to solicit, raise and collect funds from foreign donors.
4. To ensure proper accountability for funds disbursed through the MDTF the Parties shall cause audits to be performed on funds used within six (6) months of the close of the recipient's financial year.
5. All trust funds shall report the flow of funds to the CBOC.

Institutional framework

1. The regions shall be competent, within the framework defined by legislation and provisions, in the following areas:
 - a. planning and programming economic, social and cultural development;
 - b. territorial management;
 - c. creation and management of public infrastructure and basic social services (basic education and professional training, health, environment, culture, regional road and communication infrastructure, water and sanitation);
 - d. agriculture, livestock, fishing, forestry management, transport, commerce, industry, handicrafts, tourism, interregional transport;
 - e. regional administrative budgets and accounts;
 - f. setting up and collecting local taxes and revenues using parameters specified by the State;
 - g. fee collection institutions;
 - h. accepting and refusing donations, subsidies and legacies;
 - i. disbursement of subsidies; acquisition of holdings; decentralised cooperation and twinning;
 - j. territorial police and civil protection.

PART FIVE**POST-CONFLICT REHABILITATION AND RECONSTRUCTION****ARTICLE I****AMNESTY**

The NTGC shall give consideration to a recommendation for general amnesty to all persons and parties engaged or involved in military activities during the Carana civil conflict.

ARTICLE II**HUMAN RIGHTS**

1. The rights and duties proclaimed and guaranteed inter alia by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenants on Human Rights, the Fasian Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women and the Convention on the Rights of the Child shall form an integral part of the Constitution of the Republic of Carana.
2. All women and men shall be equal. No one may be discriminated against, inter alia, on grounds of origin, race, ethnicity, gender, colour, language, social situation, or religious, philosophical or political convictions, or because of a physical or mental handicap. All citizens shall enjoy equal protection of the law, as well as equal treatment under the law.
3. The Parties agree on the need for the establishment of an Independent National Commission on Human Rights (INCHR) by D+ 180.
4. The INCHR shall monitor compliance with the basic rights guaranteed in the present Peace Agreement as well as promote human rights education throughout the various sectors of Carana society, including schools, the media, the police and the military.
5. The INCHR shall work together with local Carana human rights and civil society organizations, international human rights organisations and other relevant U.N. agencies to monitor and strengthen the observance of human rights in the country.
6. Technical, financial and material assistance may be sought by the INCHR from the U.N. Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), the African Commission on Human and People's Rights and other relevant international organizations.

ARTICLE III

TRUTH AND RECONCILIATION COMISSION

1. A Truth and Reconciliation Commission shall be established by D + 120 to provide a forum that will address issues of impunity, as well as an opportunity for both the victims and perpetrators of human rights violations to share their experiences, in order to get a clear picture of the past to facilitate genuine healing and reconciliation.
2. In the spirit of national reconciliation, the Commission shall deal with the root causes of the crises in Carana, including human rights violations.
3. This Commission shall recommend measures to be taken for the rehabilitation of victims of human rights violations.
4. Membership of the Commission shall be drawn from a cross-section of Carana society, including women. The Parties request that the International Community provide the necessary financial and technical support for the operations of the Commission.

ARTICLE IV

RECONCILIATION AND JUSTICE

1. The Parties shall create the conditions needed to facilitate the rapid return, repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons and refugees, and to set up mechanisms to take care of them, in accordance with the relevant international instruments.
2. The Parties shall promote genuine national reconciliation based on the following elements:
 - a. development of a National Charter for peace, unity and national reconciliation;
 - b. creation of transitional justice mechanisms in particular by operationalising the Truth, Justice and Reconciliation Council;
 - c. creation of a Committee to fight corruption and financial mismanagement;
 - d. creation of an International Committee of Enquiry tasked with investigating all war crimes, crimes against humanity, genocide, sexual crimes and other serious violations of International Law, Human Rights and International Humanitarian Law throughout the territory of Carana;
 - e. reaffirmation of the inalienable character of war crimes and crimes against humanity and the commitment of the Parties to cooperate with the International Committee of Enquiry;
 - f. no amnesty for the authors of war crimes, crimes against humanity and serious violations of Human Rights, including violence against women, girls and infants, related to the conflict;
 - g. consolidation of judicial power in order to ensure the Rule of Law throughout the country; commitment to carry out an in-depth review of the justice system to bring it closer to the

litigants, improve its performance, end impunity and integrate traditional and customary regulations without prejudice in the sovereign law of the State;

- h. extension of legal and regulatory assistance, and information on citizens' rights;
- i. promotion of high quality training for all stakeholders and related personnel in the justice system, particularly concerning civil mediation, taking into account cultural, religious and traditional characteristics;
- j. acknowledgement of the status of traditional authorities within the regulations on protocol and precedence.

ARTICLE V

HUMANITARIAN ACTION

1. The Parties shall promote and respect the principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence, which guide humanitarian action. They shall also prevent any use of humanitarian aid for political, economic or military ends, and facilitate access for humanitarian agencies and guarantee the security of their personnel.
2. The Parties re-affirm the commitment made in the Ceasefire Agreement, to provide security guarantees for safe and unhindered access by all humanitarian agencies to vulnerable groups throughout the country, in order to facilitate the delivery of humanitarian assistance in accordance with international conventions, principles and norms governing humanitarian operations.
3. Accordingly, the Parties agree to guarantee the security and movement of humanitarian personnel, that of their properties, goods transported, stocked or distributed, as well as their projects and beneficiaries.
4. The Transitional Government provided for in this agreement shall ensure the establishment of effective administrative and security infrastructure to monitor and support the implementation of these guarantees.
5. The said Transitional Government shall request the International Community to assist in providing humanitarian assistance for those in need, including internally displaced persons, refugees and returnees.
6. The Parties shall ensure the presence of security guarantees for the safe return and resettlement of refugees and internally displaced persons and the free movement of persons and goods.

ARTICLE VI**INTERNATIONAL ASSISTANCE**

1. The Parties call for the urgent establishment of a consolidated United Nations Peace Support Mission in Carana that will have the resources to facilitate the implementation and coordination of the Political, Social, Economic and Security assistance to be extended under this Agreement.
2. The Parties also call on the International Community, to set up a monitoring mechanism in the form of an Implementation Monitoring Committee (IMC) in Galasi that will ensure effective and faithful implementation of the Peace Agreement by all the Parties.
3. The Parties agree on the need for regular joint meetings between this Implementation Monitoring Committee and representatives of the NTGC, in order to assess implementation of the provisions of this Agreement and agree on recommendations for enhanced implementation.
4. The Parties also agree on the need to organise periodic donor conferences for resource mobilisation for post-conflict rehabilitation and reconstruction in Carana.

ARTICLE VII**REFUGEES AND DISPLACED PERSONS**

1. The NTGC, with the assistance of the International Community, shall design and implement a plan for the voluntary return and reintegration of Carana refugees and internally displaced persons, including non-combatants, in accordance with international conventions, norms and practices.
2. Refugees or internally displaced persons, desirous of returning to their original Counties or permanent residences, shall be assisted to do so.
3. The Parties commit themselves to peaceful co-existence amongst returnees and non-returnees in all Counties.

ARTICLE VIII**VULNERABLE GROUPS**

1. The NTGC shall accord particular attention to the issue of the rehabilitation of vulnerable groups or war victims (children, women, the elderly and the disabled) within Carana, who have been severely affected by the conflict in Carana.
2. With the support of the International Community, the NTGC shall design and implement a program for the rehabilitation of such war victims.
3. The NTGC shall, in addition, accord special attention to the issue of child combatants.

4. It shall, accordingly, mobilize resources with the assistance of the International Community, especially in cooperation with the Office of the U.N. Special Representative for Children in Armed Conflict, UNICEF, the Fasian Committee of Experts on the Rights and Welfare of the Child and other relevant agencies, to address their special demobilisation and re-integration needs.
5. The NTGC, in formulating and implementing programs for national rehabilitation, reconstruction and development, for the moral, social and physical reconstruction of Carana in the post-conflict period, shall ensure that the needs and potentials of the war victims are taken into account and that gender balance is maintained in apportioning responsibilities for program implementation.



Report of the Secretary-General on Carana

Security Council

27 July 2021

Original: English

Report of the Secretary-General on Carana

(Omitted - refer to the CARANA complete package)

Security Council Resolution 1544



United Nations



Security Council

Distr: GENERAL
S/RES/1544/2021
10 September 2021
Original: English

Resolution 1544 (2021)

Adopted by the Security Council at its 5000th meeting, on 03 May 2021

The Security Council,

Recalling its Presidential Statements of 14 December 2020 (S/PRST/2020/24) and statements on Carana,

Reaffirming its strong commitment to the sovereignty, unity and territorial integrity of Carana,

Reaffirming the basic principles of peacekeeping, including consent of the parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, and *recognizing* that the mandate of each peacekeeping mission is specific to the need and situation of the country concerned,

Expressing its utmost concern at the dire consequences of the prolonged conflict for the civilian population throughout Carana, in particular the increase in the number of refugees and internally displaced persons,

Remaining seriously concerned over the significant ongoing food and humanitarian crisis in Carana and over the insecurity which hinders humanitarian access, the presence of landmines as well as the continued proliferation of weapons from within and outside the region that threatens the peace, security, and stability,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to uphold and respect the humanitarian principles of humanity, neutrality, impartiality and independence in order to ensure the continued provision of humanitarian assistance, the safety of civilians receiving assistance and the security of

humanitarian personnel operating in Carana and stressing the importance of humanitarian assistance being delivered on the basis of need,

Stressing the urgent need for substantial humanitarian assistance to the Carana population,

Deploring all violations of human rights, particularly atrocities against civilian populations, including widespread abduction of men, women and children, the use of landmines and sexual violence against women and children and,

Taking note with appreciation of the reports of the United Nations Commission on Human Rights Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Carana,

Noting the continued conflict in the western border region, with regard to El Hasar fighters penetrating into Carana and inflicting violence on local communities there,

Observing the increasing tensions between Carana and Rimosá with regard to territorial disputes about Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) and oil field exploration in the Indian Ocean,

Emphasizing the need for all parties to safeguard the welfare and security of humanitarian workers and UN personnel in accordance with applicable rules and principles of international law,

Deploring all violations of human rights, particularly against civilian population, and urging the new transitional Government of Carana to take all necessary measures to put an end to impunity and to ensure that the continued promotion and protection of human rights,

Mindful of the need for accountability for violations of international humanitarian law and urging the transitional government once established to ensure that the protection of human rights and the establishment of a state based on the rule of law and of an independent judiciary are among its highest priorities,

Taking note of the report of the Secretary-General (S/2021/4711), dated 27 July 2021, on the situation in Carana, including recommendations and options for establishing a United Nations Mission in Carana,

Taking note of the Kalari Peace Agreement reached by some of the key parties on 11 August 2021 in Kalari, Sumora and urging all parties to work without delay towards a broad political consensus on the nature and duration of the political transition,

Reaffirming that the primary responsibility for implementing the Kalari Peace Treaty rests with the parties, and urging the parties to move forward with implementation of these agreements immediately in order to ensure the peaceful formation of a new transitional government,

Stressing that lasting stability in Carana will depend on peace in the sub-region, and emphasizing the importance of cooperation among the countries of the sub-region toward this

end, as well as the need for coordination of UN efforts to contribute to the consolidation of peace and security in the sub-region,

Noting the co-operation agreement between the Government of France, the Government of Carana and the MPC allowing French Forces (FRAFOR) to cross into Carana to pursue El Hasar elements, as well as noting the need for close coordination between the French Forces “Operation Aigle”, Carana and the UN,

Encouraging the international community to provide broad support to resolve the crisis in Carana through coordinated actions for immediate and long-term needs, encompassing security, governance, development and humanitarian issues,

Looking forward to the high-level international donors’ conference in Accra on 25 October 2021 to support the development of Carana, commending the contributions already made toward the 2021 Humanitarian Response Plan for Carana and urging all Member States and other donors to contribute generously for humanitarian operations,

Determining that the situation in Carana continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security in the region and to the peace process for Carana,

Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council

1. *Decides* to establish the Multidimensional United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) for an initial period of 12 months;
2. *Calls for* tangible achievements in the political process in Carana, which are of critical significance for the successful deployment and activities of UNAC;
3. *Requests* the Secretary-General to expeditiously appoint a Special Representative for Carana and Head of Mission of UNAC, who shall, from the date of appointment, assume overall authority on the ground for the coordination of all the activities of the United Nations, and its agencies, funds and programmes, in Carana and shall use good offices and coordinate efforts of the international community, and coordinate the overall support of the international community in Carana, including in the field of Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration (DDR) and Security Sector Reform (SSR), further emphasizes that the Special Representative shall ensure optimal coordination between UNAC and the United Nations Country Team in Carana, in connection with the aspects of their respective mandates, and optimal coordination between UNAC, the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and French Forces Operation Aigle;
4. *Decides* that UNAC will comprise up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 staff officers, and up to 1,885 civilian police officers including formed units to assist in the maintenance of law and order throughout Carana, and the appropriate civilian component; *calls upon* Member States to provide troops and police with adequate capabilities and equipment in order to establish the capacity of UNAC to operate, and discharge its responsibilities, effectively and requests the Secretary-General to recruit qualified

staff, who have the professional experience and skills appropriate to the tasks defined under applicable competency areas;

5. Decides that UNAC shall have the following mandate:

(a) Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement:

- i. to observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;
- ii. to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties' military forces;

(b) Support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration:

- i. to assist in the development and implementation of a voluntary national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme for all armed parties, and to collect, store or destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme as agreed by the Kalari Peace Treaty of 11 August 2021, and in cooperation with relevant international organizations and donor nations;
- ii. to support the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants with particular regard to the needs of child soldiers, women, and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;
- iii. to assist and carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme;

(c) Protection of civilians and United Nations Personnel, Facilities and Civilians:

- i. to protect without prejudice to the efforts of the government, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment,
- ii. to provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;
- iii. to protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;

(d) Promotion and protection of human rights

- i. to monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Carana and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;
- ii. to support, in particular, the full deployment of UNAC human rights observers throughout the country;

- iii. to monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;
- iv. to assist the authorities of Carana in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;
- v. to ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection and monitoring activities;

(e) Support for Humanitarian Assistance:

To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions to protect refugees and internally displaced persons in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors.

(f) Support for Security Sector Reform:

- i. to assist the new Carana transitional Government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- ii. to assist the new transitional Government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

(g) Support for Implementation of the Peace Process:

- i. to assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners to re-establish national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels;
- ii. to assist the new transitional Government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;
- iii. to assist the new transitional Government in preparing for national elections to be held no later than six months after the adoption of the new constitution of Carana;
- iv. to assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;

6. Urges all parties in Carana to cooperate fully with the deployment and activities of UNAC, in particular by ensuring their safety, security and freedom of movement with unhindered and immediate access throughout the territory of Carana to enable UNAC to carry out fully its mandate;

7. *Calls upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Carana of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of UNAC;*

8. *Stresses the importance to provide UNAC with the necessary performance capacities to fulfil its mandate in a complex security environment that includes asymmetric threats while ensuring the best possible level of safety and security for its personnel;*

9. *Urges Member States to provide troops and police that have adequate capabilities, including regarding language skills, pre-deployment and, where appropriate, in situ training, and equipment, including enablers, specific to the operating environment, notes the potential adverse effects on mandate implementation of national caveats which have not been declared and accepted by the Secretary General prior to deployment, and calls on Members State to declare all national caveats, provide troops and police with the minimum of declared caveats, and to fully and effectively implement the provisions of the Memoranda of Understanding (MoU) signed with the United Nations;*

10. *Requests the Secretary-General to ensure the full, effective and meaningful participation of women in all aspects of operations;*

11. *Reiterates that the training, consolidation and redeployment of the Carana Defence and Security Forces is vital to ensure Carana's long-term security and stability and to protect the people of Carana and stresses the importance of the Carana Defence and Security Forces assuming full responsibility for providing security throughout the Carana territory;*

12. *Demands that the parties cease hostilities throughout Carana and fulfil their obligations under the Kalari Peace Treaty;*

13. *Calls upon all parties to cooperate fully in the deployment and operations of UNAC, including through ensuring the safety, security and freedom of movement of UN and associated personnel throughout Carana;*

14. *Calls upon the parties to engage for the purpose of addressing the question of DDR on an urgent basis and urges the parties, in particular the Government of Carana, the Mouvement Patriotique du Carana (MPC) and Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC), to work closely with UNAC, relevant assistance organizations and donor nations in the implementation of a DDR programme;*

15. *Calls upon the international donor community to provide assistance for the implementation of a DDR programme and sustained international assistance to the peace process, and to contribute to consolidated humanitarian appeals;*

16. *Calls upon the Government of Carana, the Government of Katasi, the French Government and the French Operation in Katasi to coordinate the efforts to address the terrorist threat posed by El Hasar in order to ensure the implementation of the peace agreement, force protection and the protection of the civilian population in border regions of Carana and Katasi;*

17. *Calls upon* the Government of Carana and the Government of Rimosa to settle their disputes with respect to the territorial ownership of the islands, the Exclusive Economic Zones (EEZ), the exploitation of the oilfields as well as fishing rights of the coast of Carana;

18. *Emphasizes* that the protection of civilians, as described in paragraph 5, subparagraph (c), must be given priority in decisions about the use of available capacity and resources, over any of the other tasks described in that paragraph,

19. *Stresses* the need for an effective public information capacity, including the establishment as necessary of United Nations radio stations to promote understanding of the peace process and the role of UNAC among local communities and the parties;

20. *Encourages* UNAC within its capabilities and areas of deployment to support the voluntary return of refugees and internally displaced persons;

21. *Requests* the new transitional Government to conclude a Status-of-Mission Agreement (SOMA) and Status-of-Force Agreement (SOFA) with the Secretary-General within 30 days of adoption of this resolution, and notes that pending the conclusion of such an agreement, the model Status-of-Force Agreement dated 9 October 1990 (A/45/594) shall apply provisionally;

22. *Calls upon* all parties to comply with obligations under international humanitarian law to respect and protect all civilians, including humanitarian personnel and civilian objects, as well as all medical personnel and humanitarian personnel exclusively engaged in medical duties, their means of transport and equipment, as well as hospitals and other medical facilities, and take all required steps to allow and facilitate the full, safe, immediate and unimpeded access of humanitarian actors for the delivery of humanitarian assistance to all people in need, while respecting the humanitarian principles and applicable international law;

23. *Reiterates* that the transitional authorities of Carana have primary responsibility to protect civilians in Carana, further recalls its resolutions 1265 (1999), 1296 (2000), 1674 (2006), 1738 (2006) and 1894 (2009) on the protection of civilians in armed conflict, its resolutions 1612 (2005), 1882 (2009), 1998 (2011) and 2068 (2012) on Children And Armed Conflict and its resolutions 1325 (2000), 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), and 1960 (2010) on Women, Peace and Security and calls upon UNAC and all military forces in Carana to take them into account and to abide by international humanitarian, human rights and refugee law, and recalls the importance of training in this regard;

24. *Demands* that all parties cease all use of child soldiers, that all parties cease all human rights violations and atrocities against the Carana population, and stresses the need to bring to justice those responsible;

25. *Reaffirms* the importance of a gender perspective in peacekeeping operations and post-conflict peace building in accordance with resolution 1325 (2000), recalls the need to address violence against women and girls as a tool of warfare, and encourages UNAC as well as the Carana parties to actively address these issues;

26. *Reiterates* its demand that all States in the region cease military support for armed groups in neighbouring countries, take action to prevent armed individuals and groups from using their territory to prepare and commit attacks on neighbouring countries and refrain from any

actions that might contribute to further destabilization of the situation in the region, and declares its readiness to consider, if necessary, ways of promoting compliance with this demand;

27. *Calls upon* the international community to consider how it might help future economic development in Carana aimed at achieving long-term stability in Carana and improving the welfare of its people;

28. *Recognizes* that the effective implementation of peacekeeping mandates is the responsibility of all stakeholders and is contingent upon several critical factors, including well-defined, realistic, and achievable mandates, political will, leadership, performance and accountability at all levels, adequate resources, policy, planning, and operational guidelines, and training and equipment;

29. *Requests* the Secretary-General to ensure full compliance of UNAC with the United Nations zero-tolerance policy on sexual exploitation and abuses and sexual harassment, including by making full use of the existing authority of the SRSG to ensure accountability of the Mission's staff and through effective mission support arrangement and to keep the Council fully informed if such cases of misconduct occur, and urges troop- and police-contributing countries to take appropriate preventative action, including vetting, pre-deployment and in-mission awareness training, and to ensure full accountability in cases of such conduct involving their personnel, including through timely investigations of all allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, and repatriate units when there is credible evidence of widespread or systemic sexual exploitation and abuse by those units;

30. *Recalls* its request to standardize a culture of performance in UN peacekeeping, recalls its requests in resolution 2378 (2017) and resolution 2436 (2018) that the Secretary-General ensures that performance data related to the effectiveness of peacekeeping operations is used to improve mission operations, including decisions such as those regarding deployment, remediation, repatriation and incentives, reaffirms its support for the development of a comprehensive and integrated performance policy framework that identifies clear standards of performance for evaluating all United Nations civilian and uniformed personnel working in and supporting peacekeeping operations that facilitates effective and full implementation of mandates, and includes comprehensive and objective methodologies based on clear and well-defined benchmarks to ensure accountability for underperformance and incentives and recognition for outstanding performance, and calls on him to apply it to UNAC, in particular by investigating and taking action on underperformance, to include the rotation, repatriation, replacement or dismissal of any under-performing UNAC uniformed or civilian personnel, consistent with resolution 2436 (2018), and notes the efforts of the Secretary-General to develop a comprehensive performance assessment system;

31. *Requests* UNAC to consider the environmental impacts of its operations when fulfilling its mandated tasks and, in this context, to manage them as appropriate and in accordance with applicable and relevant General Assembly resolutions and United Nations rules and regulations;

32. *Requests* the Secretary-General to provide regular updates, including a formal report every 90 days to the Council on the progress in the implementation of the Kalari Peace Treaty and this resolution, including the implementation of UNAC's mandate;

33. *Decides* to remain actively seized of the matter.

Mission Concept of Operations



UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

MISSION CONCEPT

25 September 2021

References:

- A. Under Secretary General Planning Directive, dated 02 Jun 2021
- B. Strategic Assessment Report, dated 22 February 2021
- C. Report of the UN Technical Assessment Mission to Carana, 27 Jun 2021
- D. Kalari Peace Treaty (KPA), 11 August 2021
- E. United Nations Security Council Resolution S/RES/1544 (2021), 10 September 2021

INTRODUCTION

This Mission Concept defines the overall approach, priorities and sequencing of the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

The main focus of UNAC in the initial period will be the deployment and establishment of the Mission and the support of the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement.

A. CONTEXT

1. On 11 August 2021, after years of violent conflict in Carana a ceasefire agreement was established, and the Kalari Peace Agreement (KPA) was developed between the country's government and the main rebel forces – the Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) in the West and the Combattants Indépendants de Sud Carana (CISC) in the South West.
2. The KPA calls for a ceasefire, disengagement of forces, a mechanism to verify and control the ceasefire and the formation of a National Transitional Government of Carana, (NTGC). It commits to develop a new constitution within a year and subsequent elections within 6 months of

adopting the new constitution, the disarmament of rebel forces and the integration of some of their soldiers into a restructured national armed force. The NTGC replaces the largely one-party, one-ethnicity, repressive governance of President Ogavo, whose actions contributed to the start of the conflict.

3. The draft KPA has an ambitious timeline for its implementation and UNAC will not be fully operational in Carana until several months after the agreement. The success of the KPA depends on the continued political agreement between the parties and the confidence in the upcoming DDR and SSR Process. UNAC's early monitoring and observing presence, especially in the areas where parties to the conflict face each other, will reduce the risk of confrontation. Disarmament is unlikely before this time and thus subsequent events will be delayed. Holding elections within 6 months after the adoption of the new constitution presents a challenge as preconditions to do so include sufficient security throughout Carana, UNAC will advise NTGC on this issue and be prepared for postponement.

4. The ceasefire has largely been held since the KPA was signed. The forces have not significantly withdrawn, still leaving the potential for a swift return to conflict. The newly formed NTGC, while mostly united, may be struggling with its responsibilities, and will not have established full territorial control. There are areas controlled by Carana National Police, Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and state security agencies; areas controlled by MPC, areas loosely controlled but not administered by the CISC; and about a third of the country ungoverned. Internal security functions such as immigration, customs and port authority barely function.

5. The still ongoing operation to neutralize El Hasar in Katasi may push the terrorist group towards western Carana. The capabilities of FRAFOR are not sufficient to both maintain the security in Katasi and neutralize El Hasar in and across the border areas to Carana. This might have negative impact on the compliance to the KPA by MPC. Furthermore, it must be expected that the activities of CISC splinter groups, armed rebel groups, warlords, armed criminal elements and fundamentalist extremist groups will remain on the current level. However, these groups have the potential to delay or stall the implementation of the KPA.

6. Crime rates are currently at a very high level. Organized and transnational crime is evident in the narcotics and diamond trade. The suburbs of the capital, Galasi, are under the control of youth gangs. In Akkabar, there is an open conflict between miners and the police. In addition to the military conflict, there are longer-term law and order challenges. A continued security vacuum will enable organized criminal groups to become stronger and harder to tackle in the long run. Efforts to support Carana in tackling these issues need to be identified early.

7. UNAC cannot address all these issues during the initial deployment and priority must be given to maintaining political consent for the adoption of the KPA and avoiding a return to conflict and to the protection of the population in Carana.

8. The countries surrounding Carana are also part of the FU. Relations between Carana and Sumora are traditionally on a professional level. Those with Katasi have been strained. Carana has accused Katasi of supporting the MPC and these allegations have been corroborated by reports

from a number international organizations. Relations with Rimosa, which has its own civil war, are also strained with one of the rebel groups, the Elasi Liberation Front (ELF), having loose links with the CISC. In addition, the GoC and the government of Rimosa have been entangled in disputes over islands of their shared coast and oil exploitation in these territories. The UN Regional Representative is responsible for this area. His office and UNAC will need a coordinated information strategy. UNAC will be unable to focus on border issues during the initial stages of the Mission but should support the FU in planning for future engagement.

9. As result of the war and of natural disasters, living conditions in Carana have worsened dramatically. Of the roughly 17 million population of Carana, 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, especially with regard to medical support, widespread malnutrition and food insecurity, mine action and sexual- and gender-based violence. Living conditions are most dramatic for the approx. 1.1 million IDPs, 700,000 of which currently live in provisional camps in central Carana. Another unquantified refugee and IDP population, estimated at approx. 30,000 refugees and 300,000 IDPs, is currently based along the borders to Katasi and Rimosa.

10. The Leppko province has not been accessible to the humanitarian community for the past five years. The most acute challenge to master will be large return movements of IDPs and refugees, alongside DDR reintegration and members of other armed groups, as soon as the KPA measures are being adopted. UNAC will need to coordinate closely with UNCT and other humanitarian actors, and provide technical, logistical and perhaps security support to relevant actors.

B. GUIDING PRINCIPLES

11. **Consent of the Parties.** UNAC has been invited by the parties to the conflict and will work with NTGC to deliver security and stability for Carana.

12. **Impartiality.** Ensuring an impartial approach will be critical considering the deep divisions along political, religious and ethnic lines and taking into account the perception of international actors by national actors and communities. This entails even-handedly engaging with stakeholders across the political spectrum and all parties to the conflict, including spoilers, armed groups and foreign-armed elements to maintain the consent and the cooperation of the main parties, but should not be confused with neutrality or inactivity. UNAC should be impartial in their dealings with the parties to the conflict, but not neutral in the execution of their mandate.

13. Positioning of UNAC along political, religious and other fault lines from the outset will be essential by a) political positioning and messaging; b) perceived association with other international actors and ensuring clear distinction between the forces; c) the manner in which the UN implements its protection of civilians, state/institution building and human rights mandates; d) provision of support to all communities indiscriminately e) areas of civilian, police and military deployment and f) effective communication. Perceptions should be measures and tracked on a regular basis including through strengthening the Mission's analytical capacity and surveys.

14. **Non Use of Force except in Self-Defence and Defence of the Mandate.** The ROE and DUF will make it clear how the military and police components can utilize force to achieve the mandated tasks.

15. **National Ownership, inclusiveness.** Beyond the important role to be played by the Mission and other international actors, sustainable peace and stability in Carana will require the necessary national political commitment that will ensure the sustainability of all regional and international efforts to address the current crisis. As such, it is their responsibility to identify the key priorities and local initiatives that could benefit from urgent international support, while also ensuring sustainability and ownership.

16. Considering the weakness of the national institutions and the lack of legitimacy, national involvement will need to go beyond the Transitional Government and include representatives of minorities, civil society, relevant religious, community leaders, and women and youth groups. Considering the absence of a formal security and rule of law apparatus and the absence of State capacity, UNAC will have to provide substantial support in a range of areas. However, UNAC cannot replace Carana actors. Its role is to accompany and support them.

17. **Protection of civilians.** UNAC's PoC mandate is to protect civilians from physical violence inside its borders, consistent with obligations under international human rights and humanitarian law, without prejudice to the primary and sovereign responsibility of Carana. Where Carana is unable or unwilling to protect civilians, UNAC peacekeepers have a responsibility and obligation to provide such protection, within capabilities and areas of deployments.

18. The PoC mandate embodies an active duty to protect; UNAC will therefore not engage in protection only in reaction to an attack. Activities to protect civilians will be planned, deliberate and ongoing, and the mission will constantly work to analyse threats of physical violence and prevent, pre-empt or mitigate harm to civilians, including through a credible deterrent posture and the use of force in accordance with the mandate and the ROE/DUF.

19. All actions to protect civilians will have to be planned in consultation with women and men of the local community and in support of the mechanisms they have established to ensure their own protection. Bottom-up information on situations and priorities, stemming from engagement and consultations with communities, will guide the implementation of the three tiers of the PoC response.

20. Effective mandate implementation requires a focused and joint civil-military planning for all PoC actions under the three tiers, including military and police operations. PoC Operations planning and coordination fora will therefore ensure that all relevant military, police or civilian sections jointly define the required respective actions and their sequencing, to ensure a comprehensive response to imminent threats of violence on civilians.

21. In order to create the most effective working relationship between the political and humanitarian aspects of UNAC presence in CARANA under the current (security/political) situation, the integration of the humanitarian component will follow the "One foot in, one foot out"-

approach, having a combined DSRSG/RC/HC within the mission and OCHA structurally separated from mission.

22. In order of priority, UNAC will first deter and neutralize threats in villages or places of habitual residence of civilians under threat, including through the pro-active use of rapid and temporary deployments and operations. Should the mission lack the time, capacity or political space to do so, it may also provide direct physical security to civilians at risk and/or accompany and secure their flight to, more stable areas. Contingency plans must be in place to afford physical protection in areas identified for that purpose outside UN premises, including existing IDP camps. Whenever population displacement occurs, the mission will aim at creating the conditions for a safe and dignified return of those internally displaced populations, in close coordination with humanitarian partners.

23. **Other Success Factors.** Promotion of national and local ownership is key to the UN's success in Carana and is a guideline for both UNAC and the UN Country Team. UNAC is supporting NTGC both at the national and local level and must listen to their leadership and support their intent.

C. KEY ASSUMPTIONS AND RISKS

24. **Assumptions.**

- a. Continued cooperation and consent of the parties to the conflict to UNAC's deployment is granted.
- b. Sufficient access to Carana seaports and airports to enable deployment and sustainment is ensured.
- c. NTGC will be established within 30 days after signing the KPA.
- d. ELF activities in the Leppko Region will have no significant impact on the UNAC operations and the implementation of the KPA.
- e. El Hasar activities in western Carana will have no significant impact on the overall Peace Process in Carana.
- f. No further escalation in political and economic disputes between Fasian countries.
- g. The Transitional authorities, the Security Council, and the FU maintain their support for the peace development process in Carana.
- h. The national political dialogue is aimed at creating minimum national consensus around major policy issues, including the holding of the elections, strengthening the rule of law and accountability of Government services, DDR, the reconstitution of the national army, transitional justice mechanisms, SSR and the return of displaced persons.
- i. Neighbouring states remain supportive of the peace process in Carana.
- j. International donors support relief and development activities.

25. **Constraints**

- a. Initial Operational Capability has to be reached until M+120.
- b. Full Operational Capability has to be reached until M+180.
- c. Area of Operations is limited to Carana.

26. **Risks and Mitigating Action.**

- a. The parties return to the conflict before UNAC deploys and there is no peace to keep. Then, UNAC will not deploy to Carana.
- b. The parties return to conflict while UNAC is deploying. UNAC will protect UN personnel and installations and protect civilians within means and capabilities.
- c. The parties return to conflict when UNAC is already deployed. UNAC will establish buffer zones between the parties to the conflict, protect UN personnel and installations, and protect civilians within means and capabilities.
- d. UNAC may be seen as a party to the conflict by uncontrolled armed groups and associated communities and are likely to be targeted, especially at the beginning of the operation. UNAC will preventively deploy a strong Public Information department and bundle resources in community liaison. UNAC will protect UN personnel and installations and protect civilians within means and capabilities.
- e. Increased presence of elements of extremist groups. If deterrence fails, UNAC will take a robust approach towards neutralizing spoilers. UNAC civil affairs and humanitarian/development branches closely monitor the situation and develop adequate responses. UNAC police will protect civilians and deter extremist groups within means and capabilities.

D. MISSION OBJECTIVES

27. **UN Strategic Objective in Carana.** The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity, and to contribute to the protection of civilians at risk.

28. **UNAC Mission Objectives in Carana.**

- a. A sustainable and credible peace process supported by regional actors that include processes at the national and sub-national levels, to foster the implementation of the peace agreement.
- b. Security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process are restored and civilians under imminent threat are protected.

- c. Social well-being and economic prosperity are restored to a level that allows recovery without international support.
- d. Trustworthy and responsible security institutions and security forces who respect the law and order and human rights are capable and maintain security in Carana.

29. **UNAC End State.** A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic well-being so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.

E. INITIAL SRSG INTENT

30. UNAC operations will be focused on the achievement of the assigned mission objectives, the UNSCR S/RES/1544 (2021) and in accordance with the intent to:

- a. support of the transnational government of Carana in the implementation of the peace process and the creation of a DDR and SSR concept is taken up quickly and efficiently already with the initial deployment,
- b. ensure that early, visible and robust monitoring and observing posture is established especially in those areas, where the parties to the conflict have not been withdrawn,
- c. coordinate all UNAC efforts and humanitarian/development activities with the transitional government, the parties to the conflict and other organizations for mandate implementation, and
- d. conduct an information campaign in close coordination with the transitional government and all parties to the conflict in regard to the objectives of the UN Peacekeeping Mission.

F. MISSION PHASES – CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

31. The CONOPS covers the initial deployment in detail and the remaining phases in outline. There are four phases:

32. **PHASE I - Initial Deployment: (M- M+120).**

33. Priority: Early influence on KPA.

34. During the Initial Deployment Phase:

- a. UNAC will establish its HQ in GALASI in order to strengthen dialogue with NTGC, government departments and national security bodies. It will assume the chair of the Joint Ceasefire Commission (JCC) in accordance with the KPA and support the NTGC's DDR programme;
- b. UNAC will observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire;

- c. UNAC will establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties' military forces;
- d. It will protect UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;
- e. It will establish close coordination and sharing of information with the UNCT and implement a Senior Leaders Forum;
- f. The first UNAC Field Offices will be established in Alur and Corma to engage with local authorities including the leadership of MPC and CISC;
- g. After establishing a security presence in GALASI, the Military Component is to support the NTGC to ensure that the military aspects of the KPA are implemented. It is to ensure Freedom of Movement of the JLTs so that the JCC has the situational awareness to respond quickly to any threats to the KPA. A return to civil war is the greatest threat to civilians;
- h. The Military Component is to deter, pre-empt and if necessary, respond to breaches of the military aspects of the KPA, initially in areas where the parties to the conflict are in close contact and uncontrolled armed groups, warlords and terrorist groups are operating;
- i. UNAC will protect without prejudice to the efforts of the government, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment;
- j. UNAC will build on the coordination with the UN Country Team and the humanitarian agencies to continue to identify areas where UNAC may support humanitarian access and human rights assistance access including, when requested, and as a last resort, the provision of security to the delivery of humanitarian aid;
- k. UNAC Humanitarian section will ensure that ongoing efforts to supply humanitarian aid are unhampered by UNAC troop deployment and will strive to harmonize the use of infrastructure between UNAC Mission Support and the UN Country Team;
- l. UNAC development branches will coordinate Quick Impact Projects to expand infrastructure relevant to mandate implementation and to facilitate the work of the NTGC;
- m. UNAC will support the NTGC's SSR (identified in the KPA) in particular the restructuring of the police force and the formation of a new and restructured Carana military through training, capacity-building, monitoring and in-kind assistance. All of these tasks will be in cooperation with interested organisations and states;
- n. Supporting the wider implementation of the Peace Process will include assisting the NTGC to establish national authority and institutions throughout the country; assist in the preparation and conduct of national elections;

- o. Assist in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

2. **Benchmarks include:**

- Mission HQ and Field Offices established;
- UNAC leading JCC and JLTs;
- Initial military presence in likely areas of confrontation between the armed groups;
- Police presence in Galasi;
- DDR and SSR outline plans agreed.

3. **PHASE II - Full Deployment: (M+121 – M+180)**

4. Priority: Security presence throughout Carana.

5. During the Full Deployment Phase

- a. UNAC will assist in the development and implementation of a voluntary national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme for all armed parties, and to collect, store or destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme as agreed by the Kalari Peace Treaty of 11 August 2021, and in cooperation with relevant international organizations and donor nations;
- b. UNAC will assist and carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDDR programme;
- c. UNAC will support, in particular, the full deployment of UNAC human rights observers throughout the country and assist the authorities of Carana in their efforts to promote and protect human rights;
- d. UNAC will facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions to protect refugees and internally displaced persons; in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees in close coordination with humanitarian actors;
- e. UNAC will assist the new Carana transitional Government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- f. UNAC, in cooperation with UNCT, will assist local and district administrations to implement crisis early-warning systems, increase resilience against natural disasters and Explosive Remnants of War (ERWs), and provide alternatives to armed conflict through industry development, civic education and livelihood programs.

6. **Benchmarks to be reached within Phase II include:**
 - a. Military Component at 80% of authorized strength with reach throughout Carana;
 - b. Disarmament has begun; armed groups are cantoned, and 70% of CDF are in barracks;
 - c. Humanitarian access to 60% of Carana;
 - d. All main roads cleared of ERWs;
 - e. Election planning commenced;
 - f. El Hasar activities in the West contained;
 - g. Police presence re-established in 50% of the country.

7. **PHASE III - Consolidation: (M+181 – M+330)**
8. Priority: Conditions set for Elections
9. During the Consolidation Phase:
 - a. UNAC will support the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants with particular regard to the needs of child soldiers, women, and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants;
 - b. UNAC will provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, including through the deployment of Child Protection Advisors and Women Protection Advisors, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict;
 - c. UNAC will monitor, help investigate and report to the Council on any abuses or violations of human rights or violations of international humanitarian law committed throughout Carana and to contribute to efforts to prevent such violations and abuses;
 - d. UNAC will monitor, help investigate and report to the Council specifically on violations and abuses committed against children as well as violations committed against women including all forms of sexual violence in armed conflict;
 - e. UNAC will ensure an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection and monitoring activities;
 - f. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;
 - g. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners to re-establish national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning and accountable administrative structure at both the national and local levels;

- h. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in restoring proper administration of natural resources;
 - i. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in preparing for national elections to be held no later than six months after the adoption of the new constitution of Carana;
 - j. UNAC will assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions;
 - k. UNAC will provide safe passage for returning IDPs and refugees.
10. **Benchmarks to be reached within Phase III include:**
- a. Sufficient security for free elections established;
 - b. Military aspects of the KPA irreversible;
 - c. MPC and CISC fully demobilized or integrated into new National Defence and Security Forces;
 - d. FOM throughout Carana;
 - e. Humanitarian access throughout Carana;
 - f. functioning administrative offices in 80% of district capitals.
11. **PHASE IV - Capacity Building: (M+330)**
12. Priority: Carana Security Institutions are able to provide security throughout Carana. While capacity building will have begun earlier, Mission resources are now available to make this activity a main effort and implement the planning conducted earlier. Priority will be on Security Forces, as this will drive the rate of drawdown.
13. **Benchmarks include:**
- a. Successfully conducted free and democratic elections;
 - b. Viable and accountable Carana Security Forces are established.
14. **PHASE V - Mission Drawdown:**
15. Options for a Mission Reconfiguration / Drawdown should be made to the Security Council following a Strategic Review conducted under the guidance of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), in close coordination with key UN and international stakeholders

G. PRIORITIES

16. Protection of UN personnel and facilities. For the police and military components, it must be accepted that some risk must be taken in order to defend our mandate and protect civilians. This

risk must be managed through thorough understanding the operational environment, planning, preparation and coordination.

17. **Monitoring the Ceasefire and Disengagement.** This is the key activity in the KPA. Accurate and timely reporting of incidents to the Regional Joint Teams (RJT) and Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will enable early resolution. The military component must be prepared to deter, pre-empt and respond to incidents.

18. **Protection of Civilians.** At all times it is our responsibility to Protect Civilians under imminent threat within means and capabilities. In the first instance, the best way to protect civilians is to prevent a return to conflict. It is accepted that we have limited means and in Phase 1 limited presence, this requires increased situational awareness so that capabilities can be in the right place at the right time to pre-empt threats to civilians.

19. **Dialogue and Engagement.** At Mission level and in the field, we must constantly reach out to engage with government and other key actors, including the leaders of MPC, CISC, and traditional authorities. This engagement needs to be managed and coordinated so that the Mission speaks in one voice and is seen to be robust, impartial and here to help.

20. **Support to Humanitarians and Human Rights Assistance.** UNAC will reach out to humanitarian and Human Rights organisations, primarily through the DSRSG (HC) but also at Field Office level to identify how our capabilities can assist their operations. In Phase 1 we will be limited by our capacity and the need to focus on the confrontation areas but our wider deployment in Phase 2 should be influenced by the humanitarian and Human Rights priorities for access.

21. Close coordination with UNCT in order to harmonize running UN operations with mission actions.

H. CORE OUTPUTS

22. The core outputs necessary to the achievement of the Objectives are provided as annexes.

I. TASKS TO COMPONENTS

23. General. Cross pillar planning, thematic coordination and coordination with Carana authorities and the UN Country Team apply to all components so that UNAC delivers its mandate effectively. COS UNAC will detail the HQ coordination mechanisms.

24. Political Component is to advise and assist the transitional government and to support the parties to the conflict in their peace process including the reestablishment of acceptable standards of human rights and rule of law, the protection of civilians, in the rebuilding of essential governmental institutions, in strengthening the structures and institutions of the civil society, in preparing for elections, and in addressing and resolving the disputes between Carana and its neighbouring countries.

25. Development/Humanitarian Component is to advise and assist the transitional government and to support the population of Carana by coordination of humanitarian and development activities in accordance with the given mandate, in addressing the economic needs, and

rebuilding the education and public health system, and support efforts to ensure the rapid return, repatriation, reintegration and reinsertion of all displaced persons, including IDPs, refugees and demobilized fighters.

26. UNAC Military Component is to assist in the implementation and compliance of the Kalari Peace Agreement through observing and monitoring the implementation of the military provisions of the ceasefire / peace agreement, establishing liaison with the forces of all parties to the conflict, supporting the DDR process and humanitarian operations, protecting UN personnel and infrastructure, and protecting the civilian population under imminent threat of physical violence, in order to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Carana.

27. Police Component to assist the new Carana transitional government in monitoring and restructuring of the Carana Police, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a Police training programme, and to further assist in the training of Carana Police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States.

28. Mission Support Component plans, coordinates, and maintain the administration and logistics structures to deploy, operate and sustain the UN PKM in Carana, be able to support other UN entities in the field if required and within capabilities, plan, coordinate and manage the Mission Budget.

J. RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS

29. The Mission Structure, Military Resources, Police Resources and Support Concept are at Annexes B-E.

Acknowledgement.

The SRSG will acknowledge receipt of the MISSION CONOPS and the requirement to produce the MISSION OPLAN, which is to be shared with DPO and DOS for approval.

Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peace Operations
United Nations


Under-Secretary-General
Department of Operational Support
United Nations

ANNEXES

- A. UNAC Lines of Operation
- B. UNAC HQ Structure
- C. Military Resources
- D. Police Resources
- E. Timeline Peace Process

Annex A


UNAC Lines of Operation



Annex B


UNAC HQ Structure

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA HQ Structure (2.194 Posts)




In addition: Mission Field Offices at Galasi, Maroni, Amsam, Folsa, Sureen, Alur, Faron and Corma.

Annex C Military Resources




Annex D

Police Resources



Annex E

Timeline Peace Process



Peace Consolidation Plan

Towards a peaceful and prosperous Carana

UN tasks and responsibilities



Public Information Concept for

UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA

(UNAC)

New York, 25 September 2021

(Omitted - refer to the CARANA complete package)

Military Concept of Operations



MILITARY CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA

(UNAC)

25 September 2021

1. References.

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement dated 11 August 2021;
- B. Security Council Resolution 1544 dated 10 September 2021 (S/RES/1544 (2021));
- C. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations on the situation in Carana 4711 (2021). S/2021/4711, dated 27 July 2021;
- D. Strategic Guidance from USG DPO dated 02 June 2021;
- E. UNAC Mission Concept dated 25 September 2021;
- F. Strategic Assessment Report dated 22 February 2021;
- G. UNAC Rules of Engagement dated 25 September 2021;
- H. Logistics Support Concept / directive dated 25 September 2021;
- I. Police Concept of Operations (CONOPS) / Directive dated 25 September 2021;
- J. UN/DPO/DOS Policy - Authority, Command and Control in United Nations Peacekeeping dated 25 October 2019;
- K. UN/DPO/DPPA/DOS/DSS Policy – Casualty Evacuation in the Field effective 01 March 2020.

2. Review. The CONOPS should be reviewed when there is major change in a mandate or Mission Concept. It is to be drafted after the IOT revision of Mission Concept.

3. Introduction.

This Military Concept of Operations (CONOPS) for the United Nations Multidimensional Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC), hereafter called the UNAC CONOPS, provides high-level guidance to military commanders and planning officers for the deployment and employment of the military component of the Mission. This guidance provides direction for subsequent operational-level plans including military operation orders, commander directives, contingency plans and operational coordination mechanisms.

The CONOPS will be reviewed annually or as determined by the Under-Secretary-General (USG) of the Department of Peace Operations (DPO), in close cooperation with the USG of the Department of Operational Support (DOS).

The UNAC Military Component has an authorised strength of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 Liaison Officers and 300 Military Staff Officers as stipulated in UNSCR 1544 (Reference B) The detailed organisation of the UNAC Military Component is provided at Annex D.

4. **Situation:**

a. **Background:**

After gaining independence from France in 1986, and although being faced with multiple challenges, Carana experienced about 10 years of decent development and stability. Over time, however, problems resulting from the time of colonialism began to have a negative impact that led to the military taking control of the government by the end of 1991 to re-establish order.

In the period of military rule (1991 – 2003) the economic situation had deteriorated to such a degree that only a massive injection of international aid could prevent the country from falling into a humanitarian crisis. As a result of the economic situation and the discrimination of Kori and Tatsi by the government, political opposition groups and rebel movements evolved in the early 2000s and challenges to the General Tarakoni's regime became more frequent. The government suppressed most of these groups. Military and police used brutal force to suppress any attempt to challenge Tarakoni's regime.

After years of instability, and under international pressure free elections were conducted (observed by UN electoral delegates) in April 2003 and in the country's first democratic elections in many years, Jackson Ogavo, a Falin, from the Parti Démocratique de Carana (PDC) was elected President. Ogavo was re-elected for four consecutive terms (2003, 2008, 2013, 2018), though opposition to his regime began to grow in 2007 due to a lack of economic growth and increasing discrimination against Kori and Tatsi members by the ruling – and predominantly Falin – party.

In 2014 some small rebel movements in the Tereni province joined the larger and better organized rebel groups known as Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) and formed a well-structured and efficient military opposition. The MPC defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in some local battles and gained increasing support from the local population in the west. In February 2016 the FDC lost control of some areas in the western highlands. Though the MPC's military engagements were well coordinated and successfully executed, the rebels failed to formulate a comprehensive political program. The only clearly stated aim was to remove Ogavo from power Beginning 2018 the MPC gained control of the three provinces in the West (Koloni, Tereni and Mahbek).

Because of the strong commitment of the FDC in the west, small ethnic based rebel movements took their chances and attacked the government institutions in Leppko province. The uprising in the south was characterized by brutal violence against members of the ethnic group of the Falin and looting rebels. Some of these small rebel groups united and called themselves Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CICS).

A combination of war-weariness and strategic manoeuvring led the leaders of both the MPC and CISC, as well as President Ogavo, to start negotiating a cease-fire and peace treaty in September 2019.

b. **Current Situation (Political, Security and Humanitarian).**

After signing the Kalari Peace Agreement on 11 August 2021 all parties complied on a medium level of compliance. To ensure the compliance to the existing Peace Agreement the parties to the conflict invited the United Nation to support their efforts to implement the signed Peace Agreement. Even, the parties seem to be trustworthy, local skirmishes and conflicts still occur on a regular basis.

There is also an increase of armed rebel groups, warlords and fundamentalist / extremist groups as well-armed criminal elements that have the potential to delay/stall the implementation of the peace agreement and might see the UN as a lucrative target, including groups operating cross border.

The Katasi based El Hasar terrorist group infiltrating the west of Carana to avoid the French COIN operations in Katasi and exploiting local communities for logistics and supply. The NTGC signed an MOU with the French Forces requested by the Katasi government to address the threat posed by the terrorist group, allowing the French Forces to pursue El Hasar across the border into Tereni and Koloni regions in West Carana.

Illegal militia groups under the command of warlords are conducting illegal exploitation and trade of diamonds in central Leppko.

In addition, the political dispute between Rimoso and Carana over the ownership of some of the islands along the southern coastline of Carana, as well as over related fishing rights in the respective national territory, is threatening the already very fragile situation in Carana.

in the last six months, an estimated 12,000 people and a total of up to 200,000 people were forced to flee their homes because of the fighting between government forces and rebels in the North and the South. Due to the tensions, access of the humanitarian community is limited.

c. **Threat Assessment.** See Appendix 1 (not included)

d. **Mission Uniformed Component.**

The UNAC Military Component has an authorised strength of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 Liaison Officer and 300 military staff officers as stipulated in UNSCR 1544 (Reference B) The detailed organisation of the UNAC Military Component is provided at Annex D.

e. **Non-UN Actors / Relevant Stakeholders.**

The main stakeholders outside UN are the FDC, MPC and CISC. It is crucial to establish a strong liaison to these parties. The current amount of civilian personnel of IOs and NGOs has to be determined after the deployment of own forces.

5. Strategic Framework:

a. **Mandate.**

UN will assist the transitional government and the signatories to the peace agreement in all aspects of rebuilding governmental functions, revitalizing the economy, restructuring the security sector and preparing free elections. UNAC will observe that all signing parties keep the “Kalari Peace Treaty” and will provide security throughout Carana.

UNAC will also assist the national DDR program and the establishment of new national army, the Forces de la Défense et Sécurité du Carana (FDSC), in the strength of not more than 22,000 soldiers with up to 4,000 being drawn from former MPC combatants and 1,500 drawn from former CISC combatants, with assistance of the UN.

b. **Mission End State.**

A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic well-being so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.

c. **UN Strategic Objectives.**

The objective of the United Nations is to contribute to the creation of an environment conducive to national reconciliation, lasting peace and stability in a united Carana, where human rights are respected, the protection of all citizens is assured and in which internally displaced persons and refugees can return home in safety and dignity.

d. **UNAC Mission Objectives in Carana.**

- A sustainable and credible peace process supported by regional actors that include processes at the national and sub-national levels, to foster the implementation of the peace agreement.

- Security and stabilization, through integrated efforts, in key areas critical to the peace process are restored and civilians under imminent threat are protected.
- Social well-being and economic prosperity are restored to a level that allows recovery without international support.
- Trustworthy and responsible security institutions and security forces who respect the law and order and human rights are capable and maintain security in Carana.

e. **UNAC End State.**

A unified and peaceful Carana in its current boundaries, with a democratically elected government in which all ethnic groups of the country are represented and accountable security forces able to protect all its citizens, on a level of economic well-being so that nobody suffers from basic needs, with a functioning civil society and situation in which human rights, gender perspectives and the rights of the vulnerable people are respected.

6. **Planning Parameters:**

- a. **Areas of Interest.** The Area of Operations (AO) is determined by the territory of the the Republic of Carana.
- b. **Area of Operations.** The Area of Interest (AI) includes the territories of the neighbouring countries.
- c. **Assumptions.**
 1. The signatories of the Kalari Peace Agreement will stay committed to the agreement and will provide continued cooperation and support to UNAC, including sufficient access to Carana seaports and airports in Carana.
 2. The Transitional authorities, the Security Council, and the FU maintain their support for the peace development process in Carana.
 3. Neighbouring states remain supportive of the peace process in Carana.
 4. There will be no further escalation in political and economic disputes between Fasian countries.
 5. International donors support relief and development activities.
 6. ELF activities in the Leppko Region as well as El Hasar activities in western Carana will have no significant impact on the overall Peace Process in Carana.
- d. **Constraints and Restraints.**
- e. **Risks.**

7. **Military Component's mission:**

- a) **UNAC Military Component** is to assist in the implementation and compliance of the Kalari Peace Agreement through observing and monitoring the implementation of the military provisions of the ceasefire/peace agreement, establishing liaison with the forces of all parties to the conflict, supporting the DDR process and humanitarian operations, protecting UN personnel and infrastructure, and protecting the civilian population under imminent threat of physical violence, in order to contribute to a safe and secure environment in Carana.
- b) **Military End State.** A safe and secure environment is ensured by well-trained and well-equipped national security forces.

8. **Execution:**

- a. **Statement of Force Requirements (SFR).** See Annex B
- b. **Task Organization of the Military Component.** See Annex D

Force HQ. FHQ staff will deploy to Galasi after completing induction training by M+45 and should be operational by M+60. Main tasks include:

- Establish a liaison to key elements of the parties within the area of operation by M+60,
- Collect and analyse all information provided by the parties and other sources,
- Continue to finalize plans on the basis of detailed reconnaissance, to facilitate TCC reconnaissance and to prepare the reception of contingents,
- Co-ordinate UN activities with all other Mission Components.

Reserve / Quick Reaction Force (QRF). An Infantry Battalion will be allocated as a reserve/quick reaction force to be employed/deployed as additional deterrence and to allow the FC to strengthen the sector troops in case of requirements / predicted threats. The Reserve will deploy to Galasi by M + 90, will be prepared to react on short notice to crisis situations throughout the mission area, will be prepared to reinforce temporarily in all sectors.

Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance Unit (ISR).

ISR units will be deployed to Sectors II and III linking battlefield functions together to assist a UN military force in employing its sensors and obtaining and managing the information critical information a part of the Peacekeeping-Intelligence cycle on behalf of the commander, improving the commander's decision-making through enhanced situational awareness. It provides early warning of threats as well as enable UN forces to increase effectiveness and coordination.

Sectors I – III. The Sectors HQs will be established by M+90 and will deploy the battalion elements through the respective sectors as laid out in the deployment map in the document. The main tasks are:

- To monitor and verify positions, strength and movement of the forces of all parties (current and planned) within the sector,

- To protect UN facilities and key infrastructure as soon as possible,
- To protect Civilians within means and capabilities in Areas of Deployment
- To monitor and report the overall security situation in the Sectors.

c. **Scheme of Manoeuvre.**

The forces will operate from Battalion camps and conduct patrols in platoon and company size. If necessary, they will establish temporary presence in hot spots or along the road Galasi-Akkabar and set up checkpoints. By visible presence, public information and proactive action they will deter and if deterrence fails, neutralize spoiler to the KPA, protect civilians under imminent threat, protect the UN operations and installations and maintain the security in the area.

In each of the three Sectors one Team Site will be co-located with the Sector HQ. The location of all other Team Sites will be determined by the location of the potential monitoring objects. Because of still existing limitations for detailed reconnaissance process and the still developing situation, the location of Team Sites will remain subject to adjustments.

It is intended to conduct the majority of patrols, inspections and investigations through day patrols from the team sites. Monitoring in remote locations away from Team Sites will be covered through the establishment of smaller, temporary team sites and airmobile patrols. Each COG must have the capability to detach one temporary Team Site. The COG fulfils its tasks by establishing liaison to the parties, establishing contacts to the population, conducting patrols, inspections and investigations.

The Team Site Commander determines on the basis of his assigned tasks and the assessment of the situation, the tasks of the Observer Teams, the composition of the patrols and the measures of protection. The representatives of the parties will always participate in joint patrols on their request.

Additional objects of monitoring and reporting, also pending on the requirements expressed by the mission and civilian actors, might be the overall security situation, such as regular crime or the consequences of return of IDPs and refugees, the activities of militias and uncontrolled armed groups and the DDR process.

Observer Teams and protection forces must be seen as different operational elements, which should be used combined to build an operational entity and to achieve a common operational aim. Thereby the role and task of protection elements can vary in a wide range. If the security situation does not require protection, the UNMOs will operate without being accompanied by protection forces. If the security situation requires protection, protection forces in sufficient strength will accompany the UNMOs. Elements of the protection force can be also used to deter uncontrolled armed groups by visible presence of protection forces.

The Force Headquarters will be collocated with the Mission Headquarters in Galasi. All military personnel and units are under the command of the UNAC Force Commander (FC).

The Mission HQ plan and conduct operations and assign the priorities. Force elements, which will be utilized will be under the direct operational command of the FC.

Enabling assets which will be utilized as mission assets, will remain under the operational command of the FC but will be under tasking authority of the Director Mission Support (DMS) for the conduct of routine tasks. A number of units will be deployed to the three sectors and will be under tactical command of the sector commander (SC), as delegated by the FC.

d. **Phases.**

Phase I – Initial Deployment: (M – M+90)

UNAC will see the deployment of its HQ, main logistic Base, Aviation Forces, and 3 Sector HQs with assigned contingents, through sea and airport points of entry at GALASI, CERINI, MALDOSA and CORMA. Other organizations will also deploy, and the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will establish Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) down to provincial level throughout the Country.

Each UNAC sector will deploy all assigned forces to monitor the cease fire within boundary, establish Humanitarian corridors and establish liaison with all parties and related agencies. Force security will be maintained throughout by securing permanent locations and maintaining Quick Reaction Forces at Mission and Sector levels. An active public information campaign will be implemented down to contingent level during this phase.

Phase II – Full deployment: (M+90 – M+180)

Military Component will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations in direct and indirect support to:

- Return of refugees and deportees;
- Establish cantonments and conduct DDR activities;
- Security operations in support of electoral process;
- Facilitate creation of the Country Legal structure.

Phase III – Consolidation: (M+180 – M+330)

Military Component will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations focusing on:

- the conduct of elections;
- the formation of the National Army and, as required, the National Police Force;
- contingent rotations;
- monitor and report of HR violations.

Phase IV – Capacity Building: (M+330 – TBD)

Phase V – Mission Drawdown: (omitted)

- e. **Rules of Engagement (ROE):** see Annex G.

9. **Logistics:**

- a. **Support Concept.** See UNAC Mission Support Concept (*refer to Complete Package*)
- b. Enabling Units.

Aviation

In each sector and at the FHQ an aviation unit is attached. Air operations must be coordinated by UNMIC Air Operations (AirOps) cell. The Aviation Unit needs to operate permanently in each Sector. Each Sector/team site will have military aviation operational 24 hour per day, 7 days per week, providing 40 flying hour per month per air asset.

Transport Coy

The Companies are to provide medium transport for movement of cargo, fuel, water and personnel beyond the self-sufficiency of deployed military units and to provide limited support to other components within a multi-role mission as requested.

Multi-Role Construction Engineers

The Chief Engineer, through the Chief of Staff, will centrally coordinate the construction engineering. Construction engineer companies will give priority of effort to reconstruction of main supply routes, keeping main supply routes open, supporting the establishment of contingent camps and installations.

The locations of specific tasks will generally align with the local sector and can be outside of the sector.

Demining Coy

De-mining will be centrally co-ordinated by UNMAS, through the Office of the DSRSG. De-mining undertaken by military units will be in support of the force; however, the units need to be qualified to undertake humanitarian de-mining tasks if considered as a mission priority.

Military Transport Unit

Military Transport Units, with a limited force protection capability (corresponding to existing threat levels, will be deployed in each Sector to provide medium lift transport support capability for UNAC.

Military Logistics Unit

Military Logistics Units (MLUs) will be deployed in each sector to provide transportation, supply, maintenance and self-sustainment capabilities to UNAC. These may include movement/transportation, receipt, warehousing and distribution of goods and material, managing petroleum, oil and lubricants, fuel management and aviation fuel handling.

Once UNAC has set full logistics civilian capabilities the requirement for MLUs might be re-evaluated.

Signal Unit

The signal units will operate and monitor UN Communications infrastructure (mission backbone network) under guidance and in close cooperation with the Mission Support. Elements of unit will be located throughout the mission area. The unit will deploy without COE and will be catered for by UNAC.

Military Medical hospitals

The military medical hospitals will provide and ensure medical services and treatment for all military personnel. Each Sector will have a Level II capability (the Level III capability in Galasi serves as Level II hospital for Sector Central. The hospitals are open to all UN personnel in case of emergency. Director Mission Support will establish policies and procedures in cooperation with the FC.

10. Administrative Issues:

- a. **Human Rights.** in accordance with UN Policy - Human Rights Due Diligence, dated 2013
- b. **Sexual Exploitation and Abuse (SEA).** Any misconduct will be investigated according to our zero-tolerance policy. Offenders will be repatriated by the respective TCC.
- c. **Conduct and Discipline.** Has to be defined by the TCCs. The general guideline for the mission will be published before the deployment. An awareness training will be part of the in processing.
- d. **Performance of Military Personnel and Units.** TCC are responsible for the physical and mental readiness of their soldiers in order to achieve military tasks.

11. Command, Control and Coordination:

- a. **C2.** The FC reports directly to the SRSG exercises "UN Operational Command and Control (OPCON) over all military personnel in the Mission. The FC maintains a technical reporting and communications link with the DPO Military Advisor (MILAD) in the UN Headquarters (UNHQ). The FC is to establish and maintain a military operational chain of command for all military personnel in the Mission. The FC may delegate authority to act on his or her behalf through the chain of command. The FC will ensure that the military operational chain of command is maintained and that military reporting responsibility to the SRSG continues in the event of the FC's absence from the Mission or during any short-term incapacitation.

Military enablers and military combat helicopters will be under OPCON of the FC. The DMS/CMS exercises tasking authority over all assigned uniformed logistics personnel and enabling units comprising medical, signal, logistics, construction engineering (except

combat field engineers), transportation and movement units including military transport helicopters within the peacekeeping Mission).

The Sector Commanders report directly to the FC. The FC may delegate "UN Tactical Command and Control (TACON) to Sector Commanders, limited to the detailed and usually local direction and control of movements and activities necessary to accomplish the assigned tasks.

- b. Civil-Military Interaction.** All components within UNAC are to support the integrated UN approach to information gathering, monitoring, verification, early warning and dissemination of information to ensure that decisions are based on sound advice and that actions are positive, pro-active and efficient.
- c. Reporting Procedures.** Attention is drawn to the SOP Integrated Reporting from DPO-Led Field Missions to UNHQ reference 2019.10 SOP Integrated Reporting from Peacekeeping Operations to UNHQ.
- d. Harm Mitigation.** All members of the mission respect IHL and ensure all possible steps to mitigate risks of civilian casualties. Accurate intelligence is critical for the protection of civilians. Intelligence enables situational understanding of the civilian vulnerabilities and threats, and it is important to comprehend how these are viewed from the population's perspective. Intelligence activities and the protection of civilians are mutually reinforcing; civilians will provide information more freely when they can do so safely and if it enhances their security. In turn, accurate intelligence should drive operations that improve the protection of civilians and make the population more secure.
- e. Training.** TBD

12. **Acknowledgement:** The Force commander will acknowledge receipt of the CONOPS and the requirement to produce the Force OPORD, which is to be shared with DPO/OMA for approval.

Under-Secretary-General
Department of Peace Operations
United Nations

Military Adviser
Department of Peace Operations
United Nations

Annexes:

- A. Threat Assessment (*not included*)
- B. Statement of Force Requirements
- C. Statement of Unit Requirements (*not included*)
- D. Mission Map and Task Organization
- E. UNAC Military Lines of Operation


Annex B
Statement of Force Requirements

| Unit Type | Number of Units | Unit Size | Total Troops | Remarks |
|--------------------------------|-----------------|-----------|---------------|--|
| Force Headquarters | 1 | 195 | 195 | Military Staff Officers |
| Brigade HQ, Sector HQ | 3 | 35 | 105 | Military Staff Officers |
| UN Military Experts on Mission | 225 | | 225 | 185 Military Observer 36 Liaison Officer 4 Liaison Officer to FRAFOR |
| FHQ Company | 1 | 150 | 150 | |
| Infantry Battalion | 10 | 850 | 8.500 | |
| Infantry Battalion QRF | 1 | 850 | 850 | |
| Infantry Company QRF | 3 | 150 | 450 | |
| Engineer Company | 3 | 275 | 825 | |
| Aviation Unit | 3 | 160 | 480 | |
| Level 3 Hospital | 1 | 120 | 120 | |
| Level 2 Hospital | 2 | 70 | 140 | |
| Military Police Company | 1 | 70 | 70 | |
| Military Police Platoon | 3 | 25 | 75 | |
| Signal Unit | 4 | 120 | 480 | |
| Demining Unit | 1 | 130 | 130 | Detached to the FHQ |
| ISR Unit | 2 | 200 | 400 | |
| Logistic Company | 3 | 80 | 240 | |
| Transport company | 3 | 125 | 375 | |
| Total | | | 13.840 | |


Annex D

Mission Map and Task Organization

Deployment Map




Military Observers/Liaison Officers



Task Organization


| Force HQ | | Sector I | | Sector II | | Sector III | |
|----------|-------------------|----------|--------|-----------|-------|------------|-------|
| | Galasi | | Galasi | | Alur | | Corma |
| | Galasi QRF | | Galasi | | Alur | | Corma |
| | Galasi Level 3 | | Galasi | | Alur | | Corma |
| | Galasi | | Galasi | | Alur | | Corma |
| | Galasi | | Galasi | | Alur | | Corma |
| | Galasi | | Galasi | | Alur | | Corma |
| | Galasi | | Galasi | | Alur | | Corma |
| | | | Galasi | | Alur | | Corma |
| | | | Maroni | | Alur | | Corma |
| | | | Folsa | | Alur | | Corma |
| | | | | | Alur | | Corma |
| | | | | | Alur | | Corma |
| | | | | | Alur | | Lora |
| | | | | | Faron | | Muka |
| | | | | | Sreen | | Kika |

Areas of Deployment – Tasks



Annex E

UNAC Military Lines of Operations





Police Concept of Operations

POLICE CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

25 September 2021

(Omitted - refer to the CARANA complete package)

Mission Support Concept of Operations



MISSION SUPPORT CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS FOR UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)

25 September 2021

(Omitted - refer to the CARANA complete package)

**RULES OF ENGAGEMENT (ROE)
FOR
THE MILITARY COMPONENT
OF THE
UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE MISSION IN CARANA
(UNAC)**



**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS
OFFICE OF MILITARY AFFAIRS
MILITARY PLANNING SERVICE**

25 SEPTEMBER 2021

INTRODUCTION

This document, including all of its Annexes (A–D), constitutes the entire Rules of Engagement (ROE) for the United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC).

This document provides authority for the use of force and explains policy, principles, procedures and responsibilities relating to the use of force.

These ROEs are directions to operational commanders, which delineate the parameters within which military personnel of national contingents assigned to UNAC's military component may use force in the Carana. They are founded on Security Council resolution. Where issued as prohibitions, they are orders not to take specific actions. Where issued as permissions, they are the authority for commanders to take certain specific actions if they are judged necessary to achieve the aim of the Mission.

While remaining predominantly defensive in nature, the ROE also allows for proactive action in order to ensure the implementation of the tasks assigned to UNAC's military component.

In addition to the main document, the key elements are attached as follows:

- a. Annex A. Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC.
- b. Annex B. Definitions and Amplifications.
- c. Annex C. Supporting Directions and Procedures, including those for challenging, warning shots, search and apprehension.
- d. Annex D. Aide-Mémoire.

AUTHORITY

The powers and authority of UNAC derive from Security Council resolution on UNAC S/RES/1544/2021, dated 10 September 2021. They must be exercised in a manner consistent with UNAC's Mandate.

MISSION

Relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions that set out the circumstances in which force may be used by UNAC to implement its mandate are set out in Annex A – “Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC.”

EXECUTION OF ROE

Principles

- a. General
 - (1) The conduct of military operations is controlled by the provisions of international law.
 - (2) UNAC military personnel must operate within the framework of this document, which has been formulated in accordance with the parameters set out in Security Council resolution.
 - (3) UNAC ROE provide direction to commanders at all levels, governing the use of

force within the Mission Area. They define the degree of force that may be used and the manner in which it may be applied. They are designed to ensure that the application of force is controlled and legal. The ROE informs commanders of the constraints imposed and the degrees of freedom they have in the course of carrying out their mission.

- (4) The ROE are to be translated in a clear and concise way into the language(s) of each participating nationality. Throughout the conduct of military operations, where force is to be used, UNAC military personnel must comply with the international legal principles of proportionality, the minimum use of force and the requirement to avoid, and in any to event minimize, collateral damage.
- (5) While the ROE may restrict the manoeuvre and operation of specific weapons systems, they do not:
 - a. Describe specific doctrine, tactics and procedures.
 - b. Address safety-related restrictions.

b. International Law, including Law of Armed Conflict.

UNAC military personnel are required to comply with International Law, including the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), and to apply the ROE in accordance with those laws, as and when applicable. Fundamental principles and rules of international humanitarian law applicable to United Nations forces that are actively engaged as combatants in situations of armed conflict are contained in Secretary-General's Bulletin "Observance by United Nations forces of international humanitarian law" (ST/SGB/1999/13).

c. Self-Defence

- (1) Nothing in these ROEs negates a Commander's right and obligation to take all necessary and appropriate action for self-defence. All personnel may exercise the inherent right of self-defence.
- (2) Pre-emptive self-defence against an anticipated attack must be supported by credible evidence or information that justifies a reasonable belief that hostile units or persons are about to attack.
- (3) Self-defence against a hostile force(s) may be exercised by individuals or by individual units that are under attack or about to be attacked, as well as by other UN forces that are able to assist those individuals or individual units.

d. Military Necessity.

The principle of military necessity authorizes the use of only that force which is required to accomplish the authorized objective. Military necessity does not and cannot authorize acts that are otherwise prohibited under international law, including the law of armed conflict.

e. Alternatives to the Use of Force.

Whenever the operational situation permits, every reasonable effort must be made to resolve

a potentially hostile confrontation by means other than the use of force (e.g. through negotiations or assistance from the local authorities). This principle does not apply where UNAC armed units are engaged in offensive operations in accordance with these ROEs.

f. Duty to Challenge and Warn.

Before resorting to the use of force, every reasonable step must be taken to deter a party(s) or person from committing a hostile act. The procedure required by the UN to challenge and warn is given in Annex C. This does not apply where UNAC armed units are engaged in offensive operations in accordance with these ROEs.

g. Duty to Identify Target - Observe Fire.

Positive identification of hostile forces prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited. Firing procedures are given in Annex C.

h. Duty to Use Minimum and Proportional Force.

(1) Any force used must be limited, in its intensity and duration, to that which is necessary to achieve the authorized objective. In some circumstances, the immediate use of deadly force may be necessary for this purpose.

(2) The use of force must be commensurate with the level of the threat. However, the level of force that is used may have to be higher than the level of the threat in order to avoid or minimise UN or civilian casualties or, in the case of offensive operations, to ensure that the authorised objective is achieved.

(3) Commanders should, where appropriate, consider the use of alternatives to the use of physical force, such as deception, psychological methods, negotiation and other non-lethal means, including the deployment or manoeuvre of larger forces in order to demonstrate resolve.

i. Avoidance of Collateral Damage.

When force is used, all feasible precautions are to be taken with a view to avoiding, and in any event to minimizing, collateral damage. The use of force shall cease if it becomes apparent that further use of force may be expected to cause collateral damage which would be excessive in relation to the concrete and direct military advantage anticipated.

j. Duty to Report.

Each and every confrontation resulting in a detention, or involving the use of deadly force, is to be reported through the chain of command as soon as possible, whether it results in casualties or not. More details are contained in Annex C.

k. Right to Maintain Position.

UNAC military personnel may maintain their position and equipment when confronted with a hostile act or intent. In such circumstances, they may also use necessary force, as authorised in these ROEs.

I. Use of Force beyond Self-Defence.

- (1) The use of force beyond self-defence may be applied in the circumstances set out in Annex A – “Rule 1 Use of Force” of these ROE and is subject to the conditions set out in these ROEs.
- (2) The Force Commander, or the commander to whom the authorisation has been delegated, retains direct control over the use of force in these circumstances.

Applicability

The ROE set out in this document apply to all military personnel of national contingents assigned to the military component of UNAC, as authorised by the Security Council.

Responsibility of Force Commander and Subordinate Commanders

- a. The implementation of these ROE is a command responsibility. These ROEs are addressed to the Force Commander, who is then responsible for issuing them to all subordinate commanders.
- b. The Force Commander and his/her subordinate commanders are not permitted to exceed these ROE, but may, when and as appropriate, authorise more restrictive limits on the actions of assigned forces, subject to United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) approval. A commander may issue these ROE as received from UNHQ, may add additional guidance or amplification consistent with their terms, or may incorporate them into appropriate orders or instructions.
- c. All commanders have an obligation to seek clarification if these ROEs are considered to be unclear or inappropriate for the military situation.
- d. It is the responsibility of the commanders of all National Contingents to ensure that all those under their command understand these ROE. To assist in this process, they must issue a ROE Aide-Mémoire (Blue Card), translated into the language(s) appropriate for their own contingent, to each individual under their command. This must be done before the contingent can be considered to be effective.
- e. Training in the application of these ROE is the responsibility of commanders at all levels. ROE training sessions should be conducted on a regular basis and, at a minimum, once per month and whenever UNAC military personnel, including individual replacements or reinforcements as authorised by the Security Council, are deployed into the Mission Area.

ROE Contravention.

The following procedures apply in dealing with ROE contravention:

- a. Any ROE contravention is to be reported to DPO at United Nations Headquarters (UNHQ) through the UN chain of command, by the quickest possible means.
- b. Flanking and subordinate commands should be informed, if the consequences are likely to affect them.

- c. Remedial measures, including training, should be taken in order to avoid reoccurrence.
- d. Any contravention must be subject to a formal investigation. The Force Commander is to convene a board of inquiry (BOI), which is to forward its findings to the Under-Secretary-General of Peace Operations as soon as possible.

Security Classification.

These ROEs are an exercise document for training purposes and are classified as **OPEN**.

ROE Changes.

These ROEs can only be amended or changed by or with the authority of the Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations.

**Under-Secretary-General
for Peace Operations**

Annexes

- Annex A. Authorised Numbered ROE for UNAC
- Annex B. Definitions and Amplifications
- Annex C. Supporting Directions and Procedures
- Annex D. Aide-Mémoire

Annex A

AUTHORIZED RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC

Security Council Resolution

1. The Security Council, by its Resolution 1544 (2021) decided to establish a United Nations Assistance Mission Carana (UNAC). The successful completion of the UNAC mission will result in Carana achieving peace and security.
2. The Security Council thereupon decided to establish by its Resolution 1544 (2021), a United Nations Assistance Mission in Carana (UNAC) which is mandated to establish UNAC, for a period of 12 months. It further decides that UNAC will consist of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 military staff officers, up to 1,885 civilian police officers including formed units, and the appropriate civilian component to assist Carana in the implementation of the Kalari Peace Agreement.
3. The UN Security Council by its Resolution 1544 (2021) approved the appointment by the Secretary-General of his Special Representative for Carana to direct the operations of UNAC and coordinate all United Nations activities in Carana.

UNAC Mandate

4. Under the provisions of Security Council Resolution 1544 (2021), the UNAC mandate consists of the following elements:
 - a. Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and peace process,
 - b. Support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration
 - c. Protection of civilians and United Nations Personnel, Facilities and Civilians,
 - d. Promotion and protection of human rights,
 - e. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance.
 - f. Support for Security reform.
5. Support for Implementation of the Ceasefire Agreement and peace process
 - (1) To observe and monitor the implementation of the ceasefire agreement and investigate violations of the ceasefire; and to establish and maintain continuous liaison with the field headquarters of all parties' military forces;
 - (2) To assist the new transitional Government in conjunction with other international partners to re-establish national authority throughout the country, including the establishment of a functioning administrative structure at both the national and local levels;
 - (3) To assist the new transitional Government in restoring proper administration of natural resources, in preparing for national elections to be held no later than mid-2023; and in developing a strategy to consolidate governmental institutions, including a national legal framework and judicial and correctional institutions.

6. Support for Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration

- (1) To assist in the development and implementation of a voluntary national disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programme for all armed parties, and to collect, store or destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme as in cooperation with relevant international organizations and donor nations;
- (2) To support the reintegration and rehabilitation of former combatants with particular regard to the needs of child soldiers, women, and addressing the inclusion of non-Carana combatants; and to assist and carry out voluntary disarmament and to collect and destroy weapons and ammunition as part of an organized DDR programme.

7. Protection of civilians and United Nations Personnel, Facilities and Civilians

- (1) To protect without prejudice to the efforts of the government, civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, as well as UN personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, and ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations and associated personnel;
- (2) To provide specific protection for women and children affected by armed conflict, and address the needs of victims of sexual and gender-based violence in armed conflict.

8. Support for Humanitarian and Human Rights Assistance:

- (1) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions; through an adequate human rights presence, capacity and expertise within UNAC to carry out human rights promotion, protection, and monitoring activities;
- (2) To monitor the human rights situation, to contribute towards international efforts to protect and promote human rights in Carana, with particular attention to vulnerable groups including refugees, returning refugees and internally displaced persons, abductees, women, children and demobilized child soldiers, as well as provide human rights technical assistance as needed in close cooperation with other United Nations agencies, related organizations, government organizations and non-governmental organizations;
- (3) To facilitate the provision of humanitarian assistance, including by helping to establish the necessary security conditions to protect refugees and internally displaced persons; in accordance with humanitarian principles, and the voluntary return of internally displaced persons and refugees.

9. Support for Security Sector reform:

- (1) To assist the new Carana government in monitoring and restructuring of the police force of Carana, consistent with democratic policing and international standards, to develop a civilian police training programme, and to otherwise assist in the training of civilian police in cooperation with interested organizations and interested States;
- (2) To assist the new Carana government in the formation of a new and restructured Carana military in cooperation with international organizations and interested States;

10. Acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, the Security Council, by its Resolution 1544 (2021), authorized UNAC, for the duration of its mandate, to fulfil its tasks, and decided to review this issue and all other aspects of UNAC'S mandate after 12 months.

SPECIFIC RULES OF ENGAGEMENT FOR UNAC

The following ROE have been authorized for use by UN Military Force in UNAC:

Rule 1 — Use of Force

- Rule No 1.1 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend oneself and other UN personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.2 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to defend other international personnel against a hostile act or a hostile intent, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.3 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist armed attempts to abduct or detain oneself and other UN personnel, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.4 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to resist armed attempts to abduct or detain other international personnel is authorized.
- Rule No 1.5 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect United Nations installations, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.6 Use of force, up to and including deadly force, to protect key installations, areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander, against a hostile act is authorized.
- Rule No 1.8 Use of force up to and including deadly force, in order to protect civilians under immediate threat of physical violence, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.9 Use of force (not including the use of deadly force) to prevent the escape of any apprehended or detained person, pending hand-over to appropriate civilian authorities, is authorized. In case of necessity to act in self-defence, use of force, up to and including deadly force, is authorized.
- Rule No 1.10 Use of force, up to and including deadly force is authorized:
- a. In order to protect the security of UNAC personnel; and
 - b. Against any individual and/or group, who limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of UNAC personnel.
- Rule No 1.11 Use of force up to and including deadly force, to resist armed/forceful attempts to prevent UNAC personnel from discharging their duties is authorized.

Rule 2 — Use of Weapon Systems

- Rule No 2.1 Use of explosives in order to destroy weapons, ammunition, mines and unexploded ordnance, in the course of the disarmament exercise, is authorized.
- Rule No 2.2 Indiscriminate pointing of weapons in the direction of any person is prohibited.
- Rule No 2.3 Firing of weapons other than for organized training and as authorized in these ROE, is prohibited.
- Rule No 2.4 Firing of warning shots is authorized.
- Rule No 2.5 Use of riot control equipment and agents is authorized.
- Rule No 2.6 Use of lasers for survey, range finding and targeting is authorized.
- Rule No 2.7 Use of Grenades and Grenade 40 mm HE is authorized only when necessary for immediate self-defence or the immediate defence of others authorized to be defended under these ROE against a hostile act or demonstration of hostile intent.

Rule 3 — Authority to Carry Weapons

- Rule No 3.1 Carriage of loaded personal weapons is authorized.
- Rule No 3.2 Overt carriage by individuals of hand-held support weapons such as machine guns, light mortars and handheld anti-tank weapons, is authorized.
- Rule No 3.3 Deployment and carriage of weapons on or in vehicles, aircraft and vessels is authorized.

Rule 4 — Authority to Detain, Search and Disarm

- Rule No 4.1 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against oneself, one's unit or UN personnel is authorized.
- Rule No 4.2 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate a hostile intent against other international personnel is authorized.
- Rule No 4.3 Detention of individuals or groups who commit a hostile act or demonstrate hostile intent against any civilian, or against installations and areas or goods designated by the SRSG in consultation with the Force Commander is authorized.
- Rule No 4.4 Searching of detained persons for weapons, ammunition and explosives, is authorized.
- Rule No 4.5 Disarming of armed individuals or groups, when so directed by the Force Commander, is authorized.
- Rule No 4.6 In the absence of police authority, warning and questioning of persons is authorized if those persons are known to be obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission, or are believed, on reasonable grounds to be so doing.

Rule No 4.7 In the absence of police authority, detention and search of persons is authorized if those persons are known to be obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission or are believed on reasonable grounds to be so doing.

Rule 5 — Reaction to Civil Action or Unrest

Rule No 5.1 In the absence of police authority, detention of any person who commits or threatens to commit a crime, is authorized.

Rule No 5.2 In the absence of police authority, warning and questioning of suspicious person or persons obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission are authorized.

Rule No 5.3 In the absence of police authority, detention and search of suspicious person or persons obstructing or otherwise interfering with the UNAC mission are authorized.

Rule No 5.4 In the absence of police authority, security operations such as roadblocks, barriers, cordon and search and prohibition of entry, which may disrupt the normal pattern of civilian life, are permitted to the extent necessary for mission accomplishment.

Annex B

Definitions and Amplifications

DEFINITIONS

1. **Civil unrest.** The commission, perpetration or instigation of acts of violence, which affect public peace and order.
2. **Collateral Damage.** Incidental loss of civilian life, injury to civilians, or damage to civilian property not part of an authorized target.
3. **Cordon.** A deployment of UNAC personnel around an object or location with the intent to isolate an area and restrict and/or control both access and exit.
4. **Detainee:** A detainee or detained person means any person deprived of personal liberty except as a result of conviction of an offence.
5. **Force.** The use of, or threat to use, physical means to impose one's will. Such means are used by formed, armed and disciplined bodies of UNAC and generally imply the potential to use appropriate and authorized levels of violence.
 - a. **Armed Force.** The use of weapons, including firearms and bayonets. Note: Such weapons are generally designed to inflict deadly force but can also be used in a non-deadly manner.
 - b. **Deadly Force.** The level of force, which is intended, or is likely to cause, death regardless of whether death actually results. This is the ultimate degree of force.
 - c. **Non-deadly Force:** The level of force, which is neither intended nor likely to cause death, regardless of whether death actually results.
 - d. **Minimum Force.** The minimum degree of authorized force, which is necessary and reasonable in the circumstances, to achieve the objective. The minimum degree of force is applicable whenever force is used. Minimum force can be deadly force if appropriate.
 - e. **Unarmed Force.** The use of physical force, short of the use of "armed force".

NOTE: Riot control equipment and other 'non-lethal weapons' may be used as a means of unarmed force as they are designed and intended to be used so as not to inflict deadly force.
6. **Hostile Act.** An action where the intent is to cause death, serious bodily harm or destruction of designated property.
7. **Hostile Intent.** The threat of imminent and direct use of force, which is demonstrated through an action which appears to be preparatory to a hostile act. Only a reasonable belief in the hostile intent is required, before the use of force is authorized. Whether or not hostile intent is being demonstrated must be judged by the on-scene commander, on the basis of one or a combination of the following factors:

- a. The capability and preparedness of the threat.
 - b. The available evidence which indicates an intention to attack.
 - c. Historical precedent within the Mission's Area of Operations (AO).
8. **Hostile operations.** The firing or use, without the consent of the Government of Carana, of any type of weapon by members of an illegal armed group against the members, weapons systems, installations or facilities of, or positions occupied by, members of another illegal armed group, the FDC, the MPC, the CISC, or UNAC.
 9. **Illegal Armed Group.** An armed group, which does not form part of the armed forces of the parties to the Kalari Peace Agreement and which has been established, and continues to operate, in contravention of the national laws of Carana. The SRSG, in consultation with Force Commander, will prepare and maintain a list of illegal armed groups and make that list available to operational commanders through the Force Commander.
 10. **Loaded Weapon.** A weapon that has ammunition attached to it but none of the ammunition has been placed into the chamber.
 11. **Positive Identification.** Assured identification by a specific means. This can be achieved by any of the following methods: visual, electronic support measures, flight plan correlation, thermal imaging, passive acoustic analysis or Identify Friend or Foe (IFF) procedures.
 12. **Proportionality.** The amount of force which is reasonable in intensity, duration and magnitude, based on all facts known to the commander at the time, to decisively counter a hostile act or hostile intent, or to achieve an authorized objective.
 13. **Reasonable Belief.** Reasonable belief is when the Commander, or individual, logically and sensibly concludes, based on the conditions and circumstances in which he or she finds him or herself that a hostile threat exists.
 14. **Self-Defence.** Self-Defence is the use of such necessary and reasonable force, including deadly force, by an individual or unit in order to protect oneself, one's unit and all UN personnel against a hostile act or hostile intent.
 15. **Pre-emptive Self-Defence.** Action taken to pre-empt an imminent hostile act, where there is clear indication that an attack is about to be made against oneself, one's unit and UN personnel.
 16. **UN Personnel.** All members of UNAC (including locally recruited personnel whilst on duty), UN officials and experts on mission on official visits.
 17. **Other International Personnel.** Personnel belonging to international agencies associated with UNAC in the fulfilment of its mandate, and other individuals or groups formally and specifically designated by the SRSG in consultation with UN HQ, including:
 - a. Members of organisations operating with the authority of the UN Security Council (SC) or General Assembly (GA);

- b. Members of authorized charitable, humanitarian or monitoring organisations;
- c. Other individuals or groups specifically designated by the SRSG; but excluding foreign nationals such as businessmen and journalists.

Warning Shots. A warning shot is a signal demonstrating resolve, or a capability to convince persons to stop threatening actions, or as a warning and potential precursor to the actual use of deadly force. A warning shot is a shot fired at a safe point of aim with no intent to cause death, injury or severe damage.

AMPLIFICATIONS

1. **General Amplification to Rule No 1:** Rule No 1 generally allows the use of force up to and including deadly force in given circumstances. Any use of force must be graduated where possible and only the minimum force necessary to meet the threat must be used. This does not prevent the immediate use of deadly force if the threat to life is imminent and there is no alternative but to use deadly force immediately to remove that threat.
2. **Amplification to Rule No 1.5 and Rule No 1.6:** The minimum force necessary, NOT including deadly force, may be used to protect your property and property (including buildings and installations) it is your duty to protect. Deadly force, including opening fire, may ONLY be used against an individual or group who:
 - a. Attempts to damage or destroy property whose damage or destruction is likely to endanger the life of, or cause serious injury to, yourself or any other person; or
 - b. Attempts to destroy property that has been declared 'designated property' by the Force Commander; and
 - c. There is no other reasonable way to prevent the individual or group from so acting.
3. For the purposes of both **Rule No 1.5 and Rule No 1.6**, the following property has been designated by the SRSG and declared 'designated property' by the Force Commander:
 - a. UNAC aircraft and vessels, including any aircraft and vessels of Troops Contributing Countries (TCC) that are deployed to the UNAC AO for the purpose of assisting to fulfil the mandate (whether occupied or not);
 - b. Occupied v vehicles, premises and compounds (including police stations, courts, and other central and district administration buildings);
 - c. Occupied vehicles, premises and compounds of organizations and agencies who are assisting UNAC in the fulfilment of its humanitarian mandate, including United Nations specialized agencies, other international organizations, foreign government agencies and non-governmental organizations;
 - d. Carana community power stations and water reticulation and purification plants (whether occupied or not);

- e. UNAC arming and refuelling points (whether occupied or not); and UNAC and civil communication facilities essential for UNAC command and control between battalions, units and higher headquarters (whether occupied or not).
4. **Amplification to Rule No 1.9:** Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to restrict movement if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person.
5. **Amplification to Rule No 1.10:** Deadly force may only be used (as part of a graduated response where possible) where the attempt to prevent UNAC personnel from discharging their duty if successful would likely result in the loss of life or serious injury to any person. This does not prevent you from using non-deadly force to resist the individual or groups attempt to prevent you from discharging your duties. If in so doing the response from that individual or group threatens yours or any other person's life, or is likely to cause serious injury, then deadly force may be used.
6. **General Amplification to Rule No. 5:** Action taken by UNAC in relation to persons who are involved in civil actions or unrest shall only occur in the following circumstances:
 - a. While performing routine activities UNAC observe serious criminal activity; Force/Mission protection;
 - b. Providing assistance to Carana Security Agencies in accordance with agreed procedures; and
 - c. While operating in the vicinity of the tactical coordination line/ border until border normalization is achieved.

Persons who are detained are to be treated in compliance with Annex C and the Force Commander's Detention and Disarmament policy issued separately.
7. **Amplification to Hostile Intent:** Hostile intent will always be determined on a case-by-case basis and will be heavily dependent upon local conditions. Hostile intent can be demonstrated by:
 - a. Persons that carry out armed attacks against UN personnel and other international personnel or against those falling under the protection of UNAC;
 - b. Members of any military or paramilitary group or organization carrying personal weapons or manning weapon systems, whether or not they are engaged in attacks against UN personnel, other international personnel and/or those falling under the protection of UNAC;
 - c. Civilians that spontaneously take up arms against UN personnel, other international personnel or those falling under the protection of UNAC.
8. In the case of Militia or suspected Militia, at all times the determination of hostile intent shall require weapons being carried in a manner deemed ready for immediate use. When UNAC Security Force units are confronted by Militia or suspected Militia who are:
 - a. Positively recognized, and
 - b. Carrying firearms and/or grenades, and

c. Operating in a tactical manner, then such Militia or suspected Militia may be engaged on the basis that they are demonstrating hostile intent. In such circumstances the requirement to provide a warning in accordance with paragraph 6 of Annex C is not mandatory.

NOTE: '**Positively** recognized' means that a person is observed and is understood to be Militia or suspected Militia.

9. '**Operating in a tactical manner**' shall be determined on a case-by-case basis. The following examples would normally constitute operating in a tactical manner:
- a. Militia or suspected Militia patrolling in a tactical manner or military formation;
 - b. Militia or suspected Militia in an ambush position;
 - c. Militia or suspected Militia deployed or deploying at a road block(s);
 - d. Militia or suspected Militia deployed or assessed as deploying as an armed sentry, or sentries to their position.

Annex C

Supporting Directives and Procedures

GENERAL

1. **Identification.** Assured identification (positive identification) of hostile forces (groups and persons) prior to engagement is required. Unobserved indirect fire is prohibited.
2. **Civil Action.** UNAC military personnel should avoid any action which would result in the disruption of legitimate civil activities in the mission area.
3. **Prohibitions.** The following prohibitions are to be observed, even when authorized ROE are being used:
 - a. Use of certain weapons and methods of combat under the relevant instruments of international humanitarian law, including, in particular, the prohibition on the use of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gases and biological methods of warfare; bullets which explode, expand or flatten easily in the human body; and certain explosive projectiles. The use of certain conventional weapons, such as non-detectable fragments, anti-personnel mines, booby traps and incendiary weapons is prohibited.
 - b. Use of weapons or methods of warfare which may cause superfluous injury or unnecessary suffering, or which are intended, or may be expected to cause, widespread, long-term and severe damage to the natural environment.
 - c. Use of weapons or methods of combat of a nature to cause unnecessary suffering.
 - d. Attacks on monuments of art, architecture or history, archaeological sites, works of art, places of worship and museums and libraries which constitute the cultural or spiritual heritage of peoples. In its area of operation, UNAC shall not use such cultural property or their immediate surroundings for purposes which might expose them to destruction or damage. Theft, pillage, misappropriation and any act of vandalism directed against cultural property are strictly prohibited.
 - e. Use of methods of warfare to attack, destroy, remove or render useless objects indispensable to the survival of the civilian population, such as foodstuff, crops, livestock and drinking water installations and supplies.
 - f. Making installations containing dangerous forces, namely dams, dikes and nuclear electrical generating stations, the object of military operations if such operations may cause the release of dangerous forces and consequent severe losses among the civilian population.
 - g. Engaging in reprisals against objects and installations protected under this paragraph above.
 - h. Engaging in punitive use of force and retaliation.

- 4. Cordon Principles.** Cordons may only be conducted if the Force Commander determines that the situation warrants isolation of the area and that such action is consistent with the mandate of UNAC.

WARNING PROCEDURES

5. **General.** The use of armed force is normally a measure of last resort, in response to a hostile act or hostile intent. If a confrontation threatens the UNAC military personnel on the scene, the UN aim must be to dissuade the parties concerned from carrying on.
6. **Graduation.** The following graduated procedures are to be observed:
- a. **Verbal Negotiation and/or Visual Demonstration.** Every effort must be made to warn any potential or actual aggressor before UNAC military personnel respond with force. The aim is to stop hostile activity.
 - b. **Unarmed Force.** If the preceding step is unsuccessful, where possible, minimum unarmed force may be employed. If riot control equipment or other non-lethal weapons are possessed by UNAC personnel trained to use those weapons, and where they would be an effective means to bring the threat to an end before having to resort to deadly force, then they may be used if authorized by the on-scene commander.
 - c. **Charge Weapons.** An attempt should be made to make use of the visual and audible effect of charging weapons to convince any aggressor that failure to stop the aggressive activity may result in the use of deadly force.
 - d. **Warning Shots.** If the threat continues, and subject to the orders of the commander on the scene, warning shots should be fired at a safe point of aim, to avoid causing personal injury or collateral damage.
 - e. **Armed Force.** If all the preceding steps, including the use of unarmed force, are unsuccessful and there are no other choices available, the necessary armed force may be used. The decision to open fire will be made only on the order and under the control of the on-scene Commander, unless there is insufficient time. Before opening fire, a final warning is to be given as follows:
 - i. The warning may be given verbally (in English and in the local language and / or visually by a sign or by illumination (e.g. hand-held red flares, searchlights, etc.).
 - ii. You are to challenge in English:
“UNITED NATIONS, HALT OR I SHOOT”.
 - iii. This challenge will be repeated in French as follows:
“NATIONS UNIES HALTE OU JE TIRE”.
 - iv. The verbal or visual warning should be repeated as many (and at least three) times as necessary to ensure understanding or compliance.

FIRING PROCEDURES

7. **Opening Fire without Warning.** The only circumstance, under which it is permitted to open fire without attempting to follow the warning sequence, would be if an attack by an aggressor comes so unexpectedly that, even a moment's delay could lead to death of, or grievous injury to oneself, UN personnel and those who are under the protection of UNAC as specified in this ROE.
8. **Procedures during Firing.** The use of firearms must be controlled, and there should be no indiscriminate firing. Automatic fire should only be used as a last resort. The following points must be kept in mind during fire:
 - a. Fire must be aimed.
 - b. Minimum rounds are to be fired to achieve the authorized objective.
 - c. All necessary precautions are to be taken to avoid collateral damage.
9. **Procedures After firing.** After any weapon firing, the following actions are to be taken:
 - a. **Medical Assistance.** All injured persons should be given first aid as soon as possible, when such aid can be given without endangering lives.
 - b. **Recording.** Details of the incident are to be recorded, including:
 - (1) Date, time and place of firing;
 - (2) Unit and personnel involved;
 - (3) The events leading up to firing;
 - (4) Why UNAC personnel opened fire;
 - (5) Who or what was fired at;
 - (6) The weapon(s) fired and the number of rounds discharged;
 - (7) The apparent results of the firing; and
 - (8) A sketch of the incident scene.
10. **Reporting.** Following an immediate report that firing has taken place, the above information and the current situation are to be reported through the UN chain of command, to the Force Commander and UN HQ (DPO), as rapidly as possible.

SEARCH AND APPREHENSION PROCEDURES

See the Force Commander's Detention and Disarmament Policy issued separately.

Annex D

AIDE-MEMOIRE

General Rules for Use of Force

1. The principles of minimum force and proportionality apply at all times. However, the level of force that is used may have to be higher than the level of the threat in order to avoid or minimize UN or civilian casualties or, in the case of offensive operations, to ensure that the authorized objective is achieved.

2. Except where engaged in offensive operations, you must make every reasonable effort, wherever possible, to control a situation through measures short of force. Your response should, if possible, be graduated and include personal contact and negotiation, voice and visual signals, radio or other electronic means of communication, manoeuvres, charging of weapons and warning shots. You may use force, unarmed or armed, only if all other means to control the situation have failed, or such means do not hold out any promise of achieving your authorized objective, for example, to protect civilians from violence.

3. You may open fire only on the order and under the control of the on-scene commander, unless there is insufficient time or opportunity for you to obtain an order from him/her.

4. Before opening fire, you must give a final warning, at least three times, in the French, local or English, language as follows:

“NATIONS UNIES, HALTE OU JE TIRE” or

“UNITED NATIONS, HALT OR I WILL FIRE”

5. You may open fire without warning only when (i) an attack is so unexpected that a moment's delay could lead to the death or serious injury of yourself, your fellow soldiers, civilians or other persons under the protection of UNAC 's military component, or (ii) if giving such a warning does not hold any promise of achieving your immediate authorized objective or (iii) you are engaged in offensive operations.

6. If you have to open fire:

- a. Fire must be aimed and controlled. Indiscriminate fire is not permitted.
- b. Automatic fire should only be used as a last resort, except (i) in the case of weapons that can fire in automatic mode only or (ii) where you are engaged in offensive operations.
- c. Take all feasible precautions to avoid, and in any event minimize, collateral damage.
- d. Except where you are engaged in offensive operations, fire no more rounds than necessary.

7. After firing:

- a. Render medical assistance.
- b. Record the details of the incident, whether or not casualties have occurred.

- c. Report those details through the chain of command without delay.
8. When in doubt, and time permits, always seek clarification from higher command.

Specific Rules for Use of Force

9. You are authorized to use force, up to and including deadly force
- a. To defend (i) yourself, (ii) other UN personnel, (iii) members of the FDC, MPC or CISC that your unit has been assigned to assist or support, (iv) individuals designated by the SRSG against (a) a hostile act or a hostile intent or (b) to resist an attempt to abduct or detain them;
 - b. To protect civilians, including humanitarian personnel and human rights defenders, under threat of physical violence from (i) members of illegal armed groups (ii) members of the FDC, MPC or CISC;*
 - c. To protect designated facilities, installations, equipment, areas or goods against a hostile act or hostile intent that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury;
 - d. Against any individual or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, limits or intends to limit the freedom of movement of (i) yourself, (ii) other UNAC personnel, (iii) members of the FDC, MPC or CISC that your unit has been assigned to assist or support;*
 - e. To prevent or put a stop to the commission by (i) members of an illegal armed group or (ii) members of the FDC, MPC or CISC of a serious crime that involves a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury to civilians;
 - f. To prevent the supply of weapons, related materiel, military advice and training and other supplies and logistic support to illegal armed groups;*
 - g. To prevent or suppress hostile activities or operations by illegal armed groups;*
 - h. To degrade or eliminate the fighting or other operational capabilities of elements of illegal armed groups that have not agreed to disband and lay down their arms;**
 - i. To prevent forcible passage by individuals or groups through a roadblock, checkpoint or cordon whose establishment has been authorized by the Sector Commander, if there is a grave threat to life or of serious bodily injury;
 - j. Against any person or group that, through the use or threat of the use of armed force, is preventing or demonstrating intent to prevent you or your unit carrying out lawful orders issued by a superior commander.

* When and where possible, seek permission from your immediate superior commander.

** These authorizations apply to you only if and when your unit is tasked with offensive operations.

UNITED NATIONS

Department of Peace Operations (DPO)



**DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR
INDIVIDUAL POLICE OFFICERS ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNITED NATIONS
ASSISSTANCE MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS
POLICE DIVISION**

25 September 2021

(Omitted - refer to the CARANA complete package)

UNITED NATIONS

Department of Peace Operations (DPO)



**DIRECTIVE ON DETENTION, SEARCHES AND USE OF FORCE FOR FORMED
POLICE UNITS ON ASSIGNMENT WITH UNITED NATIONS ASSISTANCE
MISSION IN CARANA (UNAC)**

**DEPARTMENT OF PEACE OPERATIONS
POLICE DIVISION**

25 September 2021

(Omitted - refer to the CARANA complete package)



UNAC Military OPORD

OPORD 01/2021: UNAC OP ORDER

(UN Confidential)

Copy No 01 of 40

FWD HQ UNAC

GALASI, CARANA

151030C OCT 2021

OP O 01/2021

References:

- A. Kalari Peace Agreement dated 11 August 2021.
- B. Security Council Resolution 1544 dated 10 September 2021 (S/RES/1544 (2021)).
- C. Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations on the situation in Carana 4711 (2021). S/2021/4711 dated 27 July 2021.
- D. Strategic Guidance from USG DPO dated 02 June 2021.
- E. UNAC Mission Concept dated 25 September 2021.
- F. UNAC Military concept of Operations (CONOPS) dated 25 September 2021
- G. Strategic Assessment Report dated 22 February 2021.
- H. UNAC Rules of Engagement dated 25 September 2021.

Time Z: CHARLIE

Task Organization: See Annex A

PURPOSE.

- a. This Operation Order (OpO) provides the overarching operational and tactical direction and guidance to UNAC Force headquarters and units for a period of 12 to 16 months, starting on 01 November 2021. OpO 001/2021 development and release follow the adoption of a UNSCR 1544 (2021) for UNAC (Reference B), the UNAC Mission Concept and of the development of the overall situation in Carana. It focuses on Phase 1 and 2 (Initial and full deployment) and Phase 3 (Consolidation) of the UNAC mission.
- b. The overarching tasks and objectives outlined in this Operation Order will be supplemented periodically by Force Commander's Quarterly Guidance which will continue to guide subordinates towards the Military Objectives of the Force and Mission.
- c. This OPO will be reviewed and amended if there are any significant changes in the UNAC mandate or priorities, if the UNAC Force mission is modified, if Phase 3 of the mission is achieved, or through the achievement of all objectives. Annexes to this OpO will be subject to refinement, given the expected changes in Force structure and laydown throughout the lifespan of the Order.

1. SITUATION.

- a. General. CARANA has experienced internal conflict for over ten years. Due to the lack of political and economic development as well as an increasing discrimination of Kori and Tatsi members the opposition against the government under President Ogavo grew and led to the formation of rebel groups engaging the government in armed conflict. The Mouvement Patriotique de Carana (MPC) defeated the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) in local battles and leading to the FDC loss of control in the western Carana. Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CICS) established itself in Southern Carana and engaged the FDC in the South. The conflict led to the displacement and violence against local population leading to a serious humanitarian crisis with about 700.000 iDPs needing assistance.
- b. Sustained efforts by The Fasia Union and the United Nations finally resulted in the KALARI Peace Agreement reached between the Government of Carana, MPC and the CISC. This created the conditions to form a Transitional Government, to develop a new constitution for Carana, to hold general election within 12 months of the adoption of the constitution and to establish a new CARANA National Defence and Security Forces consisting of Government forces and combatants of the Armed Political Parties and Movements.
- c. The Carana Defence Forces (CDF) and the armed components of the MPC and CISC are currently respecting the overall peace agreement. The new transitional government has been formed and plans are underway for presidential and national elections to be held in 2023. While the cease-fire is generally holding, tensions between the factions remain high

and there is a great deal of suspicion from all sides that the election might not be free or fair.

- d. Ongoing operation to neutralize El Hasar in Katasi may push the terrorist group towards western Carana. The capabilities of FRAFOR are not sufficient to both maintain the security in Katasi and neutralize El Hasar in and across the border areas to Carana.
- e. Relations with Rimosa are strained due to disputes over islands of their shared coast and oil exploitation in these territories as well as the Elasi Liberation Front (ELF) is reported crossing the border into Carana conducting armed attacks and raids on local villages along the Carana-Rimosa border.
- f. Despite some International Community Humanitarian relief attempts, the overall situation in CARANA is critical. 6.3 million are currently in need of humanitarian assistance, and living conditions are most dramatic for the approx. 1.1 million IDPs, 700,000 of which currently live in provisional camps in central Carana. Another unquantified refugee and IDP population, estimated at approx. 30,000 refugees and 300,000 IDPs, is currently based along the borders to Katasi and Rimosa. There is an urgent need to act.
- g. Political Situation. The international community has asked the United Nations to intervene with a military force. In view of this situation, the UNSC has adopted a Resolution 1544 (2021) establishing the United Nations Assistance Mission in CARANA (UNAC) for a period of 6 months and further defined that UNAC will consist of up to an authorised strength of up to 13,315 United Nations military unit personnel, up to 185 military observers, 40 liaison officers and 300 military staff officers to address the situation.
- h. Belligerent Forces. The belligerent organisations and capabilities are defined in Annex F INTSUM 01/20 200900C Oct 2021 to this OPO. There are two major belligerent groups, the FDC and the MPC. Neither side has the military strength to dominate the country to any extent. These two belligerent groups remain deployed in defensive positions but are capable of limited local offensive actions. A third armed group, the CISC, is an unstructured formation of rebels. Their capabilities are very limited and generally consist of conducting terrorist-like actions against the FDC in the **LEPPKO Province** and harassing the local population.
 - (1) FDC. The FDC has a strength of approximately 20,000 all ranks. It consists of four “area commands”, all less than brigade strength, and a small air force. The FDC is considered the official armed forces of CARANA. Its equipment has suffered from previous years of fighting and is in a poor state of maintenance.
 - (2) MPC. The MPC comprises approximately 10,000 personnel of whom approximately half have returned home and, although they have retained their weapons, are currently inactive. The remainder are organized in groups of 750 men and deployed in camps of approximately 250. They are equipped with assault rifles, light mortars and anti-tank weapons. Most of their vehicles are in a poor state of repair with shortages of spares and fuel restricting operations.

(3) CISC. The CISC consists of approximately 3,000 to 5,000 fighters with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the FDC, while others are former fighters from the civil war in Rimoso. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group are low, as is the standard of training. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

i. Friendly Forces.

(1) UNSC's Intent. The UNSC intent is to create a secure, stable, democratic and economically sound CARANA thus promoting peace, prosperity and security throughout the region.

(2) SRSB's Intent. The SRSB wants to:

(a) Support of the transnational government of Carana in the implementation of the peace process and the creation of a DDR and SSR concept quickly and efficiently already with the initial deployment;

(b) Ensure that early, visible and robust monitoring and observing posture is established especially in those areas, where the parties to the conflict have not been withdrawn;

(c) Coordinate all UNAC efforts and humanitarian/development activities with the transitional government, the parties to the conflict and other organizations for mandate implementation;

(d) Conduct an information campaign in close coordination with the transitional government and all parties to the conflict in regard to the objectives of the UN Peacekeeping;

(e) Allow the development of the conditions for the rebuilding of the country, including a general election.

(3) SRSB's Concept of Operations. In order to implement the UNSC Resolution 1544 and acting under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, UNAC is to carry out peacekeeping operations within CARANA. It is to ensure that while doing so it remains an impartial force and is perceived as such by all belligerent parties. It is to do all it can to fulfil its mandate through negotiation and mediation, having gained the consent, trust and cooperation of all the belligerent factions at all levels. Where negotiation has failed, UNAC may take the necessary action, under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, to ensure the security and freedom of movement of its personnel and, within its capabilities and areas of deployment, to afford protection to civilians under imminent threat of physical violence, taking into account the responsibilities of the Government of the Republic of CARANA.

(4) UN Components in Theatre. The UNAC is organized into five components: Political, Development/Humanitarian, Military, Police and Mission Support Components. The UNAC military force is one of the components available to the Special Representative

of the Secretary-General/ Head of Mission (SRSG/HoM) in CARANA to achieve the objectives set in the UNSC Resolution. It is a vital component as it provides overall security and adequate stability for other UN and UN components to complete their role.

- (5) UNHCR will also be present in CARANA. They are the lead agency for the refugee camps outside CARANA and so outside the UNAC mandate.
 - (6) The UNAC military forces will operate with UN-related organizations, Regional and civilian organizations, International Organizations (IO) and Non-Government Organizations (NGOs). These organizations' efforts are coordinated by the Office of Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA). In addition, the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the World Food Program (WFO), the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations International Children Emergency Fund (UNICEF) are present in CARANA.
- j. Attachments and Detachments. See UNAC Task Organization Table (Annex A) for all military forces in UNAC.

2. **MISSION.**

UNAC will implement UNSC Resolution 1544 (2021) with a view to creating conditions for a more secure and stable environment in CARANA.

3. **EXECUTION.**

- a. UNAC Force Commander's intent. The Force Commander's intent is to capitalise on the continued commitment of the belligerents to adhere to the KALARI peace agreement and to ensure that their military components do not attempt to delay its implementation. He wishes to quickly establish contacts with all parties and factions involved and develop Sector and local-level cooperation based on consensus. The quick UNAC Forces entry and deployment in CARANA and the implementation of control measures will create the conditions for the provision of Humanitarian relief and allow all the UN and UN organisations to achieve their mission and democratise the Country. At the same time, our success in providing benefits to the citizens of CARANA will secure their support to us.
- b. UNAC End State. A secure and stable environment throughout CARANA.
- c. UNAC CoG. The legitimacy of the mission is evidenced by international support and the Mandate authorised by the UN Security Council.
- d. UNAC Concept of Op. UNAC will conduct its operations along five major lines of operations. Decisive points (DP) for each line of operations are detailed in Annex C.
 - (1) Stabilize the Country.
 - (2) Secure the Country.
 - (3) Coordination with all parties involved.

- (4) Establish viable new CARANA Armed Forces.
 - (5) Obtain the support of the citizens of CARANA.
- e. To secure and stabilise the Country UNAC Forces will be deployed quickly and deal swiftly with any breach of the agreement from the signing parties. During **Phase 1**, UNAC Forces will adopt a very cooperative approach with all military factions and at the same time be ready to revert to a more aggressive posture. Special efforts will be required with those that do not follow the content of the KALARI Peace Agreement. Of particular importance during this phase, all conditions for the delivery of Humanitarian assistance must be established and maintained. This will be followed by direct and indirect military support actions aimed at securing further the environment.

The activities such as DDR will be initiated in **Phase 2** and fully supported during **Phase 3**. This will create added security and in turn facilitate the safe return of refugees and deportees. Once the desired level of security and stability are achieved, UNAC Forces will switch its main effort in support of the democratization process including the conduct of a general election and the rebuilding of the CARANA Armed Forces and Police Force.

Throughout the Mission, UNAC forces will ensure the protection of all UN components, related organisations and CARANA civilians by coordinating their actions, monitoring all faction's activities and maintaining a 24/7 capability to take appropriate actions under Chapter VII of the UN Charter as necessary. Flexibility will be ensured by a strong and very mobile Quick Reaction Force.

- (1) Phase 1 Initial Deployment. UNAC will see the deployment of its HQ, main logistic Base, Aviation Forces, and 3 Sector HQs with the first assigned contingents, through sea and airport points of entry at GALASI, CERENI, MALDOSA and CORMA. Other organisations will also be deployed, and the Joint Commission for the Ceasefire (JCC) will establish Joint Liaison Teams (JLT) down to the provincial level throughout the Country. Each UNAC sector will deploy all assigned forces to monitor the cease-fire within the boundary, establish Humanitarian corridors and establish liaison with all parties and related agencies. Force security will be maintained throughout by securing permanent locations and maintaining Quick Reaction Forces at the Mission and Sector levels. An active public information campaign will be implemented down to the contingent level during this phase.
- (2) Phase 2 Full Deployment. During the second phase, UNAC will finalize the deployment of assigned contingents in order to maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations in direct and indirect support to:
 - (a) Return of refugees and deportees;
 - (b) Establish cantonments and conduct DDR activities;
 - (c) Security operations in support of the electoral process;
 - (d) Facilitate the creation of the Country's Legal structure;

(3) Phase 3 Consolidation. In Phase 3, UNAC will maintain the established secure and stable environment and conduct operations focusing on:

- (a) the conduct of elections;
- (b) the formation of the National Army and, as required, the National Police force;
- (c) contingent rotations;
- (d) monitor and report HR violations.

(4) Phase 4 Capacity Building (omitted)

f. Grouping and tasks

(1) Grouping as per Annex A

(2) Phase 1 Tasks – SECTOR 1:

- (a) Deploy in the city of **GALASI**.
- (b) Ensure the security of all UNAC elements deployed within boundaries
- (c) Provide quick reaction forces of Coy size (QRF) at 12 hours' notice to move.
- (d) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign.

(3) Phase 1 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:

- (a) Deploy contingents assigned to Sector once entering AO.
- (b) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries.
- (c) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries.
- (d) Monitor the withdrawal of FDC, MPC and CISC from confrontation lines in cantonment areas and establish Zones of Separation (ZOS) in areas of tension.
- (e) Promote and ensure freedom of movement.
- (f) Secure the delivery of humanitarian aid and the relief of suffering.
- (g) Contact other non-signing armed factions, if any within AO, and develop local consensus to conform to the intent of the KALARI Agreement.

(4) Phase 2 and 3 Tasks - SECTOR 1:

- (a) Ensure the security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries.
- (b) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries.
- (c) Provide protection and support to the Electoral Division personnel
- (d) Provide a quick reaction force of Coy size (QRF) at 12 hours' notice to move.
- (e) Assist the Rule of Law division with escort protection as required.
- (f) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign.

(5) Phase 2 and 3 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:

- (a) Maintain AO secured 24/7.
- (b) Maintain freedom of movement throughout AO.
- (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries.
- (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries.
- (e) Provide escort protection to Electoral Division personnel when needed.
- (f) Establish Assembly Zones (AZ) and Cantonment Area (CA) for former fighters of the MPC, CISC and other armed group, if any within AO, in preparation of demobilisation.
- (g) Monitor the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the MPC, CISC and other factions.
- (h) Be at 72 hours' notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support of DDR and Human Rights activities.
- (i) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required.
- (j) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign.

(6) Phase 3 Tasks - SECTOR 1:

- (a) Ensure security of all UNAC elements deployed within Boundaries.
- (b) Promote and ensure freedom of movement within boundaries.
- (c) Provide protection and support to the Electoral Division personnel.
- (d) Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process while in the city of GALASI.
- (e) Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force.
- (f) Provide a quick reaction force of Coy size (QRF) at 24 hours' notice to move.
- (g) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign.
- (h) Assist Rule of Law division with escort protection as required.
- (i) Monitor and assist as necessary and as per capability the demobilisation and disarmament of members of the FDC, MPC, CISC and other factions.
- (j) Be ready for additional protection tasks in support of electoral process.

(7) Phase 3 Tasks - SECTORS 2 and 3:

- (a) Maintain AO secured 24/7.
- (b) Maintain freedom of movement throughout.

- (c) Protect sea and airport points of entry within boundaries.
- (d) Protect all Airport/Airfield within boundaries.
- (e) Protect electoral material delivery, collect and storage throughout the electoral process.
- (f) Monitor and assist in the training of the new CARANA Armed Forces and assist UN CIVPOL in training the new CARANA Police Force.
- (g) Be at 48 hours' notice to move to conduct cordon and search operations in support Human Rights activities.
- (h) Monitor overall Humanitarian situation and report all HR violations.
- (i) Participate in the Mission Information Campaign.

g. Coordinating Instructions.

(1) Timings.

- (a) Phase 1 to be completed as soon as possible
- (b) Phases 2 and 3 will be initiated by this HQ
- (c) DDR process to begin Aug 21 – New CARANA Armed Forces capabilities to be ready at the latest by Dec 23
- (d) Election scheduled for May 2023

(2) Boundaries. Sector AOs are assigned as per Annexes A and B

(3) Movement. All contingents' movement in and out of the Theatre will be this HQ's responsibility. Once within Sector Boundary, Sectors HQ are responsible for all UNAC troop's movement.

(4) CIMIC. All contingents CIMIC initiative will be coordinated through the CIMIC Sub-Committee of the JCC

(5) AVN SP Req. Request for Aviation Support to be forwarded 72 hours in advance to this HQ.

(6) Liaison. Sectors are to exchange LO with neighbouring formations. All liaisons with neighbouring countries will be initiated by this HQ.

(7) Coordination.

- (a) Daily Bde/Sector Report to be submitted by 16:00 to this HQ
- (b) UNAC morning coord. UNAC morning coord conference will be held at 0930hrs
- (c) DDR. Sector/Bde HQs to coordinate DDR support activities with the CARANA DDR Commission

- (d) Coordination points between Sectors/Bde as per SOP. Info this HQ when coord points are manned.
- (e) All UNAC armed forces support to Police training will be coordinated through UN CIVPOL
- (f) Direct liaison with all other components of UNAC is authorized at the Bde/Sector level

(8) Visits. All visits within Theatre will be coordinated by this HQ

4. **SERVICE SUPPORT.**

- a. Administrative Orders. Mission Administrative Order will be published as an annex to the OP Order. UNAC DMS will provide effective administrative, engineering, logistic and technical support for the operation of all components of UNAC and act as a financial 'watchdog'. Sector 1 will be supported directly from the Central admin base and Sector Regional Admin Offices will provide support in assigned AO.
- b. Each contingent support will be as per MOUs developed between UN and the contributing countries.
- c. Defensive stores. Def stores are a Mission control item. All requests are to be forwarded to this HQ. Allocation to each sector in addition to the basic load carried in theatre by contributing countries will be authorized by this HQ.
- d. All direct costs for military support to IDP and refugees will be captured and forwarded to this HQ through RAO.
- e. Medical. Formation's Med support facilities will ensure first and second-line care and first-line evacuation. The mission will provide all CASEVAC including emergency evacuation to Field Hospital, second-line care and stabilization before further evacuation. CASEVAC will be requested through the Op channel. Evacuation to the home country remains each contributing nation's responsibility.

5. **COMMAND AND SIGNALS.**

a. Command

(1) UNAC HQs:

(a) Phase 1: HQ in GALASI

(b) Phase 2 and 3: Main HQ and Alternate in GALASI

b. Communication. Code words, nicknames, passwords and Emergency Control measures.

Ack Instruction: ACK

Kinobe M.S.

Major General

Force Commander UNAC

Annexes:

Annex A: UNAC Task Organization Table by Sector

Annex B: Deployment Map

Annex C: Military Lines of Operations and Decisive Conditions

Annex D: Military Observers/Liaison Officers Deployment Map

Annex E: Known deployment locations of Belligerent Groups

Annex F: Belligerent Organizations and Capabilities

Annex G: Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces
















































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|---|------------------------|
| UNAC HQ | 1-9 |
| SECTOR 1 | 10-11 |
| SECTOR 2 | 12-13 |
| SECTOR 3 | 14-15 |
| NIGERIA HQ UNIT; ING UNIT | 16-17 |
| INDIAN SIGNAL UNIT, Level III HOSPITAL; INF BTL, TRANSPORT UNIT | 18 - 21 |
| NEPAL INF BTL/QRF | 22 |
| CAMBODIA DEMINING UNIT | 23 |
| EGYPTIAN MP UNIT, TRANSPORT UNITS | 24 -26 |
| NAMIBIA INF BTL/QRF | 27 |
| ETHIOPIA INF BTL | 28 |
| BANGLADESH INF BTL, AVN UNIT | 29 – 30 |
| CHINA ENG UNIT; LOG UNIT | 31 – 33 |
| UGANDA INF BTL | 34 |
| RWANDA INF BTL, Level II HOSPITAL | 35 - 36 |
| KENYA INF BTL | 37 |
| SOUTH AFRICAN INF BTL, ENG UNIT | 38 – 39 |
| PAKISTAN INF BTL, ENG UNIT, LEVEL II Hospital, SIG UNIT | 40 - 43 |
| GERMANY ISR UNIT, LOG UNIT | 44 – 45 |
| GHANA INF BTLs | 46 – 47 |
| SENEGAL INF BTL | 48 |
| TANZANIA INF BTL | 49 |
| UNITED KINGDOM ISR UNIT | 50 |
| ZAMBIA AVN UNIT | 51 |
| NETHERLANDS | 52 |
| PSOD | 53 -58 |
| SRCC | 58 - 60 |
| UNHCR | 61 |
| OCHA | 62 |
| SPARE | 63 - 68 |

Annex A to OP O 01/2021

HQ UNAC

15 OCT 2021

UNAC Task Organization Table by Sector


| Force HQ | | Sector I | | Sector II | | Sector III | |
|---|----------------|---|--------|---|-------|---|-------|
|  | Galasi |  | Galasi |  | Alur |  | Corma |
|  | Galasi QRF |  | Galasi |  | Alur |  | Corma |
|  | Galasi Level 3 |  | Galasi |  | Alur |  | Corma |
|  | Galasi |  | Galasi |  | Alur |  | Corma |
|  | Galasi |  | Galasi |  | Alur |  | Corma |
|  | Galasi |  | Galasi |  | Alur |  | Corma |
|  | Galasi |  | Galasi |  | Alur |  | Corma |
| | |  | Galasi |  | Alur |  | Corma |
| | |  | Maroni |  | Alur |  | Corma |
| | |  | Folsa |  | Alur |  | Corma |
| | | | |  | Alur |  | Corma |
| | | | |  | Alur |  | Corma |
| | | | |  | Alur |  | Lora |
| | | | |  | Faron |  | Muka |
| | | | |  | Sreen |  | Kika |

Annex B to OP O 01/2021

HQ UNAC

15 OCT 2021

Deployment Map




Annex C to OP O 01/2021

HQ UNAC

15 OCT 2021

Military Lines of Operations and Decisive Conditions




Annex D to OP O 01/2021

HQ UNAC

15 OCT 2021

Military Observers/Liaison Officers Deployment Map




Annex E to OP O 01/2021

HQ UNAC

15 OCT 2021

Known deployment locations of Belligerent Groups



Annex F to OP O 01/2021HQ UNAC15 OCT 2021**Belligerent Organizations and Capabilities**

1. **Introduction.** Carana is a Presidential Republic in line with the first Carana constitution adopted by a referendum in 1987. Jackson Ogavo, leader of the PDC, became the first elected president of CARANA. Initially the government was reasonably representative of the ethnic balance of the country, although still dominated by the Falin, and it followed democratic principles that were later enshrined in the 1991 constitution. During the early years some economic and social reforms were realized but over time, Ogavo's focus changed, and he became preoccupied with quietly suppressing all opposition groups and enhancing his own power base. Beginning in 2008, he expanded the influence of the central government on all economic and social activities by laws and administrative rules. The 1996 replacement of all key Kori and Tatsi government ministers with members of Ogavo's Falin tribe was followed by an increasingly repressive regime, administrative and economic inefficiency, and corruption. As in the government, the Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC) are dominated by the Falin and have become the de facto military arm of the party.

2. **Forces de la Défense du Carana (FDC).**

The FDC consists of approximately 20,000 personnel in 4 area commands and an air force, equipped with mostly a mixture of former French and Russian weapons and vehicles and a small Navy. The majority of equipment is in a poor state of repair. The most effective and best-equipped brigade, with some M3 APCs and AMX 13 tanks, is the Northern Area. The least effective and worst equipped is the Central Area. With a small number of coastal and river patrol boats, the Navy plays a specialized but insignificant role in the Defence Force. The Air Force, equipped with a squadron of armed helicopters, transport helicopters and a few light bombers has a limited striking capacity. This limited capacity allowed the government to project its power over the entire country during the conflict. However, this limited capacity was not sufficient to deliver decisive strikes against the various rebel groups. Currently, the six Alpha Jets can be assessed as non-operational. The FDC headquarters is collocated with PDC headquarters in GALASI.

For further information on the FDC, refer to the "Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) report.

3. **Movement Patriotique de Carana (MPC).**

With an eye on future elections, the leadership of MPC is currently developing its political platform and preparing for a long-term political role. Given the precedent set during the fighting in terms of its ability to coordinate activities against the government, it has the potential to become an effective political force. It enjoys broad public support in the west as it is seen

to have the ability to address the concerns and needs of the people when the government had failed. In some areas the MPC have taken over government and basic administrative functions. The MPC operates a harsh public order regime but have repeatedly indicated that they respect human rights, especially the rights of the child. As a result of broad public support, and dissatisfaction with the government, the new administrative role of the MPC is increasingly accepted by the population in the west – other elements remain compliant out of fear for the MPC.

The original assessment of The MPC strength was somewhat conservative and has been adjusted from a total of 6,000 to approximately 10,000. The MPC is assessed with a total strength of 10,000 fighters and 10,000 to 20,000 supporters. Approximately 5,000 MPC returned home last month but most have kept their weapons and remain ready to return to their formations if necessary.

The MPC is structured into groups of 750 men. Each of these groups is led by a field commander and has a local network of supporters. The groups have no internally defined military structure, but a system of sub-commanders with different numbers of fighters. The loyalty to the commanders is high and discipline is very good. The deployed elements of the MPC have established camps of up to approximately 250 from where they conduct patrols west of the separation line; while this is not in contravention of the Kalari Treaty it has the potential to act as a trigger for other action whether by mistake or by design.

The MPC is lightly armed but AK47 assault rifles, RPG7 anti-tank weapons and a variety of medium and heavy machine guns. They do not have any armoured vehicles but are extremely mobile using 'technical' - light trucks mounting machine guns or recoilless rifles.

The official HQ of MPC is in ALUR but this is more a symbolic HQ than an operational one. After the end of the fighting, the official HQ in ALUR increased in importance and became a basic administrative centre of the region. Some leaders of MPC are permanently in ALUR.

For further information on the MPC, refer to the "Technical Assessment Mission (TAM) report".

4. **Combattants Indépendants du Sud Carana (CISC).**

The CISC is an unstructured formation of rebels with diverging backgrounds. Some members are deserters from the FDC, while others are from the civil war in RIMOSA. The movement has also been successful in recruiting young men from the local population. This is mostly due to recent rebel successes along with the poor economic situation. The discipline and internal cohesion of this rebel group is low, as is the standard of training.

The CISC currently lacks the structure or organisation that would enable it to develop into an effective political body. It owes its following to frustration over poor living conditions, general dissatisfaction with the Ogavo administration and longstanding ethnic hostilities with the Falin minority in LEPPKO province.

Unlike the MPC, the ICSC has not tried to establish administrative functions and exercises control in the region only by the rule of the force. It has never made an attempt to capitalize on its potential and has probably missed the opportunity to do so in that it has never articulated any clear political objectives. It may become increasingly frustrated when it sees itself marginalised.

The public support for CISC is based mainly in the Tatsi dominated Southern region because of many acts of violence against the population. During the fighting, CISC fighters operated primarily from their villages without deploying in camps or permanent positions. After the fighting stopped, it can be assumed that most CISC rebels were living in their home villages and group only occasionally. The loose structure of CISC makes it very difficult to assess their strength and positions precisely. It can be assumed that the number of active fighters has not changed and remains in the region of 3,000 – 5,000. They are equipped with assault rifles, light machine guns and anti-tank weapons. They are notably brutal in combat and show no regard for the rights of non-combatants.

Even though CISC did not until now attack FDC positions it has relied upon the strong anti-government feelings in the south for most of its support, however, there have been recent reports of several acts of violence against ethnic minorities in the south of the area adjacent to the border with RIMOSA. It remains to be seen whether these have involved members of the CISC, in which case it would be in violation of the Kalari Peace Agreement, or whether they are the responsibility of other groups who are not signatories. Reports indicate the former although this has not been corroborated.

5. Militia/warlords

Several smaller armed groups are operating in the Northern Leppko Region mainly for economic reasons (theft, illegal exploitation of resources, ransom). The aims and loyalties of these groups are very uncertain, assumed to be loyal to their leaders (warlords) and the boundary from local militias to armed bandits is fluent.

Current information indicates that these groups consist of 300 up to 1,000 fighters with light weapons. None of these groups is signatory to the KPA.

Annex G to OP O 01/2021HQ UNAC15 OCT 2021**Foreign Military Groups/Military Forces****1. El_Hasar**

The El Hasar group was formed in the neighbouring country of Katasi and turned into a “terror organisation” requesting their own state and engaging in guerrilla type terror operations against the Katasi government. Anti-terror operations conducted by the Government of Katasi supported by the French Forces, led to El Hasar fighters/elements frequently crossing the border into Carana in the area North and South along the Kalesi River into the direction of Terpil and Herai villages in the North and towards Pukka and Maki in the South of the River, however avoiding direct engagement / confrontation with the MPC.

Local communities report of armed attacks and raids on villages, including violence against civilians such as rape, torture and other casualties.

2. Elasi Liberation Front (ELF)

The ELF was formed in the neighbouring country of Rimoso and is conducting insurgency operations against the Rimoso government. They mainly operate south of the Carana border in Rimoso, but began to challenge CISC in southern Carana and collaborate with some CISC splinter groups.

Carana communities along the border and along the road from Eres to Kika continue report of armed attacks and raids on villages, including violence against civilians like rape, torture and other casualties.

End of Document